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Abstract  
This thesis aims to bring China into comparative welfare research by using a 
historical institutionalist framework to study Chinese pension reforms (1980s-2010s). 
The study takes as its starting point the literature on welfare state development and 
change in the West and thus traces the development of Chinese pensions in 
comparative perspective. The discussion of the determinants of Chinese pension 
development concentrates on the history (path dependence, timing and sequences) as 
well as meso level institutions (veto points, veto players) and their interplay with 
macro context and micro actors in the policy making process. In order to explore the 
key explanatory and outcome variables in the research framework, this study 
includes a detailed discussion of the conceptualization, operationalization, and 
measurement of the dependent variable, Chinese pension reform, as well as, by way 
of synthesizing key contributions in the existing historical institutionalist pension 
reform literature, a detailed theoretical attempt to disentangle the explanatory power 
of mainstream determinants of pension reform. ‘Bringing China into comparative 
welfare research’ thereby necessitates the proposition of a revised framework of 
analysis based on China’s context and new developments within historical 
institutionalism. By using this alternative framework, this study attempts to improve 
the theoretical understanding of China as well as to discuss practical policy issues 
facing China.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
1.1 The substantive context: more than just ageing 
According to UN (United Nation) standards, China officially became an ageing 
nation in 2000, with more than 10% of the population aged 60 or over and almost 7% 
of the population aged 65 and over (Zhang, 2012 ). According to government figures, 
13.7% of the population were 60 and over and 9% were aged 65 and over by the end 
of 2011 (Zhang, 2012). In addition, China’s ageing has two distinct features: first, 
the rapid speed of ageing and second, and the phenomenon of 'getting old before 
getting rich'. According to UN data, the ratio of the population aged 60 and over 
increased by 3.8% during the ten-year period from 2000 to 2010. The same figure 
merely rose by 3% across the world in the sixty-years from 1950 to 2010 (Zhang, 
2012). China’s median age was only 22 in 1980, which represented a young 
developing country; it is now 34.5, and comparable to that in the United States, 
which is 37. The dramatic speed of ageing is illustrated in projections which see 
China’s median age increasing to 49 by 2050(Gifford, 2012). More than 60% of 
nations worldwide became an ageing society with their per capita GDP exceeding 
US$10,000 and 30% with per capita GDP of $5000: China became an ageing 
country with a per capita GDP of less than $1000 (Zhang, 2012).  
Demographic aging in China result from comparative longevity but also because of a 
persistently low fertility rate. Over the past three decades, China’s fertility rate has 
fallen from 2.6 to 1.56 as one of the consequences of the Chinese ‘one-child’ policy 
(Gifford, 2012). At the same time, China may be facing a long period of ultra-low 
fertility because of low marriage rates, high female participation in the labour market 
and an increasing number of unmarried females, all of which contribute to a further 
decline of fertility rates regardless of what happens to the one-child policy. In 
addition, the population control policy also impacted on the Chinese family structure; 
the so-called '4-2-1' formula considers a typical one-child family with two parents 
and four grandparents to look after, meaning that the burden of elderly care has 
become increasingly dramatic (Gifford, 2012). While it seems that the younger 
generation will not be able to afford this burden, the increasingly mobile labour 
market has further reduced the connection between adult children who are working 
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in other cities and their parents and grandparents. The inability to care for ageing 
parents at home has led to a characterisation of China as an ‘empty-nest society (Xie, 
2013, Tatlow, 2012). These empty-nesters, many of whom are elderly with chronic 
diseases, numbered 99 million in 2012 and will exceed 100 million in the year of 
writing (Xu, 2012). The demise of the extended family and migration into urban 
centres has particularly reduced the cohesion within Chinese rural families (Zhang, 
2009a). Here, the dependency ratio is projected to rise even more steeply than in 
cities as young people increasingly move out and leave the elderly behind.  
The decline in the fertility rate in the modernising Chinese society, the steep ageing 
process and the demise of family support all call for the expansion of institutional 
old-age protection and elderly care. Institutionalised, comprehensive old-age 
protection arrangements are needed in China and the Chinese government will 
certainly need to be pro-active in institution-building to provide social protection for 
its people, particular for the elderly, for many years to come. Indeed, the Chinese 
pension system has been in flux, with reform measures being announced virtually 
annually. For these reasons, the first two decades of reform from the 1980s to the 
1990s were mainly characterised by adjustment measures designed to aid the 
restructuring of the Chinese economy. The state retreated from its commitment to 
pensioners by forming social insurance programmes for the formal sector workers – 
that is, the labour market insiders. From the mid-2000s, universal access to public 
pension protection was put firmly on the agenda and old-age pension provision was 
extended to the private, informal and rural sectors in various reform packages. The 
ageing challenge has certainly pressed the Chinese government to respond to the 
socio-economic changes in China. So far, about a third of the population is covered 
by some kind of pension scheme and some China specialist calculates that under the 
current system the government could face unfunded liabilities of up to 6% of GDP 
annually in a few decades (The Economist, 2009). The government’s priority has 
been placed on working towards universal coverage of the public pension system by 
means of a multi-pillar pension system for formal labourers in the urban sectors. 
However, closing the coverage gap for labour market outsiders (including atypical 
labour, the unemployed and vulnerable groups) has proved difficult and several 
challenges still lie ahead. The late preparation (from the mid-2000s) and policy 
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implementation difficulties (legacy problems and emerging new issues) continue to 
pose huge risks for China’s economic growth and social stability in the medium and 
long term.  
The change in the dependency ratio and the aging trend not only reduce the available 
labour force in China, which drives wages up, but might also reduce China’s high 
growth rates by forcing an upgrade of China’s industrial structure and consequently 
contribute to slower growth (Zhang and Wu, 2005). There are several international 
examples in which higher old-age dependency rates have increased the likelihood of 
a growth slow-down scenario, which China is unlikely to be immune to 
(Eichengreen et al., 2012). Indeed, the prediction of an upcoming prolonged period 
of slow growth in China is broadly consistent among analysts (Eggleston et al., 
2011). What is more, as already mentioned, the increasing internal migration in the 
advance of urbanization also poses a potential crisis for future social stability (Zhang, 
2010). The question has been posed of how rural migrants will adapt when the 
Chinese economy is upgraded to a more skill- or technology-intensive system when 
their land is no longer a place of last resort. How will they afford necessary welfare 
contributions when job security is not guaranteed? More seriously, there are also 
voices that argue that demographic change will challenge the governance structure of 
China (Eggleston et al., 2011). The bureaucratic efforts to deal with the social 
challenges in China will increasingly cause tensions between state and society. State 
intervention and welfare expansion, which have been at the heart of the Chinese 
government’s attempts to deal with social inequalities, could increasingly be under 
threat as the slow-down in economic growth caused by demographic change reduces 
the state's capacities and resources to deliver welfare promises. 
1.2 Research context: China’s exceptionalism?   
The circumstances described above are the main concerns which inspired thee 
research topic of this thesis: institutionalised old-age protection has crucial 
significance for China’s long-term development, not only for economic growth but 
also for its social and political stability (Eggleston et al., 2011). How public old-age 
pension provision can deal with its current limitations and interact with the current 
and projected socio-economic challenges provide the crucial inspiration 
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underpinning subsequent discussions. The intention of this study is to synthesise the 
development process of this specific public welfare provision in the past and the 
present to learn historical lessons to inform the future. Beyond the macro policy 
focus, the discussion of the administration and governance perspective of Chinese 
pension programme also deals with the practical issues which could inform future 
Chinese administration. In the main, however, this study aims to make an academic 
contribution by bringing the Chinese case into the scope of comparative welfare 
studies.  
Comparative welfare studies are usually conducted in capitalist–democratic countries 
and exclude societies which do not have either one or both of these characteristics. 
Even though interest in East Asian welfare systems has increased in recent years, the 
confirmation of this region as containing full-fledged ‘welfare states’ has remained 
controversial. In addition, transition regimes in Central/Eastern Europe and China 
have long been excluded from comparative welfare state analysis. There has been an 
emphasis on ethnocentric western social research or an Anglo-centric frame of 
reference which has led to the exclusion of developing countries because they were 
neither capitalist nor fully democratic, thus limiting the boundaries of comparative 
social policy studies (Kennett, 2004). In contrast, this current study follows Walker 
and Wong’s (2004) suggestion of the need to go beyond the welfare state 
assumptions of capitalism and democracy associated with cultural and economic 
contexts by studying the policy content or welfare institution in a particular country 
as a proper strategy to expand the comparative welfare study boundary. There has 
been a myth of Chinese exceptionalism not only because of the difficulties of 
conceptualising a non-democratic, non-capitalist case, but also because of the 
difficulties in practical case operation: the barriers of language, size, data access and 
the uneven development within China and the vast differences between China’s 
individual provinces.    
1.3 Empirical approach  
In responding to these opportunities and challenges, this study aims to bring together 
comparative social policy research and evaluative policy analysis for the case of 
China. The study will highlight the general patterns of similarities and differences 
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between established western theory and its applicability for China. Following the 
definition of ‘comparative social policy’ by Clasen (1999, p.3), this thesis is not a 
cross-national comparative study in nature, although examining the pension 
provision development over time in China's context could also be regarded as a 
variety of comparative study because it compares the policy trajectory and dynamic 
over time within a region. In addition, in the view of Ragin (1987), this study can be 
seen as an implicitly comparative study comparing China with theoretically decisive 
ideal-type cases (advanced welfare states). In short, the welfare arrangements and 
research literature on advanced welfare states which are different from China also 
broaden and inspire new reflection on the development path, drivers and policy 
process in the Chinese context. The framework for analysis developed from that used 
in advanced countries and globally to investigate the Chinese case facilitates an 
implicit comparison between them. Indeed, the conclusion also generalises the 
similarities and differences in terms of development trajectory and examines why 
these occur. Thus, this single-country study based on pension policy analysis and 
pension institution development observation will include China into the broader 
comparative social policy area and attempt to deal with the exceptionalist myth of 
the Chinese case. The choice of this particular welfare institution, pension 
arrangement, was not only because of its significance for contemporary China and 
the future development of the country, but also because of the degree of maturity of 
this institution compared with other Chinese welfare institutions. The pension system 
was the first welfare programme to be reformed in China in the 1980s and has been 
undergoing a substantive shift in hand with the country's economic transition, and 
has, in fact, undergone reforms almost annually. As a relatively mature welfare 
system which has formed a stable paradigm now, it is now possible to synthesise the 
development trajectory and examine influential drivers of change over time.  
In the comparative social policy context, the case study approach examining the 
specific institutional, historical and political features of a country rather than a 
standardised data collection and analysis allows an opening to detect the causal links 
with the unfolding historical events. The historical institutionalist argument is ideally 
suited to the case study technique because it puts the specifics of institutional 
structures at the centre of the analysis and is more sensitive to timing and particularly 
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to history (Mabbett and Bolderson, 1999). An institutionalist account provides 
neutral comparators such as structure, function and culture to be compared or 
transplanted. Hence, it is possible to utilise a case, such as a specific country, with a 
comparative purpose.  
This case study adopts the historical institutionalist theory and analysis framework, 
which was developed from pension reform literature to guide data selection, analysis 
and explanation. The historical institutionalist technique used as the basic method 
adopted in considering this case uses the institution to find the sequence and the 
dynamic behind the social, political and economic behaviour and change over time. 
This study puts political and pension institutions at the core, using broad process 
tracing to investigate each step of pension reform in China. The analysis framework 
was inspired by the pension reform literature and revised to suit the features of the 
Chinese case and produces explanations based on case evidence. The analysis 
framework could fulfil the comparative purpose as 'holding up a mirror to see one 
country’ (Mabbett, 1999, p.28). The reviewing and learning process not only enables 
the research practitioner to understand the other’s structure, value and practice but 
also enables reflection on how the other is different from the home country. In 
particular, this revised framework grappling with the specific historical and 
institutional circumstances of China could serve to illuminate the pattern of 
development in policy making and implementation, and also offer possibilities to 
explain the commonalities and differences between China and other cases. Hopefully, 
this study of specific welfare institution development in China could offer specific 
answers to the empirical issue, but also research implications for drawing China into 
the broader comparative picture. 
1.4 Main arguments  
This thesis demonstrates what has happened in Chinese pension reforms, the extent 
to which it has changed over time, and how and why both popular (expansion) and 
unpopular (retrenchment) strategies have been pursued by successive governments 
and practised in the implementation process. Adopting the historical institutionalist 
approach and pension reform empirical literature, this study first formalizes the 
institutional analysis framework. Then, inspired by previous welfare state reform 
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investigative studies, it clarifies the outcome variables issue (dependent variables) 
when capturing pension institution change. It follows the summary of explanatory 
variable propositions and proposes the hypothesis of these variables or equivalent 
ones in China's context. The analysis framework and the variable ingredients provide 
a map to explore China's case based on quantitative and qualitative evidences. If 
dealing with the Chinese exceptionalism myth is the original and crucial motivation 
of this thesis, the main arguments should bridge the communication and comparison 
between ideal cases (which are those mostly included in comparative welfare studies) 
and this outlier case (which is usually excluded from the standardized comparison 
because of many special features in this case). Therefore, our main argument should 
provide comparative implications to improve the understanding of this specific case. 
In a nutshell, it is argued that Chinese pension reform underwent a reverse 
development path, rather than welfare development after the industrialization, and 
then retrenchment in a time of austerity as witnessed in mature welfare states, and 
China's case has converged with patterns of pension retrenchment in the context of 
globalization and with the aid of international idea diffusion in the 1980s and 
eventually reached the welfare expansion age from the mid-2000s.   
The extent of the reforms that the Chinese government adopted is modest compared 
with the fully privatized model and with highly path-dependent countries. The 
adoption of the partial defined contribution (PDC) model reflects the compromise 
between maintaining pay as you go (PAYG) and complete privatization. However, if 
we carry out a comparison within case, we find that the pension institution went 
through systemic change in the 1990s and the formation and confirmation of PDC 
demonstrates a radical shift from the socialist welfare model, and the efforts to 
introduce a multi-pillar model in the mid-2000s also represent another critical shift. 
Overall, our findings conclude that the systemic shift witnessed in urban China and 
the institution replacement in rural China all suggest the application of strong 
executive power to push radical reform at the top level, even though some of the 
measures were towards retrenchment. Compared with mature welfare democracies, it 
is less difficult for the Chinese government to pursue more radical reforms, but the 
Chinese government has not done this in a seemingly favourable environment.   
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The study also raises questions regarding how the international idea diffusion is 
structured by the domestic political institution, as well as the different manners of 
idea adoption across countries.  In addition, in China's case, we have also witnessed 
how radical reform in the central level could not be achieved in practice in 
transitional China. The de facto veto players and veto points in existing political 
institutions and pension institutions reduced the effectiveness of reform policies, and 
with the noncompliance (drift) and the re-interpretation (conversion) all these factors 
challenged the state's capacities to push welfare reform in the past and will continue 
to do so in the future too. The determinants of change and continuity interplaying in 
the Chinese context provide a different scenario of pension politics as we concluded 
above, and this also inspired us to explore the implications for policy 
decision-making and implementation in the future. In particular, the conflicts 
between the central state and the sub-national governments centred on the sharing of 
funding and administration responsibilities. The matching of sharing between fiscal 
source control and administration responsibilities (including pooling level) is the key 
to solving these conflicts. The conflict between welfare expansion efforts and private 
interest invasion centres on the balance between economic development and welfare 
protection. Strong supervision or incentives for private sector participation or 
developing and regulating alternative provision are the solutions for further 
development. In terms of the recent expansion package, the new risk groups and the 
introduction of a new scheme also raise new conflicts over the well-intentioned state 
welfare provision and the limited contribution capacities of the participants. The 
innovative scheme design targeting the vulnerable groups who could not afford the 
contributions and the financial support from central or local government are the keys 
to resolving this conflict. Similarly, in the rural sector, further expansion in the 
less-developed regions and less-wealthy groups also needs to address the money 
issue.  
1.5 Thesis structure 
The thesis is structured as follows. The following Chapter 2 will provide a detailed 
summary of previous welfare studies in advanced welfare states and in East Asian 
regimes, as well as some academic studies of China's welfare and pension 
programme. We shall present a general picture and development route of 
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comparative welfare studies based on regime classification, and the countries 
involved will include mature welfare states, East Asian regimes and China. By doing 
this, we shall locate China in the comparative welfare study landscape and the 
general state of Chinese pension reform studies will lay the foundations for stressing 
the rationale for this study and research design in chapter which follows.  
Chapter 3 will then give a detailed explanation of the research design, the research 
questions, methods, data collection, analysis strategy and quality control. In addition, 
since this research is an interpretative case study with the aim of improving the 
understanding of our particular case, we have to follow a specific theoretical 
framework to enable case observation. Here, we shall adopt the historical 
institutionalist approach which provides an epistemological and theoretical 
foundation in general to guide the case observation and data collection.  
The massive amount of comparative pension reform literature covering western 
countries or globally has been rooted in the new institutionalist tradition to provide 
answers to why and how the different cases have adopted different extents of reform 
when facing similar pressure. Chapter 4 is inspired by this body of literature on 
welfare state development and change, and will attempt to clarify the outcome 
variables (dependent variables) and explanatory variables issue in the analysis 
framework. This chapter will put the specific analysis variables in pension reform 
studies into the historical institutionalist framework, and move down the ladder of 
generality, from abstract (grounded) social theory to our specific subject domain in 
particular, and through a critical review of the literature we shall provide the process 
of defining, operationalizing and measuring our outcome variables. In addition, we 
shall overview the propositions of explanatory variables emerging from the public 
pension reform literatures globally.  
Chapter 5 will show how the analysis framework and the power of the explanatory 
variables conducted in the previous chapter is adjusted and adopted in the context of 
this case study of China. We shall expand our observation to cover the whole policy 
process based on our collected data. In addition, we shall examine the presence and 
absence of explanatory variables in China's context and try to conceptualize them in 
a systematic manner. After that, we shall propose hypotheses regarding these 
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explanatory variables in China's context and then offer possible explanations of our 
case and our comparative findings. 
The subsequent analysis section of the thesis will follow the framework laid down 
and examine the variables which we identified and the hypotheses which we 
formulated. We shall start from the descriptive analysis and present the overall 
development path and performance of the various pension systems in China. We 
shall then go into a more theoretical analysis with the intention of mapping the 
pension institution development path as well as the dynamics. Given the urban-rural 
dual structure in contemporary China, and the starting point and development 
process of pension reforms in the urban and rural sectors, we shall present separate 
analyses. Chapter 6 will offer a description of urban pension system development 
and performance based on official policy documents and administrative data.  
Chapter 7 will provide a theoretical analysis of why and how the reforms progressed 
from decision-making to implementation. It will also generalise the development 
trajectory and explanatory variables effects in this sector based on the work 
presented in Chapters 4 and 5.  In addition, given the short history and relatively 
fewer data and evidences in the rural sector system, we shall address the rural sector 
case in one chapter, combining the descriptive and analysis section into Chapter 8. 
In Chapter 9, we shall summarize our main findings by presenting answers to the 
research questions stated above. We shall also show our preliminary comparative 
findings by comparing them with other reform experiences in global and within case 
comparisons (an urban/rural comparison).  
Chapter 10 will summarize the implications from the practical, theoretical and 
methodological aspects, discuss the limitations of the thesis, and consider interesting 
question for future study. 
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Chapter 2: Welfare state scholarship and its relevance for China 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter offers a review of comparative welfare studies in recent decades and a 
summary of the causes and consequences of welfare state/system variations based on 
mainstream welfare typologies (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Comparative welfare state 
studies were originally confined to the affluent democracies but the East Asian 
regimes have increasingly been drawn into welfare state modeling debates since (see 
e.g. Holliday, 2000). The principal issues in this field include expanding the range of 
comparisons with non-OECD countries and overcoming the difficulties of 
cross-cultural research when classifying different welfare models. In addition, 
because of the methodological complexities of mapping a country as a whole in a 
specific classification, a disaggregated domain-specific comparison provides a 
possibility of generating a fruitful comparative contribution through recognizing the 
policy variations across the country (Alcock et al., 2011). The review of comparative 
welfare studies not only explores the historical development of this field in social 
research and its relation with China's case, but also presents the rationale of this 
study: to capture the DNA of China's pension model in a way which makes it 
possible to join together the current comparative social policy discourses and thus 
minimising the cultural bias in this field of research. 
2.2 Comparative welfare state scholarship 
Contemporary comparative welfare-state research became a topical domain in the 
1960s. In recent decades, this field has developed into explaining the consequences 
and causes of variations in welfare state development and reform in the post-war 
period (Clasen, 2007). This section will divide the literature into the history of 
welfare state development, expansion and retrenchment (Pierson, 2006). So-called 
‘causal research‘(Amenta, 2003, p.94) occupies a considerable space in the literature, 
and revealing the dominant driving causes in different periods will help to synthesise 
the development of this research field. Different theories accounting for the causes 
have been hypothesised and tested in different stages. The theoretical account of the 
determinants of welfare state development and reform will be reviewed and divided 
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broadly into three strands of explanation: 'economics matters' 'politics matters' and 
'institution matters'. The economics and politics matters-theses further account for 
what can be labelled the 'old politics' in welfare state expansion in the golden age, 
while the institution matters-thesis is typically utilised as part of the 'new politics' of 
welfare state resilience in time of austerity (Pierson, 1994; 1996; 2001) .  
The central objective of this chapter is to explain the how and why of dramatic 
increases in spending by searching for the driving forces of welfare state formation 
and expansion, and describing convergent trends cross-nationally. Indeed, the first 
generation of welfare studies typically turned to economic factors or the industrialist 
logic to explain the common trajectory of maturity of welfare states (Myles and 
Quadagno, 2002). From the mid-1970s to the early 1990s, the research concern 
shifted to exploring why welfare states developed in different ways with different 
levels of spending, as well as the market, state and family nexus (Myles and 
Quadagno, 2002). The notion of divergence entered the research domain after a 
slight delay in the 1970s. The second generation of studies brought in the political 
perspective to account for welfare state diversity, and the regime theory is the most 
influential element in this generation's approach to understanding the politics of the 
welfare state (Myles and Quadagno, 2002). The period since the end of the 1970s has 
been characterised as one of “permanent austerity”, to use Paul Pierson’s (2002, 
p.410) term, because of the slower economic growth, high-level unemployment, 
rising deficits, and demographic pressures (Taylor-Gooby, 2004, Armingeon and 
Bonoli, 2007). The welfare state research agenda of the late twentieth century has 
been shaped by this austerity context. Despite the financial, economic and 
demographic pressures, research on the welfare state in this context did not confirm 
the demise of the welfare state but demonstrated the remarkable resilience of welfare 
states (Pierson, 1994). This generation of studies is marked as the 'new politics' 
generation and turned to institutionalism to account for the difficulties as well as the 
varying extent of welfare state reform responses. In the following part, a brief review 
of each generation of welfare state studies in developed countries will be undertaken.   
Economics and capitalism matter  
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The first generation of welfare state research typically utilised the notion of 
industrialism to account for the emergence of welfare states throughout the 
developed world (Myles and Quadagno, 2002). In general, it was argued that 
industrialisation creates demands for public spending because of the erosion of 
kinship and family support (Wilenky, 1974, Flora and Heidenheimer, 1981); the 
commodification of labour generates specific social risks for vulnerable groups, such 
as the old, the sick and the young, in an industrialised society. As the 
industrialisation proceeds, the function of traditional families and particular 
categories of individuals whose labour has become surplus (the young, old and 
disabled) reduces (Quadagno, 1987). In addition, the state institutionalises social 
provision to facilitate the functional industrialising societies, providing financial 
support and protection against specific risks and vulnerabilities, such as sickness, 
accidents, disabilities and unemployment (Zutavern and Kohli, 2010). At the same 
time, increasing productivity and economic growth provide the resources for the 
state to deal with the problems in the industrialisation process, while burgeoning 
state bureaucracies gain the ability to implement and administer national legislation 
(Janowitz, 1976).  
In parallel with industrialisation, the logic of capitalism emphasized the origins and 
development of welfare states from the perspective of capitalism, in which the 
welfare state stemmed from the capitalist state motivation of capital accumulation 
and legitimating it (O'Connor, 1973). As O’Connor (1973) argued, for instance, 
welfare state expansion was driven by the capitalist state to create conditions for 
capital accumulation, as well as through social provision to legitimise this 
production mode. In this sense, the welfare state is the inevitable response to the 
large capitalist economic force (Offe and Keane, 1984). Even though this account is 
different from industrialisation in content, both of them essentially follow a 
functionalist logic of welfare development.  
In addition, the logic of industrialism and capitalism thus implicitly claimed that 
nations with a comparable level of economic development would converge towards a 
similar level of welfare state development, which is more contentious because it 
neglects the impact of power, resources and competition and their impacts on the 
scale and design of social programmes. Indeed, in contrast to the functionalist claims 
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about welfare convergence, no marked trend was witnessed when countries became 
wealthier. In order to identify the causal factors behind dissimilarities between 
countries, welfare research shifted to the variations and sources across countries 
emphasising political conflict, power resources and partisan effects. These 
explanations of the 'old politics' of the welfare state were better able to account for 
the different extents and characteristics of state welfare provisions than their 
functionalist predecessors. 
Politics matters in the old sense  
By the end of the 1970s and in the 1980s, in the search for the root cause of 
divergence in welfare state development, the 'politics matters' group gained pride of 
place. The power resource paradigm formed by Walter Korpi became the benchmark 
model to test the thesis empirically (Orloff, 1993, Korpi, 2001). The arguments can 
be summarised as follows: the more the mass of the population is organized within a 
social democratic movement, the higher the redistribution of welfare provision is 
achieved. Thus, the development of welfare state maturity arguably was the 
consequence of a power shift in favour of the working class and social democracy. 
The power resource distribution between the social classes determined the political 
intervention in the economy and the extent of redistribution (Kersbergen and Becker, 
2002). The empirical evidence supported the conclusion that divergences in welfare 
state development stemmed from the power balance of political actors, including 
parties, particularly parties on the Left, as well as trade unions and their alliances that 
shape the democratic class struggle and determine the level of spending and 
entitlements (Myles and Quadagno, 2002). In short, this body of scholarship 
emphasised the role of political actors, including parties and trade unions, in shaping 
the divergent outcomes of welfare states (see also Schmidt 1996). In particular, there 
is a consensus in the literature that the political efficacy of Left parties depended on 
their connection with strong trade unions, and organized labour and employers 
played a crucial role in advancing welfare development (Stephens, 1986).  
As for the actor of party, the ‘partisan theory’ argues that the political parties and the 
party composition of the government are the major determinants of welfare state 
development (Hibbs, 1992, Castles, 1999). Importantly, more recent research 
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confirmed that the extent to which parties have an impact on welfare policy is 
contingent on the state structure. According to Schmidt, large partisan effects are 
witnessed in majoritarian democracies and states, while more complex and less 
visible partisan influence is typically noticeable in consensus democracies (Schmidt, 
1996, Kuhner, 2012). 
Closely related to these important amendments to partisan theory, the second wave 
of 'politics matters' research was initiated by Evans et al. and the call to “bring the 
state back” in the 1980s(Skocpol, 1985). This started a more state-centred approach, 
which paid attention to operationalizing state structures and political institutions in 
quantitative and qualitative ways in an attempt to finding their relations with the 
welfare state. Skocpol and her colleagues (see e.g. March and Olsen, 1984; Steinmo 
et al., 1992) emphasised the organisation and structure of state institutions to account 
for the divergence of welfare states. This development started from broad 
comparative historical studies of state structure to a narrower focus on the impact of 
particular political institutions on welfare state development (Immergut, 2010). Thus, 
it is argued that the state as actor and structure shaped the interests, ideas, and 
capacities of key actors and thus the final outcomes of the policy making process. 
Here, the explanatory variables included institutional features of government and the 
rules of electoral competition, and the main explanations established linkages 
between these institutions and the opportunities and limits of political actors in 
accomplishing their goals (see Chapter 2 and 3 for a more detailed account). In other 
words, it was argued that not only the power balances between political actors, but 
also the constraints and opportunities imposed from the institutional setting 
determined welfare outcomes (Myles and Quadagno, 2002;Blau, 1989).  
As for the question how to operationalize the political institution, 'veto points' or 
'veto players' were among the most prominent tools to classify diverse political 
configurations across countries. For instance, Immergut focused on ‘veto points’ 
created from the interaction of constitutional structures and electoral results. 
Importantly, this means that the number and location of veto points in a political 
system change as the political configuration changes. In other words, the veto points 
by themselves do not veto anything, but have to be used by the opponent to block 
legislation (see also Pierson, 1994). Therefore, veto point analysis is dynamic and 
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depends on the political majority and political preference (Immergut, 1992b). 
Similarly, Tsebelis (1995) adopted the term 'veto player' to conceptualize a political 
configuration including partisan veto players and institutional veto players in an 
attempt to explain the difference in the ability of a government to pass specific laws 
and to predict the likelihood of policy change. In sum, all these operational measures 
characterise the power division between executives, legislatives and party systems. 
Concepts such as state capacity, autonomy and sovereignty (see: Lijphart, 1999) 
became crucial for explaining radical welfare expansion as opposed to merely 
incremental changes in comparative perspective (Immergut, 1992a; 1992b). 
Probably the most persuasive support for the old 'politics matters' thesis was 
presented in Esping-Andersen’s highly influential 'three worlds of welfare 
capitalism' (Esping-Andersen, 1990). The classification of welfare states as liberal, 
conservative and social democratic ‘regimes’ utilised the institutional logic by 
emphasising the concepts of de-commodification, social stratification and the 
welfare provision function between state, market and family. Institutional legacy and 
cross-class coalitions between strong Left parties and (mainly agrarian) Centre 
parties were regarded as the foundation of large universal welfare states, according 
to his classification. 
Politics matters in the new sense 
After the oil crises of the 1970s and the breakdown of the Keynesian model, 
combined with the ensuing economic stagnation, rising unemployment and 
increasing trade openness in the increasingly global economy, the economic system 
shifted to a service economy, and the ‘Golden Age’ of the welfare state passed 
(Taylor-Gooby, 2002). In its place, researchers saw the emergence of new social 
risks and an age of austerity (Pierson, 1994, Pierson, 2001, Taylor-Gooby, 2004). As 
a consequence, the ‘welfare state crisis’ scholarship gradually replaced the debate 
about welfare state development and expansion in the developed world. 
Marxism-inspired literature claimed that because of the problem of conflict between 
capitalism and the welfare state, the undermining contradiction between capitalism 
and welfare would threaten the survival of the welfare state. However, empirically 
this thesis was never confirmed. The demise of the welfare state did not materialise 
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in the way that much research had predicted; instead, the survival and resilience of 
the welfare state attracted attention and became the new puzzle in welfare-state study 
(Myles and Quadagno, 2002). It is this which can broadly be said to constitute the 
'new politics of the welfare state' school. 
The aim of this school of thought is to answer why and how divergent reform paths 
have been adopted by welfare states after the end of the Golden Age. Hence, while 
old theories of growth expansion and variation were increasingly out-dated and 
unable to explain first the resilience and then the retrenchment efforts adopted by the 
same political actors in a time of austerity, Pierson‘s (2001) 'new politics' discussion 
reshuffled the welfare state reform literature. One implication of his work was the 
increased understanding that the politics of welfare expansion and welfare 
retrenchment were very different indeed. Another implication was that he utilised 
and further developed the institutionalist study of the welfare state by stressing the 
impact of welfare institutions and policy legacies. Drawing on historical 
institutionalism (see Chapter 2), Pierson claimed that welfare states were trapped in 
commitments, expectations and vested interests, which made significant change 
unlikely. Instead, incrementalism and path-dependent reform was to be expected 
(Pierson, 2001, Pierson, 1996).  
As for how the politicians responded to the new politics of the welfare state, Pierson 
(1994) followed Weaver (1987) and put forward the notion of blame avoidance as 
the main logic undermining the reform efforts and welfare states. In light of 
unchanged popularity of post-war welfare state settlements, there are three types of 
blame avoidance strategies that governments can apply: obfuscation (reducing the 
visibility of reforms and making the cutbacks less painful), division (restricting the 
negative consequences of reform to specific segments of the voting population), and 
compensation (side payments to the losers in reforms). The possibilities of applying 
such strategies vary due to the different programmatic structures of welfare schemes, 
thus explaining the variation in the extent of retrenchment (Pierson, 1996, Pierson, 
1994). 
The post-Pierson literature initially followed his footsteps and but also progressed in 
different ways: first, it emphasised the resilience assumption to reveal the underlying 
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causal links in the entire welfare state; more recently, a second trend has been to 
investigate the political process of retrenchment of singular policy programmes 
(Green-Pedersen and Haverland, 2002). Likewise, the explanatory approach has 
shifted to an institution-centred approach which combines variables, including the 
party system, election rule, political institutions, political learning and policy 
discourse, to explore to what extent and under what conditions the welfare states or 
welfare programmes underwent change or not (see Vis, 2011; Kühner, 2010; Kühner, 
2012). In other words, recent studies on welfare state reform have been interested in 
exploring the impact of the same political actors and institutional features that once 
supported welfare expansion on processes of welfare adjustment and change in times 
of austerity. 
Thus, starting from Pierson’s work, the retrenchment of welfare-state literature has 
improved our understanding of contemporary welfare-state development, not only by 
identifying welfare-state change, but also by bringing together researchers to 
investigate country case and policy area studies (health and pension dominated). 
However, this school also suffers from some persistent weaknesses. Most 
prominently, the so-called dependent variable problem remains unresolved 
(Kersbergen and Becker, 2002). The dependent variable problem can be summarised 
as the question of what is to be explained in the new welfare-state scholarship: the 
resilience, reconstruction or recalibration of the welfare state, its cross-national 
varieties and how these ‘concepts’ can be measured (Castles, 2002; Clayton and 
Pontusson, 1998; Clasen and Siegel, 2007). Groups of scholars have continued to 
answer these questions in different ways (Clayton and Pontusson, 1998; Kühner, 
2007; Castles, 2002). 
Beyond new politics  
However, path-dependent arguments have often emphasised institutional continuity 
over change. Historical institutionalism needed a more dynamic set of explanations 
to account for not only in the radical, but also incremental changes from the status 
quo. Therefore, another research stream developed which specifically aimed to 
explore the causal factors and causal mechanisms of change. Researchers started to 
look for ways to make the institutional approach more dynamic and sensitive to the 
 20 
 
interactions of politics and of policy making (Bonoli, 2000;Kühner, 2010). The role 
of ideas and policy learning could also be seen as part of this effort and it has been 
argued that ideas or discourse matters about the welfare state change as political 
actors have been shown to adopt new ideas to justify or overcome the hindrance of 
welfare reform and thus successfully implement change (Schmidt, 2002; Béland, 
2005). The adoption of new ideas or policy paradigms is akin to policy learning, and 
the degree to which the political actors ‘learn’ has been argued to determine the 
extent of the change (Hall, 1993). One strand of the literature treats ideas as the 
source of change, while another aims to reveal the causal mechanisms of institutional 
incremental change and argues that the apparent continuity contains small, gradual 
changes, which may accumulate into a crucial juncture in the future (Béland, 2007).  
In sum, it can be argued that recent welfare state studies have shifted from 
emphasising external sources (political structures and path dependencies) to consider 
the internal sources, including idea learning, to account for gradual endogenous 
change. Indeed, there are several difficulties in ‘rolling back’ institutionalised social 
programmes, but this does not imply that nothing is happening. Instead, established 
programmes create opportunities and space to channel welfare programmes to 
develop in a particular way (Pierson, 2011b). Recent discussions on how to study 
institutional change (Thelen, 2004; Pierson, 2004; Streeck and Thelen, 
2005;Mahoney and Thelen, 2010) (see Chapter 2) facilitate the arguments beyond 
welfare resilience, opening up the space to study the paradox of stability and change 
at the same time. 
2.3 East Asian welfare state study 
Research interest in the evolution of welfare studies in the East Asian regimes has 
grown considerably over the past two decades, particular among scholars who are 
considering the economic miracle and its connection with social policy regimes. 
Integrating this region, which is different from Anglo-European welfare states, into 
comparative welfare studies has inspired more global debates about welfare state 
development (Peng and Wong, 2010). In addition, the East Asian regime approach to 
welfare evolution started with the scholars of this region working specifically on 
their own countries (for example, Mutsuko Takahashi in Japan, Yeun-Wen Ku in 
Taiwan, Kwong-leung Tang in Hong Kong, and Huck-ju Kwon in Korea) (Ku and 
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Jones Finer, 2007), and the inductively generated East Asian welfare regimes were 
mostly confined to the tiger economies, with China usually excluded from 
consideration. 
East Asian welfare studies came to the attention of the international community after 
the 1990s because of the economic miracle, and the classification of this region 
constituted another important domain of comparative welfare studies. East Asian 
welfare studies were influenced by the mainstream welfare debates summarised 
above. For instance, initially accounts of industrialism emphasised the common 
trajectory of welfare-state origins and development in East Asia and suggested a 
convergence with Western systems in the medium and longer term (Ku and Jones 
Finer, 2007). Since then, however, there have been numerous review articles on East 
Asian social policies which have encouraged East Asian scholars to develop their 
own accounts of welfare systems and welfare development in their home countries 
(Kwon, 1997; Arts and Gelissen, 2002;Ku and Jones Finer, 2007; Aspalter, 2006). 
East Asian welfare state studies can be classified into the following groups. First, 
this region as a relative latecomer has provided fertile empirical evidence to test the 
classic welfare theories. This research not only tested the industrialist logic in which 
economic growth and industrialisation would lead to welfare-state growth, but also 
distinguished the varieties of social welfare levels related with the economic 
development level by expanding and comparing the study region with the developed 
countries (Dixon, 1985). Studies of welfare state expansion with democratisation in 
Taiwan and South Korea also tested the power resource theory (Ku, 1995; Kwon, 
1998; Kwon, 1999). 
Second, the East Asia welfare state research also joined the discourse about regime 
typologies and attempted to catch up with its Western counterparts. It is no surprise 
that East Asian welfare research joined the welfare state classification debates in the 
West. Many scholars attempted to classify East Asia welfare models, either by 
integrating them into Esping-Anderson’s typology, or by generating a unique fourth 
model: Confucian welfare states (Jones, 1993; Goodman, 1998), developmental 
states (Midgley and Tang, 2001; Tang, 2000), productivist welfare capitalist states 
(Holliday, 2000; Gough, 2004), or conservative welfare systems (Aspalter, 2001a; 
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Aspalter, 2006). Beyond the generalisation of the East Asian welfare regimes based 
on their similarities, the differences within this region have also been explored in the 
literature, and two sub-groups emerged based on social policy patterns: the more 
inclusive social insurance model which includes Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, 
and the individualist market-based model which includes Hong Kong and Singapore 
(Peng and Wong, 2010), and according to Ramesh's classification, they are 
conservative and liberal regimes respectively (Ramesh, 2004). 
A third group of studies has begun to emerge in recent years, and rather than 
exploring convergence in this region by generalizing specific families of nations, 
researchers have turned to examining the diversities and divergence of East Asian 
countries as a whole or on the basis of specific programmes by utilising an 
institutional / policy-centred approach (Peng and Wong, 2010). East Asian welfare 
state research has been dominated by attempts to contribute to welfare regime 
debates in the Western literature, although recently historical institutional 
scholarship of this region has also appeared tentatively. As Ku and Jones-Finer(2007) 
have stated, the future direction of East Asian research should emphasise more how 
and why the divergent scenarios occur in this region by exploring the causal 
mechanisms of social policy making by different methods. In short, East Asian 
research can contribute to comparative welfare debates on its own terms by 
expanding study objects, and including less-developed countries, as well as countries 
with different legacies, such as China. In this way, East Asian welfare research could 
provide more comparative perspectives to test and progress discussions in welfare 
state research more generally.  
2 .4 Locating China in welfare research 
The marginalised China in welfare state debates 
The scholarship on China is developing at a very slow pace, isolated from the 
mainstream welfare-state debate (Mok and Lau, 2013). The emerging East Asian 
welfare studies have usually excluded China as a unique variety of the East Asian 
welfare regime group. It is maybe no surprise that this is the case, given China’s 
different development level, ideology and historical legacy compared with the Tiger 
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economies. Chinese ‘exceptionalism’ seems obvious in this context. However, the 
emerging power of China has attracted academic attention to explore the specific 
features of its economic and social development model. In particular, China as a 
post-socialist country, unlike the East European countries which experienced a 
radical shift towards capitalism and thus went into different extents of recession, has 
witnessed stable high economic growth during the last three decades (Aspalter, 
2001a). China, similar to other Asian countries, also has a deeply embedded 
Confucian culture, while its development strategy arguably also converged towards 
its developmental or productivist East Asian neighbours (Horsfall and Chai, 2013). 
Not least, China is interesting because it presents a contradictory case: there are 
many common features with other East Asian nations, but also many distinguishing 
characteristics which have kept China out of any welfare state family (Hudson and 
Kühner, 2011). Yet, it is difficult to compare a complex, decentralised large country 
with homogenous economies; the authoritarian regime in China makes comparisons 
with the increasingly democratic tiger economies difficult.  
Although China has always been excluded from welfare state studies from the 'three 
world' era to the 'Asian miracle' time, a large number of studies in recent years have 
begun to explore welfare policy change, welfare system development or even the 
Chinese welfare regime as a whole. Unfortunately, the scholarship on China's 
welfare state connected with the welfare-state discussion and debate has not attracted 
much attention. The following section will present a brief summary of recent 
progress. 
The study of Chinese welfare states to date 
As mentioned above, China is normally excluded from the mainstream comparative 
welfare debate. However, numerous studies have begun to address China’s social 
security reform in the economic transition context (Saunders and Shang, 2001; 
James, 2003; Feldstein, 1999; White, 1998; Cook, 2002; Zhang 2007; Zhang, 2009a, 
Zhang 2009b). These studies examine policy change from the economic 
marketization perspective, particularly associated with the re-construction of 
state-owned enterprises (SOE) and the SOE welfare systems. Following its Western 
and East Asian predecessors, Chinese welfare state research also confirms 
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conventional theories, including industrialisation and its impact on welfare system 
change. Thereby, arguments that the SOE planned economy shifted to a market 
economy, and the SOE or (unit based) welfare system was replaced by social 
insurance models are akin to the 'economics matters' logic. Given the absence of 
political democratisation in China, unlike its East Asian neighbours with their 
welfare expanding under political democracy, there is no observation of the same 
dynamic in China. This is also one of the reasons why China was typically excluded 
from the East Asia regimes (Aspalter, 2001a). 
There is also a literature gap in Chinese welfare state research exploring the impact 
of democratisation and social movements on the welfare system. However, one of 
the few exceptions is work of Beland and Yu (2004), who addressed the dissent of 
pensioners at the beginning of reform and their impact on the compensation package 
available to them. Furthermore, Philion (1998) approached his study from the 
perspective of social class and social movement and argued that the Chinese labour 
force had been commoditized in the market economy transition; the new working 
class became increasingly vulnerable with only the compensation of residual welfare 
provision. Interestingly, Philion (1998) doubted that a Chinese welfare state with 
comprehensive welfare protection would emerge. His work generally followed the 
'old politics' logic based on power resources to explain the compensation rationality 
in particular regions, as well as the residual nature of the Chinese welfare system.  
Aspalter (2001b, 2006) also studied the politics of the Chinese welfare system, based 
on the 'state-centred' approach, and emphasised the role of state institutions and 
structure. He argued that the creation of the socialist welfare system came from the 
need for the communist party's legitimacy, and that the evolution in the SOE welfare 
system stemmed from the weakened power of government, party and labour union. 
The ensuing ‘social insurance dualist welfare model’ with more privileges for urban 
constituencies underlines the logic of state legitimacy and the stability of the ruling 
party. All this research could be summed up as being part of the 'old politics' welfare 
study school, emphasising social forces, labour unions and state structures for a 
better understanding of welfare system development. He (2001b) also stressed the 
conservative nature of social policies in East Asia and included China in that group. 
Here, he examined the strong features of conservatism in this region. First, the social 
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insurance system based on employment is generally the basic welfare model in this 
region. Second, means-tested social security protection can be observed. Third, the 
state involves more in regulation rather than in financing. In addition, he identified 
that conservative parties or conservative strategy in essence adopted by government 
have an impact on the distinguishing features of this welfare-state family. 
There are more literatures that have endeavoured to include China in mainstream 
debates. This group can be said to belong to a second generation of Chinese welfare 
research, since it seeks to catch up with East Asian welfare regime studies, 
attempting to locate China in a global context. This group of studies goes beyond a 
China-specific perspective and attempts to integrate China into the general welfare 
state discourse. Various scholars have labelled the Chinese welfare state after they 
gave critical comments on the limitations of conventional welfare state theories 
when applied to the Chinese case. For instance, White (1998) emphasised the 
particularities of the Chinese case and labelled its social policies as 'developmental 
statist'. On the other hand, China shares similarities with other developmental states 
in East Asia, in terms of a preference for the social insurance model, 
government-controlled fund management and economic stimulation desire, the 
preference for a national rather than a fragmented welfare system, and the 
marginalized and stigmatized social assistance provision, highly dependent on the 
family for welfare service. But China is considerably different compared with other 
East Asian countries in terms of its distinct features, such as massive regional 
diversities and the comparatively weak third sector. White (1998) thus concluded 
that no matter to what extent China converges with the East Asian developmental 
states, the striking socialist legacy and regime type, the size and the complexity of 
the Chinese case are sufficient to illustrate a unique welfare state with Chinese 
characteristics.  
London (2009) examined China from a post-socialist perspective with the concern of 
state-socialism legacies at the centre. Rather than grouping China in with the 
post-socialist East European countries, he argued that China is more akin to a 
Marxist-Leninist welfare regime. This is because of the communist party's rule as 
well as the socio-economic transition in the control of Leninist institutions. While he 
agreed that China shares some similarities with developmental welfare states, 
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London (2009) also argued that the characteristics of the communist party influence 
matters more to theorise China's welfare state type. He suggested that 
Marxist-Leninist welfare regimes display an apparent contradiction between an 
emerging market economy and the communist party which generates inequalities 
both through the market's own force as well as through the resilience of Leninist 
political organisation, which may exercise power and resource arbitrarily and 
exaggerate these inequalities. At the same time, the emerging social inequalities also 
press the state to respond to emerging social issues and provide more protection for 
the commoditized labour. 
Different again, Frazier (2006a, 2006c) argued that the convergence theory of 
welfare-state building in the logic of structural dynamic, including modernisation 
and democratisation, cannot explain China very well. On the one hand, the logic of 
development strategy could lead to the increasing of social expenditure and the 
making of a Chinese welfare state, taking a similar path to Western advanced 
countries and China's Asian neighbours. However, this approach falls short of 
explaining the differences between welfare regimes, and it is particularly difficult to 
account for the authoritarian nature of China versus its democratic Asian neighbours, 
which makes it difficult to group China into the East Asian regime family. What is 
more, the timing and consequence of industrialisation and transition distinguish other 
post-socialist countries and China: the former as pre-mature welfare states have 
established broader welfare coverage while the emerging latter only had a limited 
SOE welfare system. In this sense, the post-socialist EU countries are more likely to 
converge with their neighbours to retrench the existing welfare system under the 
financial unsustainable crisis, while the Chinese case is tending to build a system to 
replace the previous highly biased one in the modernisation wave.  
Therefore, Frazier (2006a, 2006c) concludes studying China with a post-socialist 
logic the same way as the East European countries is not adequate, and associating it 
with this group of countries is also problematic. Also, the recent globalisation 
narrative on welfare state reform and retrenchment efforts still could not identify 
China, which confirms general arguments given the regional diversity in China. The 
empirical evidence shows two types of welfare development under the impact of 
globalisation within China: one is the compensation strategy by public transfer and 
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early retirement to increase the welfare coverage for the suffering groups in the 
context of globalisation; the other is the competitive strategy in the east-coast regions 
with the benefits of an open market. The reluctance to establish contributory welfare 
programmes is the main features of this regime type accordingly. Overall, he 
contended that the Chinese welfare state is characterized as one country and three 
systems, with parallel urban, rural and public sector welfare systems. And this 
regime shares more similarities with the developing East Asian states under 
authoritarian rule. 
Rather than dividing groups into regional blocks, Hudson and Kühner (2011) argue 
the combination of protective and productive dimensions provides a possibility of 
classifying a broader sample of country cases in a slightly different manner. They 
suggested that productivism in the East Asian region is not exclusive, while, at the 
same time the orthodox function of protection in welfare state is not restricted to 
advanced welfare states. Through the utilization of fuzzy-set ideal type analysis 
(FSITA), China is classified into the productive-protective based on the relative 
strengths of employment protection. This new proposed conceptual framework with 
FSITA opens up new possibilities for classifying welfare regimes, which transcends 
the concern about the development level and regional geographic features. It treats 
China case on the basis of welfare programme design and provides an opportunity to 
generalise this exceptional case on basis of existing quantitative data. 
However, Horsfall and Chai (2013) are critical of this approach as the employment 
protection legislation index utilised by Hudson and Kühner (2011) is confined to a 
small segment of the population and cannot represent the general picture in China.  
Rather than using this indicator they refer to corporate tax rates to demonstrate 
competitive state behaviour. Indeed, Horsfall and Chai (2013) adapt the competitive 
state thesis that was developed in the early 1990s to explain the advanced welfare 
state change in the context of globalisation in order to classify the Chinese case. The 
competitive state in the West is distinguished by low social spending and a minimal 
social assistance programme, as well as low levels of employment protection, low 
levels of anti-competitive regulation, low levels of taxation, and dependence on 
active labour market programmes (Cerny and Evans, 2000, 2003). In addition, the 
competitive state is highly impacted by the rise of new public management and 
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shows a shift from government to governance (Cerny and Evans, 2000, 2003). 
Horsfall and Chai (2013) suggest that – at first sight - China appears to fit into the 
competitive state category because of its extremely low level of social spending, as 
well as its almost negligible active labour market policy (ALMP) spending.  
However, they also warned that China is very different from the authentic 
competitive state seen in advanced countries. The emergence of a competitive state 
with decreasing expenditure levels and shifting policy priorities requires policy 
change over time; while the Chinese case arguably is simply the way that it has been 
throughout the twentieth century. For instance, the low level of social expenditure is 
mostly targeted at the privileged population, rather than a response to the pressure of 
globalisation. In addition, the competitive state is more about how the state contends 
with the global economy, particularly the de-legitimising of the welfare state, and 
efficient economy drives combined with the new public management (NPM) has 
resulted in the emergence of a competitive state. However, the Chinese case is rather 
more than just 'hollowing out' with a shift towards governance because  the state 
intervention is still intensive. Finally, the visible expansion of welfare in China in 
recent years and the central project plans represent another contradiction to the 
competitive state thesis. Therefore, Horsfall and Chai (2013) ultimately dismiss the 
notion of a competitive state being seen in China and instead argue that the specific 
features which exist in the Chinese case are best captured by the concept of a 
developmental state. 
In short, the scholarship on the Chinese welfare state has followed a similar sequence 
than welfare debates in the West: the effects of social class and social movements for 
welfare compensation follow the first-generation welfare-state studies emphasising 
processes of industrialisation and modernisation; attempts to classify the Chinese 
welfare state alongside other East Asian welfare regimes are also part of this ‘second 
generation’. Now, the third generation of scholarship is increasingly focusing on 
divergent accounts based on old and new institutional approaches. China experts also 
attempt to follow the example of their Western counterparts by focussing on the 
study the specific policy programme change and dynamic, such as pension insurance 
and health insurance rather than welfare states/regimes as a whole. In the next 
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section, I shall review what these third-generation followers have achieved in 
Chinese welfare studies, particular the study of pensions.  
The Chinese pension study 
Reviewing Chinese pension policy studies, it is apparent that the majority of the 
literatures have adopted a descriptive and normative approach. The descriptive 
approach aims to develop an understanding of the Chinese pension system and the 
content change of the programme in terms of system design, management and 
regulation (Whiteford, 2003; Wang, 2006; Takayama, 2002; Smyth, 2000; Sin and 
Worldwide, 2008; Salditt et al., 2008; Lu and Feng, 2008; Leckie and Ning, 2007; 
Hu, 2006b; Hu, 2006c; Feldstein, 1999; Dorfman et al., 2012b; Ding, 2002; Chow 
and Xu, 2003; Chen, 2012). These attempts offered faithfully detailed accounts to 
provide extensive empirical evidence to inform further evaluations or exploratory 
studies – such as the thesis at hand. Normative studies aim to evaluate and criticize 
the system or policy design by identifying problems, shortcomings and needs 
through finding the failures and successes in pension policy development. They also 
often include suggestions for future developments of pension policies in China (Li et 
al., 2011, Williamson and Deitelbaum, 2005, Sin, 2005, Shen and Williamson, 2010, 
Shen and Williamson, 2006, Shao and Xu, 2001, Ma and Zhai, 2001, Leung, 2003, 
Li, 2006, Fang, 2004, Dunaway and Arora, 2007, Zheng, 2012, Barr and Diamond, 
2010, Nyland et al., 2011, Maitra et al., 2006, Nyland et al., 2006, Bailey and Turner, 
2001, Saunders and Shang, 2002, Whiteford, 2003b, Li and Lin, 2011, Shi and Mok, 
2012).  
A move towards a more theoretical and explorative understanding of the Chinese 
pension policy making emerged in the 2000s. Even though these studies do still not 
dominate Chinese pension policy scholarship, these attempts to find causal 
inferences about welfare politics represent efforts to generalise the Chinese case by 
moving beyond descriptive and normative accounts. Not surprisingly given previous 
discussions in this Chapter, these studies were also inspired by pension politics 
studies in Western cases and typically apply similar concepts and insights to identify 
causal mechanisms behind pension policy change in the long run, in a way to 
account for the regularities and irregularities of pension politics in China.  
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In general, the exploration of the determinants of pension policy change and causal 
accounts also follows the conventional welfare discussion and approach. The 
structural approach puts the emphasis on industrialisation, modernisation and 
economic transition and their association with the social insurance pension emerging 
in China (Huang, 2003;James, 2003; Smyth, 1999; Saunders and Shang, 2002; 
Zheng, 2010). For instance, Huang studied the pension reform in the 1990s and 
argued that the economic restructuring in the 1980s was the trigger of reform efforts, 
and that the legacies of the socialist state welfare hinder the reform process (Huang, 
2003). James (2003) examined the interaction between pension reform, state 
enterprise reform and financial market reform and put forward the suggestion that 
the difficulties of achieving the pre-funded pension system resulted from the socialist 
welfare commitment legacies, the fragmented pension administration and the 
undeveloped financial market, and he proposed the implementation of a pre-funded 
system before the coverage expanded in case increased costs occurred. Smyth (1999, 
2000) analysed the interaction between labour market change and social welfare 
reform, including the pension system. He argues that the high unemployment rate in 
the 1990s was because of SOE reform and that laid-off workers pushed the reform of 
the social welfare system. The structural issues included the displaced labourers and 
their welfare entitlements, the ratio of declining workers/retirees, and the loss of 
SOE, and this challenged the social welfare system transition. Saunders and Huang 
(2001) stated that socialist market transition generated resources to fund new social 
security programmes and opened up the space to reform the existing ones, including 
the pension system. It was argued that pension reform was too fast because the lack 
of long-term financial sustainability and privatization measures were not in accord 
with the financial market condition. The intensive reform efforts still suffer from the 
defects in design and delivery.  
The power resource approach with its focus on the social class conflicts and social 
movement provided another perspective to understand Chinese pension dynamics 
(Frazier, 2004b). More state-centred approaches studied the regime type and 
part-state motivation to make and expand the pension system (Gu, 2001, Olson, 1988, 
Frazier, 2006a). The communist ideology and communist regime legitimacy explain 
the politics of social policy formation in China (Aspalter, 2005).  
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The institutional-policy approach dominant in the advanced welfare-state studies is 
also applicable in the Chinese case. The role of ideas (Shi, 2006b; Hu, 2012), the 
limited administrative capacities linked with decentralisation, the interaction 
between feedback effects and the international idea (Béland and Yu, 2004) arguably 
shaped pension reform in China.  The unintended consequences resulting from 
neo-institutionalism are also tested in China's case, and the fragmented and 
decentralized pattern of pension administration results from the interactions between 
legacies, institutional structures and pensioner interest. The central power established 
overall goals but failed to achieve them in practice (Frazier, 2004a). It was again 
Frazier (2010b) who shed light on the broader comparative questions of how policy 
legacies and political institutional structure, international ideas and trade openness 
influenced pension policy reform in terms of funding the transition cost, and 
institutionalised reform measures in pension reform. The classic path-dependent 
arguments are also applied in the Chinese context contend that the reform trajectory 
followed the World Bank model but also diverged from it because of the policy 
legacy constraints (Yu, 2007; Sam, 2008).  
This accumulated institutional literature has begun to disentangle the institutional 
change process which has occurred in the Chinese pension system. However, there 
are also important limitations existing in these literatures:  
First, studies usually separately observe the different sectors, urban, rural, migrant 
worker or public sectors, without a comprehensive investigation of the pension 
regime as a whole. Given the big size and complex reality of the Chinese case, if it is 
difficult to generate a comparative study with other countries - regional or sector 
comparisons are also feasible and important. Therefore, putting the different sectors 
in the same analysis paradigms and examining and comparing these systems in the 
same context may generate better comparative findings.  
Second, there is a paucity of systemic theoretical applications and particular welfare 
theory tests on basis of Chinese empirical evidence. At times, the adoption of 
established concepts and paradigms of analysis in the literature utilises concepts 
literally without further exploring the applicability for the Chinese case. For instance, 
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the concept of path-dependence was regarded as a policy legacy, without detailed 
investigation of the exact feedback mechanism in a different context.  
Third, the dependent variable problem has so far not been addressed adequately and 
the operationalization and measurement of institutional change or continuity, the 
distinction between dramatic or incremental changes, as well as the equivalent 
effects of explanatory variable in China context remain underdeveloped.  
Fourth, scholarship on China tends to frame the analysis exclusively to the Chinese 
case, missing the opportunity to formulate research questions and debate issues in a 
broader comparative perspective. However, it is possible to generate comparative 
findings by means of case studies. For instance, the economic liberalisation and 
marketization are well explained as a critical juncture trigger or structural source to 
push the re-establishment of the pension system (Whiteford, 2003; Gu, 2001; Xiong, 
2009); SOE welfare retrenchment was studied by the first generation but the 
incremental change in China's state and society and the associated welfare change 
after the economic transition has not so far been investigated very systematically. In 
terms of the extension and expansion of the pension system, studies that cover the 
rural population and migrant workers are not as numerous as those studying the 
urban sector.  
Finally, previous institutional analyses adopted conventional explanations grounded 
in historical institutionalism by referring to political institutional structure, policy 
legacies, interest groups and economic interest actors, as well as their interplay with 
the changing context, to explain the pension politics in China, particularly in urban 
China (Yu, 2007; Sam, 2008; Shi, 2008; Huang, 2013). Thus, these accounts usually 
conclude with an emphasis on lock-in effects or unintended consequences, such as 
unfunded programmes, the non-compliance issue, and fragmentation. Accordingly, 
the path-dependence explanations seem to dominate Chinese pension studies, but 
various unsolved challenges and causal references remain. The more recent historical 
institutionalist theses emphasising incrementalism has not attracted much attention to 
explain the change process over time (see Chapter 3). It is therefore valuable to 
revisit the policy development process and test the applicability of new theoretical 
tools for the example of the Chinese case. Previous studies with their various 
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approaches provide a formidable empirical and theoretical foundation for such an 
endeavour. 
2.5 Concluding remarks 
The efforts to generalise or classify the Chinese welfare state have not come to a 
consensus because of different challenges, including the size of China. Multiple 
welfare systems are built or rebuilt within China, which makes the generalisation or 
characterisation of the Chinese welfare state difficult. This also explains why this 
current study avoids a general discussion of the Chinese welfare state and turns to 
reforms of a specific programme, old-age pensions. Indeed, contrary to some 
contributions in the literature, this thesis contends that it may be too early to make 
concluding remarks on what the Chinese welfare state is like as a whole. The old-age 
pension system, as the first policy area to be reformed, underwent a substantive shift 
in line with the economic transition and the constant changes in the post-transition 
era until the 2011 legislation. As a relatively mature welfare programme compared 
with other social programmes, it provides a more fruitful ground to examine 
institutional continuity and change, as well as the policy making process more 
broadly based on relations between policy outputs and their explanatory conditions. 
Therefore, given the significance of China’s welfare development in the context of 
globalisation, as well as the relative importance of pension provision as part of the 
entire welfare package, this study aims to contribute to the debate on comparative 
pension reform. It aims to trace old-age pension programme development and thus 
provide a list of implications for the attempts to conceptualise the Chinese welfare 
state in a comparative perspective.   
The existing literature describing the old age pension case uses different concepts 
and frameworks. When scholars borrow theories and concepts derived from 
elsewhere to measure China against them, they are unwittingly engaging in a 
particular type of comparison, measuring Chinese reality against foreign ideal types. 
Such comparisons can yield a warped or naive vision of China. With the use of 
historical institutionalism as an epistemological investigation lens to look at this 
outlier case and explore the texture and structure in Chinese's policy and polity, this 
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thesis attempts to find a way to compare and bridge these differences between China 
and other countries.  
Historical institutionalism has advantages for explaining welfare policies in general, 
given its assumption of uneven power distribution and its emphasis on history, which 
is highly related with welfare policy development. Many historical institutionalists, 
including Pierson, Steinmo, Thelen and Mahoney, have presented work across 
various policy areas (Steinmo et al., 1992; Pierson, 2011a; Thelen, 2004; Thelen, 
2009; Mahoney, 2000a; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010), and this approach has been 
effectively applied in explorative studies of redistributive policy, especially welfare 
policy. This volume of work has explored how scarce resources are distributed 
among rival actors, and why some groups ‘win’ while others ‘lose' parliamentary 
debates and, consequently, shape policy outputs, in a way to seek a better 
understanding of the divergences in policy outcomes across advanced countries. The 
recent application of incrementalism within institutional analysis should be assessed 
in a substantive way, and applying the concepts and propositions in a Chinese case 
study has the potential to help to refine and elaborate this theory. 
Using China as empirical terrain to test and build a theory should be taken more 
seriously because of the various distinctive features of this case.  
Bringing China's case into the current theoretical debate in welfare studies and 
welfare politics would make China an integral and instructive case in the field. The 
review of the welfare state development literature demonstrated that China has 
remained somewhat a puzzle – the remainder of this thesis will explore whether 
historical institutionalism presents a possible key to its solution. 
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Part Two: theory and method and research design 
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Chapter 3: Research design and historical institutionalism approach 
3 .1 Introduction   
The assessment of the Chinese welfare state and welfare policy studies in Chapter 1 
suggests that there is a gap in the current knowledge which reveals the need to 
integrate China into comparative research, and an inadequate application of Chinese 
evidence to test and refine welfare state theory and debates more generally. This 
literature gap, as well as my own knowledge of the empirical evidence, inspired me 
to select China, and particularly China's pension programme development, as the 
object of my case study. This study belongs to the interpretive case study category, 
which uses a theoretical framework to provide an explanation of particular cases and 
lead to an evaluation and refinement of theories (Vennesson, 2008). Here it uses the 
institutional framework to provide an explanation of China's case. Thus, it is the 
hope that this thesis will not only improve the understanding of the development of 
China's welfare programme and socio-economic issues, but will also offer an 
evaluation and refinement of welfare state theory as well as social science theory 
more generally. 
Usually, the within-country diversity of China discourages the scholars from 
attempting cross-national comparisons because these variations make it hard to 
formulate a general characterization of China and facilitate comparisons with other 
countries. In particular, China is an emerging country and has been through rapid 
social and economic change, so such generalizations may turn out to be short-lived. 
However, studying China as a single case has to deal with this issue of diversity. As 
a huge country with a massive population and a large number of cities, as well as 
wide diversity between regions, sectors and individuals, it is difficult to disentangle 
the country case on the basis of specific criteria. This study focuses on the welfare 
system (specifically the pension system) and the variations represented in the 
urban/rural dualism in general. Apart from this crucial characteristic, contemporary 
China is more complicated than socialist China because of industrialization, 
urbanization, internal migration, changes in the labour market and many other 
factors. China's pension system has to be divided on the urban-rural dual structure, 
and the urban Chinese system is also segmented into different occupations and 
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sectors. This study does not consider the programme for public sector workers 
because that has not changed very much over the past decades. The pension 
programme for the urban populations is also divided by employment status. The 
enterprise worker scheme is the main component of the Chinese pension system; it 
has undergone reform in the past three decades and has become the basic policy 
template for pension schemes for other population groups, including atypical labour 
(the flexible worker scheme) and jobless urban citizens (urban residents). Therefore, 
this study of the Chinese case will be conducted on urban-rural sector cases, and then 
in the urban sector, four separate schemes for different urban populations will be 
examined.  
3.2 Research design 
3.2.1 Research objectives 
This thesis serves three objectives: first, it presents Chinese pension policy change in 
the past decades by reviewing empirical evidence of the policy process, from the 
decision-making stage to the final implementation. The thesis is intended to illustrate 
a set of key policy-making decisions and to explain why and how these were made 
and implemented; it will also discuss what the key policy outcomes are. The study 
will investigate the formation of this welfare programme agenda in the Chinese 
context and present causal chains of policy making, starting from problem pressures 
and moving through to implemented policy solutions.  
Second, it attempts to achieve a broader generalisation of the welfare state or pension 
reform discussion by including evidence from China's case into a general analysis 
paradigm. The issues of whether the pension programme has undergone change or 
not, and to what degree the original model has shifted to the desired one, will be 
examined. The 'pillar-tier' taxonomy and 'crowd-in-crowd-out' theories are adopted 
to disentangle the pension institution profile change and its effects (Ebbinghaus, 
2011, p.7). In terms of the pension reform path, the path-dependent and 
path-departure groups map these distinctive reform trajectories. The former is 
usually the dominant argument given the famous double payment issue of pension 
reform (Jochem, 2007). However, change or departure has also been examined in 
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recent studies based on the 'crowding-in' private pension and the promotion of the 
multi-pillar model (Ebbinghaus and Gronwald, 2011). In explaining the divergent 
paths, the new politics of the welfare state, in particular the notion of blame 
avoidance, laid down the basic tones. However, the different cases practised blame 
avoidance through different mechanisms and strategies. In particular, the diversities 
of veto points, veto players, party ideology, election system, corporatism, 
bureaucratic politics, federalism, strategic actors and interest, policy ideas and so on 
present the divergent explanatory factors of reform paths. These theoretical 
propositions in the existing literature also guided me to find specific research puzzles 
and logic for connecting the evidence and the propositions when investigating the 
Chinese case(s). In order to achieve this, I shall attempt to cover the full range of 
theories that may be relevant to the topic. The previous theoretical framework and 
propositions developed from the other countries’ reform experiences, particular 
Western cases serve as the template to study China. And this study also endeavours 
to develop a theoretical framework to study this outlier case, which not only aids in 
defining the research design and data collection methodology but also becomes the 
main vehicle to generalize the case results. 
Third, this study also aims to apply and test the general institution evolution theory 
to explain Chinese pension institution development and its causal mechanisms. Since 
the incrementalism argument brings the compliance issue into the investigation, it is 
helpful to explain the causal chain of unintended consequences in policy 
implementation. The context, conditions and actors' preferences as well as their 
strategies combine to map out the different institutional change manners in different 
stages of the policy process. 
3.2.2 Research questions  
Understanding policy change and what conditions facilitate or constrain such change 
is important; not only for policy analysis research attempting to develop or refine 
theory, but also for policy managers who can manage the policy dynamics to achieve 
the objective. Studies of policy and institutional change based on different 
epistemological and theoretical premises form a variety of theories and frameworks 
(Howlett and Cashore, 2009). The general question of this research is to trace the 
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pension policy change by identifying the dimensions of change, as well as the 
pension institution revolution and the causal mechanisms, as a way to deal with this 
dynamic and complex phenomenon. 
Specifically, this research attempts to answer five sets of questions. First, what 
pension policy change has happened from 1980s to 2010s? Here, the object of 
analysis should be defined clearly: 'policy change' refers to the concept of policy 
problems, the structure and content of the policy agenda, the content of the policy 
programme and the outcome of the implementation of the policy. This level of 
analysis is based on micro-level investigation, and observes the policy actors 
involved, including the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the State Council (SC), 
ministries, bureaucratic actors, employers and pensioners. Their interests and 
perceptions about the context and the problems determine the consensus making as 
well as the effectiveness of policy implementation.  
Second, the thesis aims to study the pension institution from the meso level. Has the 
pension institution undergo change or not, to what extent and in which way?  The 
issue of dependent variable will be dealt with in the analysis at this level. The 
consideration of whether the pension institution has been through a model shift from 
the original one and the extent to which this institution leads to other directions are 
the crucial dimensions of dependent variable.  Measuring the institutional 
characteristics and outcomes are adopted to capture the scope of change. The 
typology of the pension institution structure, the institutional characteristics and 
outcomes in term of generosity and privatization will be adopted to compare the 
distance from the starting point to the current time, and the comparison over time 
examine its general development path. As for the conceptualisation, 
operationalization and measurement of pension institution change and extent, a later 
chapter will review the literature on the level or degree of change in pension reform 
literature (see Chapter 4).  
Third, apart from identifying the change, investigating the change dynamics and 
causal factors is another set of research questions. What factors bring about the 
change in policy and institution level? The explanatory variables or independent 
variables existing in the literature will help to understand China's case by identifying 
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whether similar causal factors exist in China's case and whether or not they generate 
similar outcomes compared with other East Asian and Western cases. All detailed 
causal determinants and interaction effects can be addressed in the explanatory 
framework. These theoretical propositions provide the basis to generate specific 
hypotheses to analyse the Chinese case(s). Whether these theoretical propositions 
generated from the European welfare-state evidence are appropriate to be adopted in 
China's case will also be discussed. The different socio-economic structures, 
development levels and multiple explanatory factors used in western cases may not 
be seen equally in China's case. In this situation, the explanatory variables, 
framework and hypothesis elements should be revised according to the Chinese 
context (see Chapter 4 and 5).  
Fourth, how the casual factors interact with each other and push the pension 
institution evolve over the last decades? This more general analysis will be aided by 
the institutional evolution theory. Process tracing (George and Bennett, 2005) will 
identify the context condition and the features of institutional challengers and their 
strategies to construct institutional change modes (displacement, drift, conversion, 
layering and so on) (see Chapter 4). 
Fifth, has the pension reform achieve the original objectives and what challenges are 
ahead in the future development? All these questions will be answered, and 
corresponding policy suggestions will be proposed for future policy practice. 
3.2.3 Case study design 
In general, there are four types of case study design: single case (holistic) design, 
single case (embedded) design, multiple-case (holistic) design and multiple-case 
(embedded) design (Yin, 2003b, pp, 39-55). This study adopts the single-case 
(embedded) design. Yin noted that within the single case, attention is also given to 
the units of analysis. This study focuses on the pension programme and involves 
different funded projects in the Chinese context as discussed above, in particular the 
different units of urban and rural sector programmes. The single case design is made 
according to following rationale: China's welfare state and welfare systems have not 
been observed and studied among the mainstream welfare studies because of 
problems such as language, data access and so on. This single case study forms a 
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revelatory case for comparative welfare research. In addition, this study also 
comprises historical/longitudinal cases, studying the pension policy change over 
time. In this sense, two or more different points in time will be observed, and the 
research interest will specify what the condition change is, and how the causal 
mechanisms operate over time (Yin, 2003d).  
Given the research objectives laid down above, the single case study has to involve 
more than one unit of analysis based on the level of analysis and subsequent 
common approaches in the policy process literature (see for example, Hudson and 
Lowe, 2009). From the micro level of analysis, the main unit was the policy actors 
involved in pension reform, politicians, bureaucrats, pensioners, employers and so 
on. From the meso level of analysis, pension institutions, political institutions, as 
well as associated intervening systems such as the labour market and social 
institutions will be treated as sub-units of analysis for the research. From the macro 
level of analysis, social transition, market economy reform, political leadership 
change, globalization and economic crises are also important in the analysis. 
Therefore, this study presents an embedded single case study with a focus on 
understanding welfare programme change using multi-analysis sub-units. In 
particular, as mentioned above, the Chinese case is separated into two sub-cases (the 
rural and urban sectors) given the dual social structure and different pension 
programmes which have developed in each sector. 
3.2.4 Data collection 
Data for case studies can come from many sources of evidence, including 
documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant 
observation and physical artefacts (Yin, 2003c, p,83). In order to answer the research 
questions set out above, that is, to identify old-age pension policy decision-making 
and policy change, secondary documentation provides important sources of data. A 
variety of documents were collected to inform the empirical case analysis in this 
thesis: 
First, administrative documents, including proposals, government projects and 
reports are reviewed thoroughly. In particular, regulatory and policy documents for 
urban and rural pension programmes, national development projects, legislation, and 
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decisions from the CPC (Communist Party Committee), the NPC (National People's 
Congress) and the SC (State Council). This group of data from the state, central 
government and Party were used to identify the policy profile change over time, as 
well as the Party's ideological changes and socio-economic development strategy 
change at the central level.  
Second, another set of data was retrieved from Chinese statistical yearbooks which 
have been officially published annually over the research period. These yearbooks 
include a wide range of data, such as the China Statistical Yearbook, the China 
Labour and Social Security Yearbook and the China Civil Affairs Yearbook, which 
provide quantitative data about socio-economic development and the pension 
programmes in the urban and rural sectors. These quantitative data present the 
scenario of social programme development in terms of coverage rate, benefits levels, 
fund reserves and so on.  
Third, pension programme qualitative and quantitative data provided by international 
organisations were also collected and reviewed. The World Bank (WB), 
International Labour Organisation (ILO), and Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
reports regarding Chinese pension systems, old-age insurance and demographic 
aging data supplemented the domestic data. All of these documents and archives 
could be traced either from formal publications or from reputable government and 
organization websites.  
Fourth, additional secondary documents, including policy assessment studies from 
other researchers, mass media reports and statistics, were also used for this study, 
providing additional perspectives from academic and media circles apart from the 
government’s official standpoint. It should be mentioned here that the media reports 
included the state media (including Xinhua, China Daily) and relatively independent 
media (South Weekly, Caijing, Caixin and others). Fieldwork reports from the latter 
group investigate policy implementation issues or interviews from top-level officers 
and present unknown stories about the policy process.  
Fifth, academic papers adopting various methods, including surveys and 
questionnaires, also present the practical issues and policy stakeholders' preferences 
and interests in pension policy reform. The combination of government documents 
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from domestic and international sources with the secondary data from the media and 
from academia help to enhance the credibility and reliability of the data sources, 
minimizing the risk of cognitive bias. Furthermore, documents may not always be 
accurate; so multiple sources of evidence can clarify a complete picture and 
minimize the errors in a case study (Adams and Schvaneveldt, 1985). 
As for the selection of a time frame, this study aims to trace the pension programme 
development after the social transition of the 1980s. The dismantling of the 
communist economy and its replacement with a market economy brought about 
massive social change in a variety of aspects. The SOE welfare system has been 
gradually replaced by the social insurance model (Mok, 2013). The painful reform 
process of the pension system began in the 1980s and underwent different stages 
until 2011, when social insurance legislation was enacted, thus institutionalising the 
old-age pension programme design. Those three decades witnessed the policy 
learning, pilot projects, and a trial-and-error process, and provide massive empirical 
evidence for understanding changing China from a social development perspective.  
3.2.5 Strategy of analysis  
Every case study should have a general analytical strategy which defines the 
priorities for what to analyse and why (Yin, 2003a, p.109). After collecting empirical 
evidence, there should be a definite idea about how to analyse it in a case study, and 
this will help to treat the evidence fairly and produce compelling analytic 
conclusions too. A clear strategy of analysis also helps the investigator to use 
research tools and manipulate the acquired data more effectively and efficiently. 
There are three general analysis strategies: relying on existing theoretical 
propositions, thinking about rival explanations and developing a case description 
(Yin, 2003a, p.116). This study relies on existing theoretical propositions to inform 
the case study, that is, they direct the focus of data collection and analysis. The 
proposition also helps to organise the case study to refine the alternative hypotheses. 
Finally, with a proposition focusing on causal relations, the 'how' and 'why' questions 
also help in case analysis.  
In this study, generally, historical institutionalism approach will direct the case 
investigation focusing on old-age pension institutions as well as the implementation 
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process of major policy reform. The institutional evolution theory will help us to turn 
to the features of context, the characteristics of change agents and their strategies to 
explore the causal linkages behind pension reform. In addition, the specific 
theoretical propositions regarding the pension reform path and dynamic in the 
existing literature will provide a template for investigating China's case, while 
refinement or new propositions will be added to accommodate and account for the 
Chinese context. 
This study will employ the process tracing method to reveal pension policy changes 
at different stages and how these changes were made within the decision-making 
process and achieved through the implementation of it, as well as why and how 
unintended consequences occurred. Using the process tracing method can explore 
the process by which initial conditions are translated into outcomes. It can connect 
the disparate evidence and shed light on a single outcome or a set of related 
outcomes. Initially formulated by George (2005), the notion of process tracing has 
become more standardized than the original version, and it emphasizes the causal 
mechanisms connecting independent and dependent variables (Mahoney, 2000b, 
Bennett and Elman, 2006). Process tracing is a possible way to perform empirical 
observation based on interviewing, participant observation and document analysis to 
understand previously unknown links between factors. Through this procedure, the 
investigator is enabled to identify steps in the causal process leading to the outcome 
of a given dependent variable of a particular case in a particular context (Della Porta 
and Keating, 2008). The task of researchers is to assess the theory by identifying the 
causal chain that links the independent and dependent variables, revealing the 
relations between possible causes and observed outcomes. Process tracing has been 
developed in order to contribute to theory testing as well as development. 
There are different ways of process tracing: to discover causal mechanisms and 
illustrate the theoretical proposition underlying the mechanisms connecting causal 
and outcome variables; to demonstrate the conjunction and temporal sequence of 
variables, to increase the number of observable implications that the theory predicts, 
or to operationalize variables, measure independent and dependent variable by 
looking at the decision-making process to search for relevant evidence (Della Porta 
and Keating, 2008). The first version is the most common technique of process 
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tracing and is the main tactic adopted in this study. From an interpretive perspective, 
process tracing allows the researcher to look at the ways in which contexts and 
outcomes are linked. The exploration not only concerns what happened, but also how 
it happened. Process tracing is helpful for examining the reasons that actors give for 
their actions and for investigating the relations between beliefs and behaviour (Jervis, 
2006) because it provides a way to learn and evaluate the preferences and 
perceptions of actors, their proposals, goals, values and conception of the situation 
facing them directly or indirectly, and consequently fleshing out causal mechanisms.  
Apart from revealing the reasons that actors give for their actions, process tracing 
also helps to understand the meaning and role of established regularities and helps to 
uncover the unknown relations between actors. In other words, as George explained, 
process tracing constructs the actors’ behaviour theory through causal mechanisms, 
but also accounts for the constitutive part for the phenomenon by reference to its 
structure, and comes up with the explanation of the conditions of possibilities 
(George and Bennett, 2005). Therefore, the method not only contributes to the 
explanation of causal mechanisms in the policy-making process from decision to 
implementation, but also accounts for the intervening process in which context 
conditions offer constraints and opportunities to maintain or change the status quo.  
The revealed causal mechanisms assumed from the theoretical proposition at the 
onset may fit or not fit empirical observations, and this would contribute to the 
theory testing and theory development at the end. Finally, the adoption of the process 
tracing method also helps in the examination of policy suggestions and 
recommendations, because no matter how well the causal effect link is examined, the 
policy needs the support and co-operation of stakeholders to be implemented to 
avoid unintended consequences and achieve the policy objectives and improve 
policy outcomes (Lin, 1998). In this sense, a case study together with process tracing 
can improve and refine reasoning for practitioners. Process tracing is therefore an 
analytical strategy that chimes well with historical institutional analysis focusing on 
different macro-, meso- and micro-levels of analysis.  
What is more, document analysis has often been used in social science research 
(Bowen, 2009). In this current research study, process tracing combined with 
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document analysis aims to provide a historical perspective in which to collect and 
examine the evidence from the past and present, and it is an unobtrusive way to 
collect data (Adams and Schvaneveldt, 1985, Bailey, 1978). Because of these 
strengths, document analysis meets the need of this research. One aim of the study is 
to explore pension policy change and policy outcomes over time, from policy 
making to policy implementation since the 1980s. To examine the policy profile over 
time and identify the changes, document analysis has been shown to be effective.  
3.2.6 Quality control: reliability, validity 
Regarding the validity of process tracing research, two measures can give greater 
confidence in results based on non-comparable evidence. The first measure is to use 
process tracing as a complement to a formal research design (experimental or 
observational). Rather than bear the whole burden of empirical study, it offers 
supporting evidence through anecdotal and narrative evidence. The second is to use 
process tracing based on contextual assumptions and assumptions about how the 
world works, which also increases the validity of the findings (Della Porta and 
Keating, 2008). This research adopts the second method to improve the validity by 
laying the historical institutionalist epistemological foundation, providing the basic 
assumption of the actors' behaviour motivated by rational interest but also 
constrained by structures. The interaction between actor, structure and context 
determines the way the world works. In addition, as long as sufficient documentation 
is included in the account, the verification of process tracing is achievable. Therefore, 
even though process tracing is not a standardized methodological rule, it has an 
important role to play in case-based studies whether combined with formal design or 
primarily relying on non-comparable observations. 
Another quality control of a case study considers the reliability of the results. The 
objective is to ensure that a later investigator following the same procedure described 
by earlier researchers could arrive at the same the results and findings. In other 
words, reliability means minimizing the errors and bias in a study. The way to 
achieve these objectives is to document the data collection process by offering an 
annotated bibliography of the documents and archival records used, in a way which 
makes the documents readily retrievable for later inspection. In addition, the 
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evidence sources and collection method must also conform with the principles for 
constructing validity and reliability. Yin suggested that three principles, using 
multiple sources of evidence, creating a case study database, and maintaining the 
evidence chain, are extremely important for high quality case study and will help to 
deal with the validity and reliability issues (Yin, 2003b, p.35).  
This study attempts to follow these principles. First, government policy papers, 
Communist Party Project documents and archival records are collected for data 
analysis. Collecting as much relevant evidence as possible is the main objective of 
the data collection process. This case study used an array of sources of evidence, 
reviews of policy document, public profiles, domestic state and party media articles 
and relatively independent media articles, as well as international organization 
reports, in a way which can triangulate the data sources and present the facts of the 
case study from different source perspectives. With data triangulation, the problem 
of constructing validity can be addressed because the multiple sources of evidence 
provide multiple perspectives and measurements of the same phenomenon. Second, 
this study will give a bibliography of evidence sources, including documents, 
archival records and datasets, which will provide a database for later consultation 
and investigation. In this way, it will increase the reliability of the case study. Third, 
this study will maintain the chain of evidence to increase the reliability of the results 
through sufficient citation. 
3.3 Historical institutionalism approach  (HI) 
The above has demonstrated a complete research design including the case selection, 
research questions, data sources and analysis strategy adopted in this study. In order 
to explain the analysis strategy in detail and to carry out the empirical analysis later, 
a theoretical/methodological approach and analysis framework are needed. Yin has 
pointed out that the use of theory in conducting a case study is an aid in defining the 
appropriate research process and data collection, and the theoretical orientation is 
also one of the main tools to generate case study results (Yin, 2003d). Therefore, the 
next section will give a brief introduction to historical institutionalism and the main 
assumption and propositions in general, and this will lay a foundation in which to 
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form the analysis framework in particular and to conduct empirical case analysis 
later.  
This section is to introduce this study’s methodological approach: historical 
institutional analysis. Since this method is used in social science in general and 
comparative social policy in particular (Amenta, 2003), I shall first briefly explain 
the development of new institutionalism and then introduce the crucial issues in 
historical institutional analysis: institution continuity and its causal mechanism as 
well as the recent development of institution change. Subsequently, I shall discuss 
the application of historical institutionalism in policy analysis and explain why it fits 
my case study. 
3.3.1 new institutionalism and historical institutionalism  
New institutionalism is derived from old institutionalism and developed from the 
critiques of behaviourism. Reversing the behaviourism of the 1950s and 1960s 
which eliminated the institutional factors in analysis, new institutionalism not only 
brought 'institution' into the social research domain, but also attempted to construct a 
general theory which distinguished it from the old institutionalism fashion (Bell, 
2002). New institutionalist research puts the institutional factor at the centre of 
analysis and attempts to detect the role of institutions (in the form of formal and 
informal rules, norms, conventions, procedures, organization and so on) in 
decision-making. However, even though new institutionalism shares the common 
critique of the micro account of policy processes and basic assumptions in 
behaviourism, different strands within this school give different definitions of 
institutions, and argue the divergent extents of the role which institutions might play 
in the policy process. Particularly, the different strand puts different weights of 
analysis on the institutional setting and on micro individual behaviours as well as 
macro context factors such as social norms and conventions. All the research puzzles 
are related to classic debates about whether structure, culture or individual action can 
best explain social phenomena (Taylor, 1989), and each strand of new 
institutionalism gives its own position in this debate. 
According to the weights put on the parameters of individual, culture and structure, 
new institutionalism can be classified into three broad categories: rational choice, 
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sociological and historical institutionalism (Koelble, 1995). In this section, I shall 
provide a brief account of each school and show their distinctive approaches to 
explaining social or political problems, and finally I shall compare the similarities 
and differences among them. The revival of interest in the institution in economics 
gave rise to rational choice institutionalism, which argues that individuals and their 
calculations should be central to social science. Rational choice institutionalism in 
economics was introduced by Douglass C. North, who argued that institutions are 
created by utility-maximizing individuals with clear intentions, but that the 
institutions also set constraints on their further actions (North, 1990). Historical 
institutionalism does not deny the individual calculation rationality, but borrows the 
concept of ‘bounded rationality’ and argues that outcomes come from the 
interactions between various groups, interests, ideas and institutional structures 
(Koelble, 1995). It assumes that the institution is a determinant variable in 
structuring individual actions, and that institutions are affected by individual or 
collective choice as well. The third group, sociological institutionalism, argues that 
individual actions are not only affected by institutional structure but also by the 
macro setting, such as culture, society and organizational field. In this sense, 
institutions can be considered as macro variables, like culture and society, and the 
individual is  largely a dependent and unimportant variable in determining 
outcomes (Koelble, 1995). 
After reviewing the different analytical focus of each school, how the three different 
schools approach their explanations in social research in detail, in terms of how to 
define institutions and the degree to which the importance of factors including 
individual, structure and context should be considered when elaborating the 
relationship between individual and institution, and how to explain institution 
genesis and change are all puzzles which will be explained in the following 
paragraphs. 
First, we shall look at how each strand defines ‘institutions’. Sociological 
institutionalism defines the institution more broadly, including the formal rules, 
procedures and norms, but also the symbol systems, cognitive scripts and moral 
templates provide the 'frames of meaning' guiding human action (Scott, 1994). In 
this sense, the definition equates ‘culture’ with ‘institution’, treating the institution as 
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a mechanism of routine, symbols or scripts to guide human behaviour (Swidler, 
1986). Rational choice institutionalism treats the institution as the measure or rule to 
structure and shape the interaction and competitions between different strategic 
actors, and the rule could lead the calculations to better outcomes (Peters, 2005). The 
strategic actors make the institution according to their own interests and preferences, 
as well as changing or reshaping the institutional setting according to their own goals. 
Historical institutionalism defines institutions as the formal or informal procedures, 
routines or norms embedded in the organizational structure or the polity of political 
economy, and associates institutions with organizations and the rules of conventions 
adopted by formal organizations (Longstreth et al., 1992). 
Second, we shall consider how each strand approaches the relationships between 
institutions and actions. Historical and sociological institutionalism rejects the 
assumption of individual utility maximization and argues that the context shapes the 
intermediate institutional setting within the individual act (Hall and Taylor, 1996). 
However, as for how the institution constrains individual behaviours, the two strands 
have different preferences: sociologists contend that individual action is determined 
by social and cultural factors; whereas the historical institutionalists in political 
science contend that individuals may attempt to calculate the utility but that 
outcomes are shaped by a number of structural and institutional factors beyond the 
control and conception of the individual. The rational choice institutionalist approach 
maintains the actor as the central unit of study, but incorporates the impact of the 
institution as a parameter to influence action rather than determine it. Rational choice 
institutionalism provides good explanatory tools to analyse interaction and exchange 
between actors within an organization. Historical institutionalists cannot ignore the 
action analysis and put more importance on the structure within which actors behave. 
In particular, they focus on how the political struggle affects outcomes, and how 
these outcomes in turn affect further rounds of struggle over institutional rules and 
policy (Hay and Wincott, 1998). This draws us into the observation of interplay 
between structure and agency, and provides a more powerful explanation of 
institutional development and policy making. Sociological institutionalism has 
moved to a broader approach which emphasizes the context explanation of human 
actions, and puts the cultural context in the central role rather than rationality 
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calculation in the preference formation process. This approach provides richly 
descriptive work of institutional and individual action from the sociological 
perspective (Koelble, 1995).  
Third, we are concerned with how each strand explains how institutions originate 
and change. Rational-choice institutionalists create the most sophisticated account of 
institutional origins and continuity from the perspective of functionality and benefits. 
Their position is good at explaining that an institution continues to exist because it 
delivers benefits based on utility calculation assumptions. By this token, an 
institution changes because it cannot fulfil its function in line with the purpose of the 
actors. By contrast, the historical and sociological institutionalist explains the 
problem of how an institution originates and changes differently. Both of them admit 
the precondition that a new institution is created on the basis of a world filled with 
institutions, and that new sets of rules should be adapted to the existing institutional 
world. The sociological institutionalist approach emphasizes the role of the 
collective process of interpretation and the social legitimacy in the process of 
institutional creation and change. Historical institutionalists focus on how the power 
relationships in the existing institutions give more power to some actors than others 
in the process of institutional creation and change. In addition, they have developed 
the concept of path dependency which emphasizes the influence of existing and 
previous institutions on the development of a new institution (Taylor, 1996).  
In short, the three schools within new institutionalism have continuous debates over 
whether culture, structure or utility rationality drives human actions, and there is no 
doubt that the debates will continue. However, a consensus also exists: that structure, 
culture and action all have a place in explaining general phenomena. Each theoretical 
school has its advantages and disadvantages, and each may suffer criticism from the 
perspective of the other approaches, but whether they have superior features to their 
competitors ultimately depends on the research question.  
3.3.2 Institution development model in HI: continuity matters 
Punctuated equilibrium mode and path dependence  
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In historical institutionalism, the punctuated equilibrium model has dominated the 
institutional development discourse by using the concept of critical junctures, a 
reproduction mechanism to reflect institution formation, stability and change. The 
notion of punctuated equilibrium suggests that institutions are stable until disrupted 
by a shock which triggers a major institutional change, but that they will eventually 
reach a new equilibrium (Krasner, 1984; Howlett, 2009; Howlett and Cashore, 2009). 
The term ‘critical juncture’ refers to major exogenous shocks and crises disrupting 
the status quo and thus triggering fundamental institutional change (Haydu, 1998, 
Thelen, 1999). Things like war or crisis are good examples of critical junctures as the 
force of transformation of political institution (Lindley-French and Boyer, 2012). As 
for the environmental factors conducive to punctuated change, some studies of 
critical junctures have suggested that significant changes are rooted in prior 
cleavages and crises, such as the urban-rural divide, class differences and more 
dramatic events such as an economic crisis or social unrest (Collier and Collier, 1991; 
Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). From this perspective, critical junctures are regarded as 
the resolution to these cleavages and crises. 
Apart from the critical juncture in punctuated points in time, institutions are regarded 
as being in long and stable equilibrium with the path-dependency mode because of 
self-increasing or self-reinforcing effects. Path dependency is a critical characteristic 
in historical institutionalism to explain the development of institutions (Pierson and 
Skocpol, 2002). Even though political and social analysts prevalently use the concept 
of path dependency, there is no specific clear definition of it. In practice, there are 
two ways of thinking about path dependency: one relatively broad version defines 
the path dependency process as that “what happened at an earlier point in time will 
affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time” 
(Sewell, 1996, p.262-263); a narrower version of path dependency was first proposed 
in economics to explain the technology trajectory by Margaret Levi(1997), who 
argued that dependency meant the dynamic process involving positive feedback, and 
that it generated multiple outcomes depending on event sequence. This definition 
was further developed in political science by Pierson, who tended to use the term 
'path dependency' in a more restricted way, suggesting that the “social process 
exhibits positive feedback and thus generates branching of historical development” 
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(Pierson, 2000, p.263). Importantly, Pierson adopted the notion of “increasing 
returns” to explain this effect. More precisely, he postulated that when increasing 
returns occur, further steps along the same path increase as other options move down 
that path, because with the passage of time, the existing costs of shifting the present 
path to other alternatives will increasingly rise. The contemporary welfare state 
studies and politics are surrounded by the effects of path dependency. The famous 
double payment issue in the old pension system provides a powerful example. Most 
countries adopted the pay-as-you-go pension system at the outset and workers paid a 
contribution to finance the retirement of the current retiree generation. Once the 
welfare cutbacks and adjustment were adopted in a time of austerity, the reform 
measures encountered high resistance. Shifting to privately-funded arrangements 
could bring more burdens on the current working generation who have to finance 
current retirees as well as save for themselves. The welfare commitments previously 
made in the existing institution raised the cost of reform. Thus, the idea of increasing 
return represents the main characteristic of the reproduction mechanism in the 
path-dependency mode as used in comparative welfare research (Pierson, 2002). 
The determinants of path dependency: veto players and veto points 
The path dependency argument emphasizes that earlier policy decisions limit the 
future options available for the reformers and then constrain the reform options and 
produce path dependence (Pierson, 2000). To explore how the path-dependence 
mechanisms played out in different contexts and what determinants bring the 
different pattern and dynamics of path dependence, we shall consider the tools of the 
veto players and veto points which account for the diverse patterns and dynamics of 
path dependence in welfare studies. A 'veto point' is viewed as an opportunity within 
the policy decision-making process or specific institutional features which could be 
adopted by the opposing groups to veto policy projects (Immergut, 1990, 1992a, 
1992b). Veto points can be generated from both formal and informal rule. The 
constitution as the formal rule outlines how the legislation must be adopted or 
changed and the opportunity to block legislation according to the constitution could 
be regarded as a veto point (Huber et al., 1993). For instance, bi-cameralism, 
referendum and separated executives all require that any change should be agreed. 
The other generator of veto points existing in welfare studies is that social partners 
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who administer the welfare programme could exercise veto point and oppose 
specific proposals (Marier, 2008). It is usually argued that the higher the number of 
veto points, the greater the possibility of path dependence (see for example Bonoli, 
2000). 
The tool of 'veto player' developed by Tsebelis can capture the model of political 
configurations and account for the capacity for change/continuity. It is defined as 
individual or collective actors whose agreement is required for a change of the status 
quo (Tsebelis, 1995). Tsebelis divided veto players into institutional veto players and 
partisan veto players. The institutional veto players are specified by the constitution 
and their agreement is necessary for the passage of legislation. Chambers and 
presidents, courts, constitutionally-required super majorities and referendums are 
regarded as institutionalized veto players, which are roughly equivalent to veto 
points. Partisan veto players are generated from the electoral system and the parties 
which comprise the government. The veto player theory predicts continuity 
(stability), and it is argued that the higher the number of veto players, and the larger 
the distance of ideological range between them, the less possibility there is of a 
change in policy (path dependence)(Tsebelis, 1999). 
Veto players theory provides an approach to locating actors and their preferences 
involved in the policy process. Veto points provide insights about the source and 
dynamic of change/continuity, which brings the affected interest groups into 
consideration and creates the source of bargaining powers and their dynamics. In 
addition, these concepts provide the possibility of explaining the extent of 
difficulties of change, or the diverse reasons for path dependence in different 
contexts. 
The critique of punctuated change and path dependence 
Although the punctuated change model can explain change to a certain degree, the 
path dependency argument is maybe overly deterministic. Several problems are 
highlighted in the literature. First, the critical juncture argument can explain why 
major revolutionary change occurs, but struggles to account for more incremental or 
evolutionary change (Thelen, 2000, 2003). Second, critical junctures are usually 
assumed to be the exogenous source of institutional change. This approach ignores 
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the endogenous sources that are inconsistent and contradict the current institutional 
configuration, which may also result in a transformation (Haydu, 1998, Schneiberg, 
1999). Third, this approach tends to focus on key events or big events, but not on 
small or trivial events which may turn out to be consequential over a long stretch of 
time observation (Campbell et al., 1991). It would appear that we need a more 
rigorous approach to identify and explain a change beyond typically punctuated 
equilibrium. 
3.3.3 beyond continuity 
Historical institutionalism puts the institution at the centre of the investigation and 
defines it as the rule of the game, organization structure and outcomes. It emphasizes 
the constraining feature of institution development and leads to path dependence. 
However, it cannot account for institutional change in an empirical world over the 
long term (Steinmo et al., 1992; Hall and Taylor, 1996; Thelen, 1999; Pierson, 2000). 
As mentioned above, historical institutionalism is criticised for its inability to 
explain institutional change endogenously. And historical institutionalists attempt to 
deal with historical determinism, turning to the role of the idea as the source of 
institutional change initially, and gradually going further to explore when and why a 
particular idea won out and caused a change to occur. How the idea is formed and 
diffused in a particular context and structures definitely goes further than the role of 
ideas. However, all these ideational process arguments more or less start with the 
historical institutionalist tradition (Schmidt, 2010). 
The ideational discourse 
In traditional historical institutionalist research, proponents were already open to 
turning to idea to account for change, but they saw institutions as structures with 
incentivising or constraining features to facilitate or block the adoption or diffusion 
of an idea. In other words, they treated the idea as an external source which brings 
about change. For instance, Hall (1989,1993) followed the HI approach and focused 
on the explanations of the different influence of the Keynesian idea and then 
continued by explaining how the monetarist ideas impacted the formation of a new 
institution. Hall (1993) also suggested that institution-builders construct institutions 
because of shared ideas or ‘policy paradigms’. The policy paradigm thereby is a 
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framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only the goals of policy and the 
instruments used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems that they 
will address (Hall, 1993). So institution-builders can learn and change either the 
instrument or the means to pursue their goals or the goals and ends themselves (Hall, 
1993). Under specific economic and political conditions, the paradigm shifts and 
more limited changes in social and economic assumption can help to explain the 
nature and the overall direction of institution change. Paying close attention to the 
role of ideas in institutional change provides the grounds for the claim that idea can 
shape the content of policy proposals and the perception of interests in the political 
struggle (Blyth, 2002; Hansen and King, 2001;Lieberman, 2002). Hall argued that 
the institution structures the flow of ideas and conflicts of interests, thereby partially 
determining the institutional outcomes. And the whole ideational process is 
constrained by the policy paradigm which assumes the opportunities and constrains 
the possibilities and feasibilities in the policy-making process (Hall, 1993). In this 
sense, the institution not only works as a structure to constrain and create 
opportunities of change, but also acts as a filter for ideas.  
Apart from the role of ideas as the source of institution change, scholars have 
discussed when ideas generate change and why some ideas win over others in 
generating change. Some scholars argue that ideas generate institutional change 
because of the condition of existing institutional failure. For instance, the ideas in 
economic crisis may reduce uncertainty and promote collective action and coalition 
building, thereby illegitimating the existing institutional arrangement and forming 
new blueprints (Blyth, 2002). From the above statement about the role of ideas in 
institutional change, two notions should be emphasized: the notion of crisis 
condition, and that of institutional failure. Beland (2005) built a model to explain 
how and when ideas matter in institutional change in general and in social policy 
reform specifically. Ideas are central to the political construction and problem 
perception and determine the policy agenda as well as the narrative articulation 
between policy legacies and current problems. In this sense, ideas play an important 
role in problem diagnosis and problem solving in the policy process. However, as for 
why certain ideas can generate institutional change, it is argued that powerful 
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entrepreneurs seize opportunities to sell the ideas they support and illegitimate the 
existing institutional configuration. 
So far, historical institutionalist conventional explanations for institutional change 
have been presented. The dominant path-dependent equilibrium turns to institutional 
or systemic variables, such as socio-economic change, leader shift and economic 
crisis, as explanatory variables which generate change. An alternative strategy is to 
bring ideas back into the argument, and put the shared ideas and cognitive maps in 
the central role when explaining institutional change, which also leads to emerging 
discursive institutionalism, as Schmidt (2010) suggested. Here it just addresses the 
relation between idea and institution in historical institutionalism rather than 
emphasizing the institution as the construct of ideas, as discursive institutionalist 
scholars explain the ideas of actors to account for change and continuity, critically or 
incrementally. 
Incremental change 
In recent years, historical institutionalist scholars have begun to construct 
comprehensive theoretical accounts of more incremental institutional change over 
time (Hacker, 2004; Streeck, 2005; Thelen, 2003; Campbell, 2005; Mahoney and 
Thelen, 2010). 
To be specific, Thelen and Streeck (2005) offered four models of institutional 
change in the literature: displacement, layering, drift and conversion. ‘Displacement’ 
is understood as new rules replacing old ones. This model of change describes an 
abrupt and radical shift and is therefore most akin to the punctuated equilibrium 
model discussed previously. Revolutions can be treated as displacement, but there 
are also slow-moving processes that can lead to displacement, primarily when new 
institutions are introduced to compete with an old set of institutions. Thus, if the 
supporters of old rules have no ability to prevent the introduction of new rules, then 
gradual replacement may take place (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). Deeg (2001) 
provided an example of this type of institution change in the German financial sector. 
His analysis found the coexistence of two different or even competing logics of 
action in the documents. There were traditional German institutions that emphasized 
the long-term link between banks and firms and depended on mutual obligation and 
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trust, and the other new institution copied from Anglo-Saxon countries featured 
more distanced relations between firms and banks. In his view, both of these 
institutions coexisted, but with the declining efficiency of the traditional one, the 
new institution would become taken for granted (Deeg, 2001)  
‘Layering’ does not introduce new institutions altogether, but provides amendments, 
revisions or additions to existing ones (Thelen, 2003). The institution-builders add 
new institutional arrangements rather than replacing the old ones. This process often 
takes place when the challengers have no capacity to change the old rules; instead, 
they aim to alter existing systems by adding new rules and making revisions to the 
existing rules. For instance, there is empirical evidence of public pension system 
reform: when lock-in effects and vested-interest groups obstruct welfare 
retrenchment, conservative parties have often promoted privately-funded pension 
plans to play out alongside the public system (Pierson and Dolowitz, 1994). 
Therefore, layering can change the overall social security structure in the country 
and develop more diverse interests among the constituent actors (Myles, 2001). 
‘Drift’ is understood as a process in which a new environment alters the demands on 
existing institutions while the old rules remain the same; drift may occur in order to 
accommodate shifts in external conditions (Hacker, 2004). When the actors fail to 
change the existing rules in response to the condition shift, the impact of institutions 
can change. In other words, the actors who are capable of making change tend to 
sustain the policy status quo, which ironically may result in an institutional 
transformation in the new socio-economic setting. The new emerging 
socio-economic trends have been shown to make the existing institutional 
arrangements less and less adequate if the new reforms are not introduced 
accordingly. 
Finally, ‘conversion’ occurs when the rules remain formally the same but are 
interpreted and enacted in new ways (Thelen, 2003). However, the misinterpretation 
is not driven by the changed setting; instead, the actors actively pursue and explore 
the inherent ambiguities of institutions. Through redeployment, they convert the 
institution to new goals, functions or purposes to serve interests favourable to 
themselves. Thelen (2003) pointed to an example of conversion in the development 
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of the German vocational training system, which was originally designed to benefit 
artisans and pre-empt the influence of organized labour; consequently, the unions 
gained greater power and were incorporated into the system. 
The causal link between institutional context and incremental models 
After listing all the mechanisms of incremental change patterns, Thelen and 
Mahoney (2010) considered the important elements and relationships between them: 
existing institutional rules, prevailing political context, and the power of change 
actors. Political context, the institutional characteristic, determines the modes of 
change. On the one hand, the institutional context is full of high veto possibilities 
and makes it difficult for change agents to mobilize and displace existing rules. Thus, 
displacement is unlikely to occur. Likewise, conversion will also be difficult because 
veto powers may have strong powers in rule enforcement. So drift and layering 
become more promising strategies in a context with strong veto players, because 
neither of them needs to make clear direct change or actively shift their enactment by 
changing rules themselves or redirecting the implementation actively. With drift, 
institutional change grows out of the neglect of existing institutional rule, or its 
failure to respond to a new changed environmental context (see Hacker 2004). 
Powerful veto players may defend displacement, but are unable to rule out the drift 
impact because doing so might mobilise the change supporters to shore up an 
institution once the setting begins to shift. With layering, institutional change results 
from adding new institution rules onto or alongside existing ones. While powerful 
veto players can protect the old rules, they cannot prevent the addition of new 
elements. For example, the UK conservative party introduced voluntary 
supplementary pension or private pension schemes alongside the public pension 
system, attempting to change the structure of the public and private mix and hoping 
that the balance would turn towards the latter over the long run. In Germany, the 
2001 pension reforms introduced the voluntary take-up of certified saving plans with 
tax incentives or direct subsidies and these incentives could also be converted into 
occupational pension plan contributions. These added measures and incentives put 
the German pension system on the multi-pillar track (Jochem, 2007). On the other 
hand, the institutional characteristics which allow the different levels of discretion in 
interpretation or enforcement of rules also explain the change modes. If the 
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institutional challengers have no room for discretion in enforcement, then drift 
strategies are more likely to occur. With conversion, the rules are ambiguous enough 
to permit interpretation and might redirect to a different implementation path. With 
drifts, there is a gap between rule and enforcement, and the innovation might take 
place in the enforcement process and reorient the objective of rule. In short, 
administrative capacities may be especially important for conversion and drift 
because the weakness on the fronts open up possibilities for those who oppose the 
rules on the book. However, the other types, layering and displacement do not need 
to use openings in rule enforcement. The layers refer to new elements added to 
amend the old ones, and displacement is simply the replacement of the old ones over 
time; therefore, neither of them has any correlation with rule enactment and 
enforcement because the rule remains intact. 
3.3.4 Remodelling institutional development  
What the above discussion seems to suggest that it is not necessary to strictly 
separate punctuated equilibrium from the incrementalist model. Instead, this thesis 
will argue that the two models can be combined to explain institutional development. 
Punctuated equilibrium and incrementalism are separate mechanisms and 
contradicting tools, but they emphasize different perspectives and - jointly - have 
explanatory power. Therefore, I suggest combining the path dependence effect and 
the incremental change mechanism into a single theoretical framework. The path 
dependence effect, as part of the punctuated equilibrium discourse and as a 
constraining context, impacts the direction and the extent of change. Incrementalism 
brings the ambiguity and compliance variable into the investigation, which provides 
an incentive to push change forward in the implementation process. Combining both 
could provide a more complete picture of how particular observed institutions 
change over time. Thereby, the path dependency model shines a light on how 
difficult institution formation or policy making is in the initial phase, and what kind 
of dynamics are going on there with the interaction between agent, structure and 
context. The incrementalist model is good at explaining how the agents break or 
reinterpret the rule of the institution and consequently generate outcomes deviating 
from the original objectives, and finally generate change. Combining the two models 
can present a complete picture of institution or policy formation and development as 
 61 
 
well as outcomes, and the compound model can facilitate the snapshot examination 
in the short-term as well the long-term, historical tracing. 
3.3.5 HI in policy analysis and why I chose it for this study 
The literature on historical institutionalism is diverse, and the theory is applied in a 
wide range of empirical cases, from social revolution, to state building, to regime 
formation, to welfare-state development and so on (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002). 
Historical institutionalism is generally interested in observing divergences across 
countries: such as why a certain choice is made, or why certain outcomes occur in 
certain cases but not in others. Historical institutionalists attempt to understand the 
outcomes as a result of rule following and interest maximizing (Steinmo, 2008). Not 
only do they stress that institutions constrain and impact behavioural strategies and 
the formation of interest, they also pay attention to the way in which institutional 
arrangements foster a particular interest perception, and they shape the strategic 
activities within a specific context (Thelen, 2002). In other words, historical 
institutionalists explore the policy world on three levels: interactions between 
individuals and institutions, the institutional intersections, and institution and 
context.  
First, historical institutionalist research tends to explore the causalities at the 
inter-organizational or inter-institutional level, which is also consistent with the 
principle of behaviour accounts (Little, 1991). It claims that institutions shape power 
distribution and allocation among various actors (Thelen, 2002). Second, historical 
institutionalism usually analyses how sets of organizations and institutions interact 
with each other and shape the process and outcomes. The focus on the 
meso-institutional level rather than single isolated institutions provides a 
comprehensive discourse on key relationships among multiple institutions (Skocpol, 
2002). For instance, the interplay between particular welfare structures and political 
institutions has been argued to determine the convergent welfare retrenchment 
efforts and outcomes across countries since the late 1970s (Pierson, 2004). The 
coherence and coupling between institutions contributes to the stability of 
institutional configuration, and can also be used to explain change because an 
opening in one institution might trigger other relevant institutions to change as well 
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(Deeg, 2005). Third, historical institutionalism is not only concerned with the causal 
configuration at the organizational and institutional level, but also points to the 
overarching context, such as the types of regime, region and culture, which places 
bounds on research (Thelen, 2002). Attention to the significant overarching context 
can reveal some data not available in the short term, thereby enabling exploration of 
some significant findings which the behaviourist might ignore (Broschek, 2012). In 
addition, concern for the macro context can enable us to see how changing 
background conditions might cause the same variables to play out in different ways. 
Why did I choose historical institutionalism over the other new institutionalism for 
this case study? Historical institutionalism puts the attention on structure, and 
provides a comprehensive picture of the political and social world, the eclectic 
approach comes between cultural and calculus extremes and builds a rigorous 
examination of the empirical world. To be specific, the calculus approach 
emphasizes that the institution affects an actor's behaviour and expectations, and 
strategic interaction is the crucial element of analysis; while the cultural approach 
stresses that behaviour is not fully strategic but is bounded by the actor’s view of 
context and culture, and, as has already been said, the interpretation of a situation is 
the crucial part of analysis. Historical institutionalists adopt the eclectic view and use 
both of these approaches to specify the relation between institution and action (Hall 
and Taylor, 1996). The institution not only affects the short-term calculation and 
expectation but also shapes the world-view of the actors in the long run. The 
instrumental calculation and context/cultural interpretation are both important in 
historical institutional analysis. Many historical institutionalists, including Pierson, 
Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth, have presented work across various policy areas, 
such as labour policy, health policy, state policy, economic policy and work-welfare 
policy (Steinmo et al., 1992). This approach is most effectively applied in the 
redistributive policy, especially welfare policy literature (Reich, 2000). This volume 
of work explores how scarce resources are distributed among rival actors, and why 
some groups win while others lose, and consequently shape the policy outputs in a 
way to seek better understanding of the divergences of policy outcomes across 
countries. My study will follow these scholars’ steps to reveal the 'structuring 
politics' in Chinese pension policy development. As for why the historical 
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institutionalist approach is saliently used in the welfare policies, Reich (2000) gave a 
good reason. On the one hand, this approach emphases the role of history, and 
historical development is very influential in determining 'who gets what' in the 
redistribution process and constrains the possible solutions. On the other hand, the 
emphasis on the role of the 'institution' also means that this approach is primarily 
concerned with how the resources are divided, or the domestic interest competitions 
within the institutional organization. Welfare policy is also concerned with the 
redistribution of resources within polity. The historical and power relations focus 
could well explain why and how the resources were distributed and redistributed 
over time.  
To find answers to my research question, I shall attempt to trace pension institution 
transformation over the past decades. My enquiry is not only concerned with 
describing welfare policy change, but also seeks to identify the drivers and 
interactions pushing forward the change. Historical institutionalism puts the weight 
of the analysis on the meso-level institutions and how they intermediate between the 
strategic behaviours of policy makers and the overarching macro context (Hudson 
and Lowe 2012). My study is also based on this assumption and attempts to find out 
how the special Chinese institutional setting produces policy outputs and dynamics. I 
believe that historical institutionalism could serve the case study well: on the one 
hand, it puts the institutional structure into the centre of the analysis, and aims to find 
how the institutional configurations shape the interactions, patterns and results. One 
the other hand, it examines the actions of the micro actors as well as the 
macro-context variables equally, and gives them similar weight in the analysis. And 
this eclectic method caters well to my research concerns. In the past three decades, 
China has gone through massive change against the background of globalisation 
(Nolan, 2004); the attention to both the international and the domestic macro 
contexts should be emphasized in this dramatically changing case. In addition, to 
address questions about the political dynamics in China's pension policy change, the 
observation of the strategic political actors within the institutional structure is also a 
necessary element.  
Second, historical institutionalism emphasizes history (Pierson, 2004). In other 
words, adopting historical institutionalism into this research should provide a long 
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stretch of time for observation rather than merely a fraction of the process. My 
research will trace the development of the pension regime in China from the socialist 
era, through the social transition, right up to the present. Therefore, the long-term 
historical process will be examined in detail, which is consistent with the 
requirements of historical institutionalism.  
Third, taking history seriously in historical institutionalism is not only implied in its 
concern for historical process, but also suggests that the legacy of the past is crucial 
in explaining the existing present state (Pierson, 2004). China is undergoing social 
transition, and the communist and the transition policy legacies also impact the 
current institution formation and transformation. 
3.4 Concluding remarks 
To sum up, this study applies the historical institutionalist approach because it puts 
the meso-level institutional structure into the centre and can deal with the complexity 
of interaction effects. The long-term observation of social/political phenomena could 
reveal hidden causal mechanisms which might be missed in a snapshot study. In 
addition, historical institutionalism as a general theory in social science and political 
science could facilitate the investigation and observation of China's case which poses 
a challenge of generalization or comparison quantitatively or qualitatively in 
orthodox comparative welfare studies. It guides the case researcher about where to 
look, and what sources of data evidence should be collected in general. The next 
chapter will discuss where to study and what evidence should be collected in 
particular, delineating the variables (explanatory and outcome variables) in existing 
pension reform studies.    
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Chapter 4: Explanatory framework and variables in comparative 
pension reform study  
4.1 Introduction  
In the past decades, the welfare state modelling business has assumed that welfare 
states did not change very much (see for example Esping-Andersen, 1996). Instead, 
path dependency and institutional inertia were the dominant arguments in the 1990s 
and early 2000s (Starke, 2006; Green-Pedersen and Haverland, 2002). The 
path-dependency concept together with veto player and blame avoidance 
explanations were the major factors in understanding and explaining reform in a 
mature welfare state, particularly in pension reform (Ebbinghaus, 2005; Mahoney, 
2000a; Pierson, 2000; Pierson, 2011a; Streeck and Thelen, 2005). This causal 
argument not only explained welfare state continuity in general, but also the 
stickiness of pension schemes in particular. The way old-age pension institutions 
institutionalised at the earliest point of implementation would impact considerably 
on their future development. One version of this concept adopted in welfare state 
discussion is to use the policy feedback effect to explain why the observed changes 
in the welfare state programme did not alter the fundamental logic of the whole 
system and scarcely transcended the historical path (see Pierson and Dolowitz, 1994; 
George, 2005). Another stricter version of the concept argues that the welfare state 
institution has an inbuilt causal mechanism that makes it difficult for policy makers 
to change the status quo, such as 'cultural solidarity' (Pierson, 2000). In this version, 
the path-dependency argument mainly emphasizes the 'history matters' thesis.  
From the middle of the 1990s, the discussion began shifting to the witness of welfare 
state change more generally and the pension ‘elephant on the move’ more particular 
(Hinrichs, 2000). With the population ageing, the resistance of the elderly and those 
close to retirement to reform is the general feature of the politics of pension reform. 
Since pension expenditure typically forms the largest proportion of national social 
spending, it is, like a full-grown elephant, difficult to move. However, changes have 
been monitored across OECD countries, substantial path changes were possible and 
have occurred, and it has become obvious that the “elephant can be moved” 
(Hinrichs, 2000). This new discourse has provided empirical evidence of large 
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changes in pension institutions despite the strong inertia embedded in old-age 
pensions (Hinrichs, 2000). It is acknowledged that far-reaching change occurred in 
many Western nations and this phenomenon was neglected in the earlier stages of 
research because of the slow speed of change and the lagged effects of much welfare 
programme change. This has meant that the concept of path dependency to 
understand welfare state change has increasingly been scrutinised, particularly 
because it cannot explain the degree and logic of institutional change (see Chapter 
3).  
First, path-dependency arguments were particularly associated with macro-level 
investigation using quantitative and qualitative data; Castles, for example, used 
public spending data to provide evidence for path-dependency accounts (Castles, 
2004), an approach which has been criticized (Clasen and Siegel, 2007; Kühner, 
2007).  
Second, from a 'bird’s eye view', the differences between welfare regimes 
(Vennesson, 2008), families of nations (Della Porta and Keating, 2008), or varieties 
of capitalism (Mahoney, 2000b) are path dependent. However, from the micro 
perspective, the investigation of a welfare programme (such as pensions) has been 
argued to capture changes which transcend the historical logic (Jochem, 2007).  
Third, it was argued that the path-dependency concept is unlikely to explain welfare 
state change. While, nobody doubted the existence of lock-in effects, it became 
increasingly questionable whether it is possible to explain both change and 
continuity in one framework (Jochem, 2005).  
Fourth, and similarly, there has also been an increased understanding that the 
institutional mechanism that stabilizes different development paths depends on 
political will and capacities. When the context enables the change and political 
actors have the will and ability to switch a given institutional logic, the previous 
lock-in mechanism also provides an opening for change (Jochem, 2005).  
Fifth, it has increasingly been argued that the political institutional explanation 
inspired by new institutionalism has approached its limit. For instance, it has been 
argued that the veto player (Tsebelis) and veto points (Immergut) perspective is only 
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fruitful when the focus is on the decision-making process, and if it takes into 
accounts the investigation of the whole political process including implementation 
(Mahoney & Thelen) and election cycles (Bonoli). 
There is, then, reason to believe that path-dependency concept can be said to be 
limited if it intends to explain continuity and change at the same time. So-called 
institution inertia may be witnessed across countries given the functional causal 
mechanism, and including increasing returns, the sequence of historical events and 
institutional complementarities which reflect the functional or structural demands 
will influence the stability of the path. However, another causal mechanism based on 
legitimacy, conformity and power relations provides another perspective to explain 
continuity and change (that is, the actors with willingness and strategies activate the 
mechanism to stabilize or change the path). And when we intend to adopt the second 
mechanism to study the phenomenon, the nature and dynamic of political 
competition, the extent of the crisis, and the external influences which might impact 
the conception, the preference and the willingness, it reveals why and how 
politicians accept the uncertain and high-cost transition or not (Jochem, 2005). 
In terms of pension studies, developments in a mature pension system have largely 
confirmed path-dependency arguments providing widely-cited reasons such as the 
double payment issue, grey voter power and so on (Myles and Pierson, 2001). 
However, some authors have also challenged the path-dependency argument for 
pension systems. They argue that most recent development has transcended the 
historical path (Myles and Pierson, 2001;Hinrichs and Kangas, 2003; Hinrichs, 2000; 
Jochem, 2007; Andersen, 2007a). Some studies (see Marier, 2008, Arza and Kohli, 
2008, Ebbinghaus and Manow, 2001) have argued that a theoretical framework 
should facilitate the explanation of reforms and non-reforms and feasible conditions 
when reform is adopted (Van Vliet, 2010). 
As in the study of welfare state retrenchment, the dependent variable problem in 
pension reform should be defined and measured. What should be regarded as 
pension reform and what should not? The choice and definition of dependent 
variables for this study reflects the research questions and objective of this thesis. In 
this chapter, I shall borrow the perspective of welfare state change conceptualisation 
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and draw from the extensive pension retrenchment and reconstruction literature 
(Boas, 2007; Green-Pedersen, 2004; Andersen, 2007b; Clegg and Clasen, 2003; 
Jochem, 2005; Bonoli, 2000; Bonoli and Shinkawa, 2005b; Pallares-Miralles et al., 
2012; Jochem, 2007; Andersen, 2007a; Immergut et al., 2006; Streeck and Thelen, 
2005; Holzmann and Hinz, 2005; Ebbinghaus, 2005; Hinrichs and Kangas, 2003; 
Marier, 2002; Clasen and Van Oorschot, 2002; Pierson, 2001; Palier, 2001; Myles 
and Pierson, 2001; James and Brooks, 2001; Palacios and Pallares-Miralles, 2000; 
Orenstein, 2000; Hinrichs, 2000; Taylor-Gooby, 1998; Pierson and Dolowitz, 1994; 
Esping-Andersen, 1990; Castles, 2003; Pierson, 2005; Grimmeisen, 2004; Müller, 
1999a; Babich and Béland, 2009; Kittel and Obinger, 2003; Béland and Shinkawa, 
2007; Ebbinghaus, 2005; Ebbinghaus and Gronwald, 2011; Holzmann, 2013; Bonoli, 
2003; Aysan and Beaujot, 2009; Schmidt, 2006; Jensen, 2009; Marier, 2012), to 
clarify the dependent variables and independent variables in pension institutional 
analysis and answer the second set of my research questions.  
In particular, this study involves such questions as whether the pension institutions in 
China changed or not, and what dimensions are included in defining this change. All 
of these questions determine which data are most appropriate for the investigation. 
The debate about pension reform has been rather heated because of its significance 
and the fact that it occupies a significant part of public spending. However, any study 
of this subject should first identify the nature of the dependent variable problem. The 
dependent variable problem in this study is the pension institution change problem. 
First, what is the theoretical definition of pension institution change in terms of 
direction, extent, and pattern? Second, how to identify the direction, measure the 
extent and define the pattern of pension policy change. The first question requires a 
systemic literature review to clarify the definition of change in pension institutions 
and provide a scope for the study.  
The disagreement about the dependent variables originates from the theoretical 
frameworks, which different researchers adopt and the research questions they try to 
answer. The dependent variable problem within welfare retrenchment has been 
crucial in the welfare retrenchment discussion. Different theoretical perspectives on 
retrenchment lead to different conceptualisations, operationalization and 
measurements, as well different findings (Green-Pedersen, 2004). Thereby, the 
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dependent variable problem is not only a problem of data, but also mainly one of 
theoretical conceptualisation (Clasen and Siegel, 2007). The different measures of 
welfare state change, including standardised and non-standardised social expenditure 
indicators and the de-commodification index, usually reach different conclusions, 
sometimes even contradictory, which challenge the view that a single quantitative 
indicator (social expenditure or social rights) is valid to assess and explain welfare 
state change (Kühner, 2007). Kühner (2007) therefore concluded that the adoption of 
multiple indicators wherever possible could provide an alternative option and he 
suggested that research should engage in disaggregated, programme level assessment. 
Focusing on a particular programme, for instance, old age pensions would avoid the 
limitations of the macro bird's-eye-view indicators but still facilitate more relevant 
conceptual arguments. As Green Pedersen (2004) found, separating the quantitative 
change (including expenditure / generosity) from the qualitative change (institutional 
structure shift) is a thorny issue. Distinguishing the extent of change is more difficult 
too. In order to answer the question of the pension reform trajectory, this thesis will 
study two dimensions: first the scope or degree of reform, and second the causal 
dynamic and mechanism behind the trajectory. The conceptual framework is formed 
on the basis of pension reform in mature welfare states and reform trends globally, 
which will be adopted to assess the pension reform trajectory in China.  
As for the dynamics of the path, this study will turn to the explanatory accounts 
emerging from the literature and identify the independent variables, including 
political institutions, existing pension institutions, the macro context and interest 
groups, to explain the dynamic of pension reform. The causal links will be generated 
from the existing pension reform literature and reveal how and to what extent the 
explanatory variables have affected the outcomes.  
For the causal mechanism interplay between the dependent and independent 
variables, the study will follow the institutional change mechanisms, including 
layering, conversion and drift, to reveal the interactive effect in the process. 
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4.2 Conceptualising and measuring the dependent variable  
In this section, I shall measure pension reform by examining the qualitative 
(institutional characteristics) and quantitative change (institutional outcomes) over 
time and identifying the reform process and its impact. Qualitative change is 
identified through pension institutions' architecture and characteristics based on the 
available qualitative data including government documents and other qualitative 
literature. The quantitative change is identified from the institution outcomes in term 
of pension adequacy, pension redistribution and pension privatization based on the 
quantitative data. First, to operationalize and measure qualitative change, pension 
taxonomy will be used as a map to identify the architectural changes in pension 
institutions. To measure the extent of change, Hall’s (1993) conception of 
three-order change will be used in conjunction with systemic and programmatic 
measurements developed by Pierson (1994) to scale the degree of change. Second, 
the institution outcome will be measured quantitatively by means of a public pension 
generosity index (Scruggs, 2006) and pension privatization index (De Deken, 2013), 
which will both be introduced in the following sections.   
4.2.1 Conceptualising institutional characteristics  
Given the variations of institutional design, it is difficult to generalise the detailed 
content of pension programmes between countries. Even so, this section will attempt 
to outline the general architecture of pension structures as well as the parameters of 
design change across countries. An important facet of pension path change could be 
disentangled through the pension programme profile or the pension institutional 
structure by adopting the language of pillars and tiers (Jochem, 2007). The 
comparative historical literature on pension policy change has been discussing the 
multi-pillar pension as the macro institution design for a long time (Myles and 
Pierson, 2001). Comparative studies usually classify the origins of pension systems 
as following the models of Bismarck or Beveridge. Bismarck's model developed on 
the social insurance principle, and old-age insurance is related to employment status 
with the aim of maintaining income level after retirement. The Beveridge model 
developed from the poor law tradition, in which a universal tax- or 
contribution-financed pension was established to prevent poverty (Bonoli, 2003). 
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Most OECD countries belong to one or the other of these two models. Since the 
1990s, pension privatisation has been carried out in various ways across the world 
and pension institutions have shifted from the original model.  
In order to capture the change trajectory and goal shifts over time within a country, 
the general practice in the analysis is to adopt the 'pillar-tier' method to map out the 
whole pension institution architecture. To define a change or measure change, 
Hinrichs and Kanga proposed that a shift in the structure-mix could be qualified as 
change, such as the addition of a new pillar or the revision of a tier within a pillar 
(Hinrich and Kangas, 2003). For instance, Finland abolished the national pension 
completely and Germany introduced a special minimum benefit scheme in 2003: 
Finland broke with the citizenship principle and Germany joined the multi-pillar 
trend with other industrialized nations. Cutting a pillar or adding a new pillar which 
broke with a previous principle could cause a large change, and a change such as 
increasing the link between contribution and benefits could cause a parametric 
change (Hinrich and Kangas, 2003). All parametric or systemic shifts could be 
identified from a review of the policy programme and the relevant documents. 
Capturing this institution architecture shift is crucial to mapping out the pension 
institution development trajectory. 
Consideration of WB, OECD and comparative pension reform literature can clarify 
the pillar-tier mix method in more detail (OECD, 2011; Holzmann and Hinz, 2005; 
Palacios and Pallares-Miralles, 2000; Andersen, 2007b; Myles and Pierson, 2001; 
Hinrichs, 2000; Jochem, 2007). According to Ebbinghaus (2011), several pillars 
(that is, institutionalized providers which are responsible for the provision of old-age 
pensions) can be distinguished. Although various public schemes exist which can be 
distinguished according to their diverse goals and functions, the first pillar is 
typically understood to be state-provided (see table 4.2.1); the second pillar is 
provided by employers or social partners and features a similar degree of variation in 
regards to goals and functions across countries; and the final pillar is provided by 
individual savings or investment plans through financial markets.  
The use of the notion of separate tiers is one way to further disentangle complicated 
multi-pillar pension systems according to the tier function and feature, whether they 
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are redistributive or saving, mandatory or voluntary (OECD, 2011). The first two 
tiers are usually redistributive (public pillars), and mandatory or quasi-mandatory 
based on state intervention (private pillars), and the third tier focuses on savings 
plans and rarely exists in a public pillar, except in Sweden (where there are 
mandatory funded individual accounts) and is more prevalent as a voluntary scheme 
in private pillars. Different countries will present diverse architectures based on 
different pillar-tier compositions.  
The first tier comprises programmes designed to ensure absolute minimum living 
standards; these programmes have an evident redistributive character and are aimed 
broadly at poverty prevention in the public pillar, and are usually regulated or 
intervened in by the government in the private pillars. Among the OECD countries, 
there are mainly three types of first-tier scheme provided by the public sector.  
First, resource-tested schemes are typically aimed at providing targeted benefits to 
poorer pensioners; entitlement to benefits depend either on income from other 
sources or on both income and assets. Such safety-net programmes can be found in 
all countries, but in some cases they only cover relatively small numbers of older 
people who can look back on interrupted working careers.  
Second, universal basic pension schemes provide flat-rate benefits to all retirees 
based on social citizenship criteria; the calculation of benefits may still be based on 
years of work.  
The final type is minimum pensions, which share many features with 
resources-tested plans, but are different because the entitled values depend on 
pension income rather than the income from savings or assets.  
In this sense, workers in earnings-related schemes with very low earnings may be 
entitled to minimum credits in the context of higher-level earnings through other 
means. And in the private pillars, the mandatory occupational pension or individual 
pension schemes constitute this tier. The second tier is aimed at maintaining previous 
living standards after retirement through earnings-related benefits and following a 
contribution record and expected benefits. Usually, this tier in private pillars has 
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government subsidies, tax deduction or regulation, which is the main strategy of 
promoting the multi-pillar pension worldwide.  
There are three kinds of scheme within this second tier in the first two pillars.  
First, defined-benefit (DB) plans can be provided by the state or occupational 
schemes and benefits depend on the contribution record and individual earnings.  
Second, defined-contribution (DC) plans are either compulsory or voluntary. Under 
this scheme, contributions flow into individual accounts and the accumulated 
contribution and investment returns will convert into a pension income stream after 
retirement.  
Third, notional defined-contribution plans are somewhere between DB and DC in the 
sense that contribution records in individual accounts are used as the standard to pay 
the benefits while the accounts are notional in the balances; additionally, the notional 
capital accumulated is converted into pension payments using a formula based on 
life expectancy. In the third pillar, various insurance products and collective 
investment plans constitute this tier. The third tier is meant to 'top-up' retirement 
income. It is more prevalent in the private pillars in the form of various voluntary 
schemes. Investments saving plans (provided by employers to high-skilled 
employees) or voluntary personal saving plans (provided by financial institutions) 
are the most common third-tier pensions: individual investment and saving plans, 
housing assets and family support also belong to this category. However, it should be 
mentioned here that this study would focus on the collective social responsibilities, 
including state and non-state actors, and exclude the complete individual 
arrangements.  
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Table 4.2.1 A Taxonomy of Pillar-tier Pension Systems1 
First pillar Second pillar Third pillar 
Third tier: mandatory 
individual saving (state 
managed) 
Types: e.g. Swedish funded 
accounts 
Third tier: voluntary 
occupational pension 
Types: additional plans on 
top of the first two tiers (for 
high income groups, or high 
skilled workers) 
Third tier: voluntary additional 
plans 
Types: housing assets, 
retirement saving, family 
support, etc. 
Second tier: mandatory 
saving 
 
Types : earning- related DB, 
DC, NDC schemes, pension 
points, etc. 
Second tier: government 
subsidized or promoted 
quasi-mandatory or voluntary 
schemes 
Types: occupational plans or 
company plans (DC) 
Second tier:  government 
regulated insurance products 
 
Types: lump sum, annuity 
products, life insurance, etc. 
First tier: mandatory, 
adequate 
Types : social assistance, 
minimum pension, basic 
pension 
First tier: mandatory schemes 
Types: occupational pension 
plans, or 
employer-sponsored 
pensions (DB, DC) 
First tier: mandatory, quasi 
-mandatory private pensions 
Types: individual retirement 
accounts, e.g. AFP in Chile, 
401k US (DC) 
                                                
1 Apart from the system architecture from the structure view, the details of programme parameters are also different from one 
another and constitute different institutional features. According to the WB classification of operational parameters, there are 
two components of a pension system. The first is the qualifying criteria, which include the entitlement conditions for receiving 
benefits, the retirement age, and the minimum investment period, which means the required contribution history/service to 
qualify for pension entitlement. The second operating parameter includes contribution rate, benefits formula, indexation, target 
replacement rate and public-private mix. The contribution rate is found to vary across countries globally. Benefit accrual 
formulas are diverse based on whether the pension calculation is defined by average life earnings or final salary. Benefit 
indexation is indices to adjust pension payments, and these differ with changes in wage or price level. The target replacement 
rate describes the objective of a pension system replacing the pre-retirement wage level. The target replacement rate refers to 
new entrants in the labour force covered by the pension scheme  
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4.2.2 Measuring institutional pension reforms  
The pension reform measures since the 1980s which have been adopted by countries 
within Europe and globally, particularly in the public pension domain, have mainly 
followed the following trends. First, reducing benefits by changing the parameters of 
the existing system. Second, increasing contributions, either by raising the 
percentage rate or by widening the range of income on which contributions are 
payable. Third, raising the retirement age (increasing the eligibility condition). 
Fourth, shifting the risk and sharing it between more actors, particular individuals or 
the private sector. The measures include changing the DB to DC or NDC (Notional 
Defined Contribution), which leaves the risk to the investment market and individual 
choice. Fifth, bringing more incentives to increase savings or funding pension 
scheme development through tax incentives, which reduces the reliance on DB 
schemes or public pension provision (Barr and Diamond, 2008a). Sixth, indexation 
rule changes and adjustments according to socio-economic changes. For instance, the 
pension indexation is no longer based on wage but on price, which corresponds more 
to the cost of living and can be adjusted according to the economic situation. In 
addition, other sustainability factors are brought into consideration; for instance, 
techniques which take into account population aging in pension calculation (Vidlund, 
2006).   
Hall’s (1993) three-order change proposed another general way to scale the nature of 
change. First-order change refers to instrumental change, such as raising the pension 
contribution level, or changing the indexation from wages to prices. Second-order 
change refers to future changes by bringing in new instruments, such as stricter 
conditions or new calculation rules, and these instruments are usually visible. 
Third-order change involves paradigmatic change both in instruments and goals, 
which changes the overall logic of a pension policy. Similarly, Pierson (1994, p.17) 
circumscribed ‘programmatic’ retrenchments “that either cut social expenditure [or] 
restructure welfare state programs [sic] to conform more closely to the residual 
welfare state model” and ‘systemic’ retrenchment that aims to “alter the political 
environment in ways that enhance the probability of such outcomes in the future”. 
Following Kühner (Hudson and Kühner, 2011; Kühner  and Zhang, 2012), this 
thesis use these descriptors to measure the parameter changes adopted when 
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countries embark on pension reform (see Table 4.2.2), to scale the extent of reform 
over time within one country or to compare different extents across countries. 
Accordingly, policies aimed at cost control implicitly and explicitly as well as 
adjustment within or across pillars can be classified as programmatic and systemic 
change. Such reforms may include explicit cost controls measures, including raising 
the contribution rate and reducing the benefits, raising the retirement age, changing 
the indexing formula and reducing non-contributory periods. Additionally, increases 
in benefit reductions for early retirees up to actuarial level and the tightening of 
eligibility rules for disability pensions often have an immediate effect on pensioners 
and those close to retirement. The same is true for the introduction of income tests or 
the direct reduction of other auxiliary benefits. All these measures are immediate, 
visible cuts to public pensions. Implicit cost control includes stricter qualifying 
conditions, such as prolonging the investment period, moving the pension 
calculation from final salary to life average salary, changing the DB scheme to DC 
or NDC and sharing the risk among more actors, utilising parts of the increased 
contribution rate to build up a fund reserve, calculating employers’ share on value 
adding items, and differentiating employees’ individual contribution rates according 
to the number of children. All these measures are not immediate and may change the 
future projected cost. These implicit or explicit switches reduce the cost of achieving 
better fiscal sustainability and greater alignment with lifetime consumption patterns, 
which are based more on the adjustment of existing parameters without general 
architecture change within or across pillars.  
We shall classify the reform efforts aimed at structure change as systemic or 
third-order change. Such reforms may include activities that are either mandatory or 
encourage supplementary private, fully funded pension provision, large structural 
reform activities of old-age pension systems, introducing fixed contribution 
principles or increasing subsidies out of general taxation to public pensions schemes; 
equally, the introduction or strengthening of first-tier pensions falls into this category. 
Following the taxonomy of pension systems described above, all these initiatives 
arguably represent a multi-pillar approach to pensions implicitly or explicitly – a 
paradigmatic change of the function and goals of state pensions which is likely to 
result in considerably different pension outcomes, if not in the short term, then 
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certainly in the medium and longer term. Therefore, the introduction or cancellation 
of a particular pillar or tier is seen as systemic change.  
In addition, the conceptual framework based on the retrenchment literature can also 
explain welfare expansion, which takes a reverse direction. Given the special nature 
of the Chinese welfare system, which is in the making and developing process, the 
complexity of reform direction can not only be identified as retrenchment. In order to 
explain the Chinese pension reform process more precisely, the full span covering 
the retrenchment and expanding dimensions could be adopted in the framework (see 
Table 4.2.2). The welfare expansion measures include actual increases in net pension 
replacement rates, expanding coverage, changing from funded to PAYG financing, 
and the introduction of automatic benefit indexation and/or contributory periods. 
Policies to encourage early retirement and facilitate eligibility for disability pensions 
have been a preferred method of alleviating labour market pressures, but have 
proven to be equally costly. The incorporation of unpaid family work into the benefit 
calculation is another way to strengthen the goal of status maintenance in public 
pension provision and thus to undermine the need for first and third pillar solutions. 
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Table 4. 2. 2 Coding Framework for Pension Reform 
Direction Hall (1993) Pierson 
(1994) 
Hinrichs (2000: 364; 2010: 97-98); Ebbinghaus (2011); 
Pallares (2012) 
 
 
 
Retrenchm
ent 
3rd  order: 
paradigm 
changing 
Systemic • Mandating or encouraging supplementary private, 
fully-funded provision 
• Introducing fixed contribution principles; increasing 
subsidies out of general taxation to public pension 
schemes 
• Introducing basic pensions 
• Harmonising public and civil servant pensions 
schemes 
1st/2nd order: 
parametric, 
instrumental 
Programmatic • Decreasing net pension replacement rates: 
strengthening equivalence principle; suspending 
automatic benefit indexation and/or changing the 
indexing formula; reducing non-contributory periods 
• Raising retirement age; increasing benefit 
reductions for early retirees up to actuarial level; 
tightening eligibility rules for disability pensions 
• Introducing income tests; reducing auxiliary benefits 
• Tightening contribution benefit link: increasing 
contribution rates (employees); utilising parts of 
increased contribution rate to build up a fund 
reserve; calculating employers’ share on value 
adding items; differentiating employees’ individual 
contribution rate according to the number of children 
 
 
Expansion 
1st/2nd  
order: 
parametric, 
instrumental 
Programmatic • Loosening contribution/benefit link: increasing 
contribution rates (employers); increase of transfers 
between social security branches 
• Increasing net pension replacement rates: changing 
from funded to PAYG financing; introducing 
automatic benefit indexation and/or changing the 
indexing formula; increasing non-contributory 
periods 
• Encouraging early retirement; facilitating eligibility 
for disability pensions 
• Incorporating unpaid family work into benefit 
calculation 
3rd order: 
paradigm 
changing 
Systemic • Introducing/extending contributory, earnings-related 
benefits that are mandatory for particular 
occupational groups; crowding out private provision 
• Tax-financed, non-contributory pensions for civil 
servants 
4.2.3 Operationalizing quantitative institutional pension change  
The design features presented in the previous section reveal how the programmatic 
diversity across countries or programme change over time within one country. 
However, there is always a gap between formal requirements and actual practice, in 
order to achieve the whole picture of pension system change; addressing the pension 
institution outcomes quantitatively is another dimension to explore change or the 
absence of change. This section will introduce different pension institution outcome 
measurements include generosity, redistribution and privatization. The first two 
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measures are more about public pension provision and the third is more related to 
pension reform trends with privatization and multi-pillar model diffusion. The 
combination of these three measurements not only evaluates pension system 
performance in terms of level of generosity and poverty reduction, but also 
demonstrates the dynamic of a pension system in terms of the public-private mix. 
Adequacy and generosity  
To gauge generosity level, we shall use indicators including the macro expenditure 
data, the replacement rate and coverage to evaluate the institution performance. 
International comparison of national social policies has largely relied on programme 
spending data (Scruggs, 2006). Researchers use various measures of social spending 
data to examine the consequences and causes of social programme change within a 
country or across countries. The adoption of macro expenditure data for this purpose 
is reasonable because it can easily be used to assess welfare policy between countries. 
However, some caution is warranted when using such measures. As already 
mentioned before, macro spending data often obscures as much as it reveals and the 
different measures of expenditure data sometimes produce confusing or even 
contradicting results (Kühner, 2007). More precisely, Scruggs (2006) pointed out 
that macro expenditure data does not address the size of or changes in the dependent 
population; for instance, countries might have the same level of expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP, but they may have a different proportion of old-age population, 
so the same spending level does not necessarily guarantee the same level of 
generosity. In addition, spending data cannot separate social spending trends and 
economic growth trends. A relative increase in spending growth may be due to faster 
economic growth (Scruggs, 2006).  
Even though there are problems in or criticisms of macro expenditure measurement, 
we shall still adopt it as one indicator to represent spending level change over time, 
and we shall add more complementary indicators to mitigate the above limitation. 
This remains common practice in comparative welfare research (see Castles, 2004). 
When assessing a pension system, the pension spending as a share of GDP does not 
reflect the generosity level, as much as it is concerned with the financial capacity to 
pay benefits; indeed, in comparative public pension research macro spending data it 
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is usually a starting point for financial status analysis (Pallares-Miralles et al., 2012). 
In order to show quantitative degree changes in spending data, we shall use spending 
per retiree to measure the scale of public pension generosity (see Castles, 2002; 2004; 
Kühner, 2007). 
The complementary indicators of spending data involve public pension replacement 
and coverage ratios. For an individual, one of the most important indicators of the 
generosity of a welfare programme is the income replacement rate, i.e. the 
proportion of income in work that is replaced by social welfare benefits after 
retirement (Scruggs, 2006). The net replacement rate and empirical replacement rate 
are the two most common indicators used to reflect the adequacy and generosity 
level of a benefit. The first is based on a forward-looking simulation of replacement 
rates for workers entering the labour market today, and is operationalized as the ratio 
of the pension entitlement when retired to individual earnings when working. The 
results are based on current parameters and rules of the pension system based on the 
systematic analysis of pension entitlements across countries (Whitehouse, 2006; 
OECD, 2011), which are calculated out of taxes and contributions paid on earning 
when working and pension during retirement. Net replacement ratios are commonly 
used in the analysis of public pensions in advanced Western economies (Whitehouse, 
2012), but for China data availability is much more restricted. Hence, the analysis in 
this thesis will solely rely on the empirical replacement rate, which are measured 
from administrative data and show the benefits actually received by the retirees.  
Scruggs (2006) suggested that another determinant of the generosity of a pension 
insurance system is the coverage rate. Expanding the coverage rate is widely 
considered an important indicator of welfare expansion by simply including more 
people (ILO, 2012; 2013). National social insurance programmes started historically 
in the twentieth century with limited coverage and only gradually extended to the 
entire population (Scruggs, 2006). Therefore, examining the coverage rate change 
over time is another complementary measurement to reveal the generosity level of 
pension insurance. Coverage of a pension system can be calculated from the 
numbers of contributors and beneficiaries, that is, the working-age population 
building up pension rights and the numbers of people of pension age receiving 
benefits. The working-age population refers to the labour force or the population of 
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working age (15-64) (Whitehouse, 2012). Similar to net replacement rates, coverage 
ratios are not readily available for the Chinese case. However, it is possible to 
calculate ratios by means of data included in various Chinese Statistical Yearbooks 
(MOHRSS, 2011; NBS, 2011, 2012). All coverage figures presented subsequently 
were calculated by the author. 
Closely related to measures of adequacy and generosity are indicators capturing the 
redistributive impact of pensions? These institutional outcomes or policy outputs, i.e. 
whether they reduce the income insecurity risk (poverty prevention) or create 
inequality among pensioners, can be adopted to assess the system over time (Barr 
and Diamond, 2008b). Since a pension system is typically intended to reduce 
poverty among the elderly, poverty figures (for instance, based on a poverty line of 
fifty per cent of median per capita income) are crucial for assessing the outcome of a 
pension system. One direct measurement of pension impact on poverty is the extent 
to which pensions reduce poverty (the percentage of the poverty gap reduced by 
pension transfers), and the incidence of pension spending by calculating the 
percentage of the transfer received (the percentage of elderly households receiving 
pension transfer), as well as the percentage of consumption of elderly households 
compared with non-elderly households.  
All these indicators have to be calculated using the household expenditure surveys of 
countries which report the sources of income (Pallares-Miralles et al., 2012). Data 
availability, however, remains an issue once more. Major OECD publications 
routinely provide poverty figures, but data for non-OECD countries using 
comparable and systematic equivalent definitions and scales are often not readily 
available (Pallares-Miralles et al., 2012) The World Bank Social Protection 
Department uses household survey data to generate indictors for non-OECD 
countries, such as Latin America countries but China is not yet included in these 
calculations except the year data of 1995 and 1997(WB, 2013). Consequently, 
redistributive effects of pensions in China could not be accounted for systematically. 
Analysis of the other institutional and quantitative indicators nevertheless enables a 
tentative assessment of the redistributive effect of pension reforms in China.   
Privatisation  
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Pension reforms have often altered the public-private mix in the institution 
architecture as discussed above.  Therefore, indicators measuring the share of 
retirement income coming from the public versus that from private pensions have 
been more widely used since such a measure can denote institutional outcomes 
before and after key reforms, particularly whether reforms have increased (or not) 
the extent to which the individual relies on public and private provision respectively. 
For instance, DeDeken’s (2013) pension privatisation index is calculated as the 
relative share of public and private pensions thus offering a possibility to 
demonstrate the extent of privatization across countries (a similar measure was 
included in Esping-Andersen, 1990 to indicate one aspect of stratification).  
DeDeken (2013) adopts two variables reflecting different public-private pension 
arrangements: current expenditure of private benefits and the funding rate of private 
pensions. To measure the importance of current and future private pensions, he 
proposes using the coverage of private pension plans and the theoretical replacement 
rate of public pensions (target replacement rate). The first indicator, the replacement 
rate of a public pension, tests whether a generous statutory scheme will crowd out 
private provision, and this indicator presents the implicit option of exiting from 
statutory programmes. The second indicator is the pension scheme assets of private 
pensions, which tend to be pre-funded and can be measured by financial assets as a 
percentage of GDP. The third indicator, private pension expenditure as a percentage 
of public expenditure, indicates the extent to which the administration of the pension 
has been transferred to private actors. In measuring this indicator, the distinction 
between public and private pension should be clarified. Following the OECD 
definition, 'public' is considered as statutory programmes administered by the general 
government as well as public bodies such as social security institutions. In China's 
case, the whole public pension pillar belongs to this category. 'Private' pension plans 
are those administered by a private sector employer as plan sponsor, private pension 
fund or private provider (OECD, 2005). The fourth indicator is the coverage by 
private pension plans: the percentage of the active population covered by private 
plans, and the contribution rates levied by the 'largest private pension scheme' reflect 
the extent to which private actors are responsible for providing retirement incomes. 
To perform this sort of analysis requires very detailed information on public and 
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private tiers across the different pensions pillars. Data availability does, once again, 
not allow for a complete replication of DeDeken’s approach, but nevertheless a 
presentation of slightly simplified privatisation measures is included in the 
subsequent analysis. More detailed explanation of these alternative measures is 
provided in Chapter 5.   
4.3 Determinants of pension change 
The notion of ‘elephants on the move’ described earlier is now very much a 
consensus among welfare-state studies. Nevertheless, the extent and direction of the 
‘move’ became a topic for discussion. Part of this, is an exploration what has 
determined the degrees of change. To solve this puzzle, various explanatory factors 
have been introduced. Much attention has been focussed institutional independent 
variables, such as social partners, employers and unions, pensioners and partisan 
veto players, to account for the diversity of pension reform across countries. 
Together it is argued that they form an actor combination in the polity and that their 
interactions in the decision-making process determine the degree of reform and 
reform strategies. It is striking, that all these propositions developed from a 
decision-making or consensus making perspective, without much consideration of 
the issue from the implementation process. While much attention is put on these 
institutional variables, other factors at the macro and micro level have been included 
in exploratory frameworks too. The following section will provide a review of these 
different kinds of determinants utilised in the comparative public pension literature 
and follow this with a discussion of the causal linkages found in mainstream 
accounts of public pension reform. 
4.3.1 Macro context: demographic ageing and the state of economies 
Demographic ageing and the deteriorating old age dependency ratio (the ratio of 
people aged 65 and above to people aged 15-64) have been used by pension reform 
proponents as the most important reason to undertake pension reform since the 
publication of the need to avert an old-age crisis (Pordes, 1994). Population aging is 
often suggested to be the major trigger of reform, while the pattern of demographic 
aging is argued to affect the extent of reforms (Bonoli and Shinkawa, 2005b) – in 
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short, different speeds of ageing should trigger different levels of reform across 
countries. It is assumed that the higher the problem pressure caused by population 
ageing, the more radical the reform it will be. However, the evidence does not 
suggest this is always the case. For instance, Germany certainly has a moderate 
ageing trend and has been slower to introduce radical reforms compared than other 
countries with more radical reforms, such as Sweden and Italy (Immergut et al., 
2006). In addition, demographic projections merely provide one side of the pressure 
regarding the viability of the retirement system. An alternative measurement, old-age 
pension expenditure projections, should be taken into account to assess the degree of 
the pressure and its relation with the reform options (Bonoli, 2000). The variations in 
expenditure projections are generally suggested to constitute a more substantial and 
more visible factor in alerting the government to propose reform. In general, 
demographic ageing is measured as the proportion of the population aged 65 or over. 
Another factor related to demographic aging are concerns about pension 
sustainability and budgetary crisis. As people live longer, it becomes more expensive 
to provide them with a monthly pension. This issue is further exacerbated by the 
decreasing fertility rate and increasing early retirement rate. If pension formulas 
remain unchanged, projected trends in longevity, fertility and economic growth 
suggest that the pension expenditure relative to GDP will increase (Barr and 
Diamond, 2008a). For instance, the expenditure crisis in pension programmes came 
mainly from the slow wage growth after the 1990s, since the tax-financed pension 
system adopted by Europe in the post-war period depended on high wage growth, 
high fertility and high labour force participation – consequently, early retirement, 
low wage growth and demographic aging have combined to constitute the issue of 
the financial sustainability of old-age pensions (Myles and Pierson, 2001). In 
pension reform studies, the shortage of capital for the increasing needs of an aging 
population is usually argued as the crucial reason for pension reform, and it has 
received a great deal of attention from researchers. In addition, for developing or 
transitional countries, the dependence on foreign capital or international organisation 
is another reason affecting reform options (Müller, 1999b; Madrid, 2002; Elkins and 
Simmons, 2004). This particular issue will be discussed further in the following 
paragraph (see 4.4.2). As for the measurement of crisis, since it shares common 
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features with the financial situation of the pension institution, it will be explained in 
a subsequent section (see 4.4.4). The higher the financial crisis of a pension system, 
the more likely pension reform is to occur, and the greater the possibility of radical 
reform being adopted, such as privatisation or a fully-funded financial mechanism 
shift (James and Brooks, 2001).   
Overall, the macro context variables provide helpful clues for particular pension 
reform patterns. First, they are helpful in explaining what triggered reform agendas 
among the advanced countries – thus providing a useful lesson for the analysis of 
China's old age pension reforms. Second, macro context variables, and particularly 
the timing of the old-age spending crisis, can be used to explain the timing of reform 
initiatives. However, macro context variables do less well in explaining the 
continuity of pension regimes in particular countries or the specific reform patterns 
across countries. Other determinants of public pension reform have to be considered 
to draw a picture that is more complete.  
4.3.2 Macro context: diffusion and policy learning  
Apart from economic, demographic and spending pressures, another reform pressure 
comes from international organisations such as the EU, the WB and the IMF, and 
from the idea of pension privatization they advocate. These international 
organisations and their ideas impact on pension reform by different means: the first 
is through loan conditionality; the second is through ‘anticipated reaction’ in which 
countries adopt measures from international organisations without consultation; the 
third is the adoption of an internal organisation template to legitimise reform options 
in the domestic context; the fourth is policy learning and policy transfer from other 
countries; and finally, harmonization occurs and the member countries have to 
follow the common practice required by the super-national organization (Brooks, 
2004). In Western European countries, ideas or the ideational construction processes 
have also affected pension politics. Domestic policy makers have been influenced by 
international debates about public pension reform promoted by a community of 
pension experts and international organisations (Immergut et al., 2006). However, 
this happened through the diffusion of ideas, and policy makers have mainly used 
existing institutional templates and combined them with the internationally discussed 
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proposals to form reform options (Immergut et al., 2006). Communication with the 
public regarding the reform options, particularly about unpopular measures, is 
crucial here. Therefore, assessing how the international idea is used as a template 
and using policy discourse across countries to legitimize pension reform options has 
become a principal research area in developed countries (Immergut et al., 2006). 
Instead of the international ideas as the trigger or justification for reform strategies in 
advanced countries, developing countries have mainly been influenced by 
international organisations and ideas through policy intervention. The World Bank's 
direct intervention strategy includes technical assistance and sending advice and 
financial assistance and bank employees to the national policy offices (Orenstein, 
2000). Global policy discourse and direct interventions play a powerful role in 
pension reform across countries. However, an assessment of the role of ideas should 
be combined with the political institution which creates opportunities for and 
constraints to adopting the ideas (Hudson and Lowe, 2009). Therefore, the general 
proposition about the role of international ideas in advanced economies is that 
politicians respond to austerity pressure and use the international idea to justify the 
retrenchment measures, minimizing blame and electoral loss. However, the strategies 
they adopt and the final options they have are determined by the political and 
pension institution features (Immergut et al., 2006). 
4.3.3 Meso-context: veto points and veto players 
The pension reform literature offers several arguments about how political 
institutions structure opportunities for policy change. A large number of studies have 
explored how political decision-making institutions influence pension reform 
processes, and these studies can be classified as two groups according to the political 
institution features on which they focus. The first group adopts the static view to 
disentangle the relations between political decision-making and policy outcomes. It 
uses the tools of veto point and veto players to emphasise the existence and impact 
of specific constitutional structures (Huber et al., 1993). As for the theoretical 
explanation of the veto points impact on policy outcomes, the core argument is that 
veto points in the political system shape the possibility and content of major 
legislative reforms. The probability of legislation is proportionally related to the 
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policy-making powers of the executive government. In other words, the more veto 
points there are in any given polity, the more difficult it is to bring about radical 
change of the status quo (Immergut, 1990; Immergut, 1992b).  
More recently, the term 'veto players' was coined by Tsebelis (2011) (see also 
Tsebelis, 2002; Tsebelis and Chang, 2004). He constructed a more general model to 
investigate the impact of political institutions by focusing on executive power and 
government composition. In this model, it is the number of veto players (including 
partisan players and institutional veto points) whose agreement is necessary for 
passing legislation and this determines the possibility and difficulties of change. In 
addition, Tsebelis also suggested a way to measure the distances between veto 
players who are also crucially related with the probability of agreement. Tsebelis 
hypothesised that the greater the numbers of veto players, the greater the policy 
distance and the greater cohesion between veto players there will be, which will 
result in greater policy stability. The case evidences from West European countries 
provide a good test for the explanatory power of these hypotheses. For instance, 
Bonoli (2000,2001) found that the presence or absence of veto points was critical to 
the passage of reform in Britain, France and Switzerland.  
Another group concerns the political competition aspects, with the focus on the 
election system, electoral rules and the party system in the political institution 
(Immergut et al., 2006). These studies argued that that the degree of political 
competition structures and influences the effective governance and the capacities of 
introducing significant policy change. They hypothesise that low political 
competition will lead to policy stability because the government has little incentive 
to respond to voter concerns and policy problems. In contrast, high political 
competition is likely to lead to the introduction of policy changes as a response to 
policy problems, but the worry about the risk of election loss in response to 
unpopular reforms forces the government to compromise with other parties or groups. 
Therefore, high and low political competition are unlikely to achieve effective 
governance, but for different reasons. The medium political competition is likely to 
be effective to introduce change because the government with a stable majority in a 
competitive environment is able to sacrifice some votes to pass its legislative 
initiatives.  
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The veto points and veto players approach are useful to understanding the dynamic 
of pension reform because they provide the cause of the resistance to change in 
certain political systems. And the political competition aspect also brings incentives 
and constraints for the politicians to propose change. Therefore, when studying the 
impact of political institutions on pension reform, these two aspects should be 
combined to check the legislative process. The question of how to disentangle the 
Chinese political institution through formal institution design and political 
competition will be explained in the next chapter.  
4.3.4 Meso-context: policy legacy and path dependency 
Among the European countries, the origin or the starting points of pension system 
design not only shaped the problem pressure, but also the logic of pension reform. 
The different infrastructures of pension systems generate different incentive 
structures for policy makers and ultimately generate different pension politics. 
Observation of Western European pensions systems reveals two types of pension 
design, social insurance (Bismarckian) and multi-pillar systems (Beveridgian) 
(Bonoli, 2003). The distinction between these two types is down to the relative 
weight of first, the universal public pension pillar, and second, the 
occupational-based or private pillar. The former is based on employment and 
contribution, and the benefits are earnings–related; countries such as Germany, 
France, Italy and Sweden belong to this group (Bonoli, 2003). The multi-pillar 
model provides flat-rate minimum pension benefits with the aim of poverty 
prevention, which leaves room for the development of private provision; countries 
such as the Netherlands, Denmark and Switzerland belong to this category (Bonoli, 
2003). 
This distinction not only teaches us about the classification of pension systems, but 
also tells us a great deal about the problems faced in individual countries. The 
architecture of the pension system is a powerful determinant of the pension problem 
diagnoses and reform options that a country could adopt (Bonoli and Shinkawa, 
2005b). For instance, social insurance faces problems of financial sustainability. The 
PAYG basis and large size of the state pension determine the restraint against 
retrenchment because of the inter-generation transfer being sensitive to aging, and 
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the greater government control makes the retrenchment more explainable. As a 
consequence, this group with a mature public pillar is said to be less likely to adopt 
full funding measures, and some have moved towards partial funding (Canada, 
Sweden) or the promotion of the private pillar (German)(Myles and Pierson, 2001). 
The multi-pillar model can control the public pillar's sustainable problem but faces 
more challenges of adopting austerity measures in second pillar pensions, such as the 
insufficient benefits of this pillar, which are observed in many countries, including 
the UK and Switzerland (Bonoli and Shinkawa, 2005a). This group develops funded 
provision, a universal or quasi-universal capitalized pension scheme, on top of the 
existing programmes which were established by the early 1990s (Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland, Australia, the UK) (Bonoli and Shinkawa, 2005b; Pierson, 
2001).  
This thesis shall adopt the language of this typology to carry out the case analysis 
even though the origins of the pension system in China started from an incomplete 
system, which only covered state sector workers, but this is the main part or the 
template for welfare reform in China. At least, the development of state sector 
pensions started from Bismarckian principles and then gradually expanded to other 
sector workers. In terms of the Chinese case, the starting point of the Chinese 
pension system can be understood as an incomplete social insurance model; in this 
sense, China has faced multiple problems. On the one hand, it was forced to retrench 
social insurance through partial privatisation; on the other hand, China has had to 
expand this system to provide universal coverage. 
When a country makes a transition from a PAYG public system to a privately 
managed, funded regime, its government faces the transition cost problem which is 
presented in the form of implicit pension debt (James and Brooks, 2001). This means 
that the government must continue to meet its existing obligations, which can be 
measured by the value of the accrued rights of current workers in the old system at 
the current time. The scale of the existing PAYG system puts significant constraints 
on the scale and timing of the funded proposal. Even partial privatisation often 
requires substantial benefit cuts, pay tax rises, or both. It is therefore commonly 
hypothesised that countries with a high implicit pension debt will adopt less radical 
reform (James and Brooks, 2001; Pierson, 2001).  
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This occurs because of the path-dependence effect from the old system. The public 
pressure to retain the acquired rights in the old system will constrain the policy 
makers from making radical changes for fear of losing pensioner support (because 
pensioners still vote). And the social security bureaucracy that managed the old 
system and which had accumulated power through handing out money and 
employing workers is likely to oppose a reform that strips some of its power away 
(James and Brooks, 2001). In addition, apart from the size of the PAYG transition 
cost, the pre-existing funded plans also have an important effect on the probability of 
structural pension reform. It is thus expected that the prior existence of funded plans 
increase the probability of structural change. This is not only because of the low 
transition cost, but also the existence of political constituencies, which favour the 
funded system. This is a trend that was witnessed in multi-pillar pension regimes 
such as Australia and Switzerland. The pre-existing privately managed, funded 
pension plan (voluntary, collectively based) led to a situation in which mandatory 
funded plans increased their coverage, at times even to include everybody (James 
and Brooks, 2001). 
In terms of China's case, the implicit pension debt will be measured and included in 
the analysis. The pension reform design needs to consider the pre-existing design, 
not only the communist legacies, but also transition legacies accumulated over time. 
It will be shown that the institutional legacies from the communist welfare regime 
highly impacted the options of social insurance model building in the late 1980s, and 
the transition legacies accumulated in the 1990s highly impacted the reform efforts 
in the 2000s in terms of institution expanding. 
4.3.5 Micro-context: key stakeholders 
A number of studies have traced different preferences of interest groups to accept or 
oppose reforms according to variations in the effects of policy feedback (Ebbinghaus, 
2006). This argument supplements the new politics approach because it emphasizes 
non-state actors as the key stakeholders who either accept or oppose old-age pension 
retrenchment and/or re-construction (Pierson, 1996; 2001). Mobilised interest groups 
also shape the pension reform path and dynamics. Their preferences and behaviours 
determine the competition and power struggles and consequently determine the 
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direction and extent of change. This section will delineate these groups and their 
manifest interest in pension reform. Furthermore, the interest groups or their 
combinations interplay with institutional structure and macro context to determine 
the direction and extent of reform across countries.  
Employers  
In comparative public pension research, employers as collective actors and an 
important economic interest group are usually seen as opponents of social protection 
provision, particularly mandatory programmes, because of their fear of labour cost 
increases (Ebbinghaus, 2006). Employer co-funded social protection programmes 
through insurance contributions or tax and their associations are highly related with 
the opponents of the introduction and expansion of public pension schemes because 
of the mandatory financial responsibility (Bennett and Elman, 2006; Zhang, 2013). 
In addition, mandatory old-age insurance taking contributions out of wages also 
provides leeway for industrial sectors or occupational groups (Ebbinghaus, 2006). 
The institutionalised uneven social risks that spread across sectors could make the 
pooling of risk and resources more advantageous to more powerful larger firms than 
to smaller ones. Another aspect related to the employers is that they can use public or 
collective schemes to shed older workers when they reach eligible retirement age, or 
through an early retirement option. Politicians have to take the interests and 
preferences of employers into account when designing and delivering pension 
reforms. The historical circumstance, institutionalised class division and the 
preference and strategic moves of employers often result in different policy 
outcomes and institutional development (Ebbinghaus, 2006).  
Organised labour  
In the welfare-state expansion literature, organized labour and its allied political 
parties are crucial in expanding welfare provision (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi, 
2001). A positive correlation between the strength of unions, the electoral power of 
the Left and welfare expansion can be found consistently in the literature (Huber and 
Stephens, 2001). In the welfare retrenchment stage, the increasing contribution rate 
is one key measure adopted to solve the financial problems of pension schemes. 
Pensions as deferred wages paid by workers and employers highly impact on net 
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wages and labour costs. The policy agenda regarding wage and pension policy 
reform has to consider not only the interest and concerns of employers, but also 
organised labour (Ebbinghaus and Hassel, 2000). Indeed, particular pension design 
empowers the unions and gives them resources to resist reform (Bowen, 2009).  
Similarly, self-administration provides trade unions a source of jobs for union 
officials (France), or a political or administrative influence (Germany) (Ebbinghaus, 
2006). Organised labour is typically segmented by sectors or occupations, and the 
conflicts and competitions between different trade unions have also been said to 
shape the design and outcomes of reform. For instance, some countries have specific 
pension schemes for civil servants and other public employees, and these schemes 
are often financed by tax or pay-as-you-go pension funds. Esping-Anderson (1990) 
suggested that such special pensions for public employees and their share in the 
overall pension spending are major indicators of fragmentation. Public sector 
employees are better organized in general, and their high unionisation rates and 
higher replacement rates have often made benefit cutbacks and pension 
harmonisation more challenging. However, a long-term prospect of pension reform 
in times of fiscal austerity and public service privatisation is to harmonise these 
special schemes with the private sector and thus undermine these past privileges – 
indeed, such processes have already been witnessed across Western Europe (Palier, 
2012). 
All in all, the role of unions becomes a crucial element in successful reform. The 
institutionalisation of labour unions and governments determines the extent of 
reform and reform strategies. The relationship between unions and government, and 
more particularly the role of unions in national pension schemes, is twofold: one can 
be described as ‘parliamentary integration’ in which the government has a strong 
influence as a financial contributor while the unions are more likely to seek support 
from political parties to advance their agenda, and this type is mostly witnessed in 
the Beveridge pension regime. The other is more akin to a ‘social partnership type’ 
in which unions are highly involved in pension administration and the government 
has only a limited role in financial or supervisory aspects. The latter type is most 
commonly seen in continental Europe, or the Bismarckian pension regime. It is 
expected that reform is more likely to occur when the unions have a cooperative 
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relationship (as in Belgium) with the state compared with a confrontational one (as 
in France) (Marier, 2002). 
Additional key economic interests  
Pension policy is highly embedded within economic and social institutions, which 
includes the financial and banking sector and industrial relationships, which means 
that any study of the need for or difficulty of reform has to consider the 
complementarities within these institutional networks. A particular change in a 
pension system might or might not conform to the political economy logic of the 
country (Streeck and Thelen, 2005; Thelen, 2003). In addition, the banking system is 
embedded in the pension system, and the groups representing the financial sectors 
and the insurance industry have been active in pension reform (Bonoli and Shinkawa, 
2005b). Therefore, when the reform is highly related to marketization and 
privatisation, the impact and roles of these economic actors and their accumulated 
interest in the post-retrenchment situation should be considered and analysed 
(Weaver, 2003). The same is true for burgeoning housing and mortgage markets and 
the various interests represented therein (Lowe, 2013). While these additional 
economic interests are typically at the fringes of mainstream comparative analysis, 
the degree to which they can impact the reform option should not be neglected and 
depends on their respective opportunities to assert their influence over the political 
decision making process. 
 Pensioners 
An aging population uses a considerable share of social budgets; while the exact 
pace of use is determined by national demographic transitions, and projections of 
old-age pension spending indicate further increases of costs across all high income 
and emerging economies in the medium and long term (UNFPA, 2012; WB, 1994a). 
At the same time, the elderly have arguably been one of the most well-organized 
societal groups among recipients of social security benefits and services (Pampel and 
Williamson, 1989); there is a growing ‘generational conflict’ literature which 
focuses on the influence of ‘grey voting power’ on public budgets and on welfare 
spending in particular (Sanz and Velázquez, 2007, Rattsø and Sørensen, 2010). 
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Retrenchment reform has targeted a large share of the social spending pension 
program, and the pensioners are the benefit recipients who suffer the cutbacks and 
various impacts from retrenchment measures, but this group has favourable interest 
representation in political parties, trade unions and the workplace (Bell, 2002; 
Koelble, 1995). Older people and particularly those approaching retirement are 
typically well-organised and can exert opposition to pension reform in the 
retrenchment or recalibration stage, and the impact which they can have is also 
highly related to the reform strategy and agenda design (Ebbinghaus, 2006). 
Therefore, it seems that the greater the number and power of pensioners in this 
context, the less likelihood there will be of reforming the existing pension system, 
particularly in the direction of retrenchment.  
4.4 Causal links  
Based on the above summary of the key dependent and independent variables in 
pension reform studies, the existing literature has proposed and tested particular 
causal mechanisms to explain the possibility and extent of change as well as the 
difficulties of change and the reasons for change. In this section, we shall sum up the 
propositions emerging from the literature, and present the typical causal linkages 
between the dependent variables and the independent variables. Doing this will 
provide a foundation for generating hypotheses for the China case study in the next 
chapter. Whether these propositions about pension reform generated in the West and 
seen globally are applicable for China's case will be answered in the empirical 
finding section of this thesis (see Chapters 6, 7 and 8). 
The first explanatory variable is the macro context setting. In the pension reform 
literature, demographic aging and financial pressures are widely accepted as the 
factors, which trigger pension retrenchment and determine the extent of reform. It is 
contended that greater pressure from demographic aging and financial sustainability 
will produce more radical reform. Therefore, we generate the first set of propositions 
as follows: 
Proposition 1a:  the higher the demographic aging pressure, the more 
radical the reform; and causal link proposition  
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Proposition 1b: the higher the pension expenditure projections and the higher 
the financial crisis in the pension system, the more likely radical reforms 
such as privatisation or a fully-funded scheme and so on are to be adopted.  
The general argument about the role of international idea diffusion in the case of the 
West is that the international idea is used by politicians to justify or legitimize 
unpopular pension reform. Given that international organizations have more direct 
intervention measures for developing a country’s pension reform, this empirical 
study will consider how international organisations impact on domestic politicians 
and pension reform design. The role of the World Bank and its impact on the design 
and extent of national pension reform can be concluded as follows:  
Proposition 2: the higher dependence there is on World Bank capital support, 
the more possibility there is of having radical or structural reform.  
The third set of factors that have an impact on the trajectory and degree of pension 
reform are political institutions. The impact of political institutions on the option and 
scope of reform can be generalized as follows:  
Proposition 3a: the more veto points in the polity context, the less possibility 
there is of radical reform;  
Proposition 3b: the greater the number of veto players and the greater the 
distance between them, the less possibility there is of changing the status 
quo;  
Proposition 3c: the higher the political competition, the more likelihood there 
is of changing the status quo by a quick response to policy problem.  
The fourth set of independent variables is pension institutions. In the pension 
institution variable, there are two additional propositions which are drawn from its 
features and its impact on the degree of reform:  
Proposition 4a: the greater the maturity of PAYG public pensions (the more 
implicit the pension debt), the less possibility there is of radical change;  
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Proposition 4b: the prior existence of funded plans in a pension system 
increases the probability of structural change.  
The fifth set of factors determining the reform is the key stakeholders (including 
employers, pensioners, organized labour and economic interest) and their influences 
over the change. In general, their relations with state, veto player and their veto 
opportunities determine the direction and success of reform. We shall present the 
impact of these actors on the possibility of reform and the difficulty of reform in 
different directions (expansion and retrenchment): 
Proposition 5a: employers and their associated interests are opposed to the 
introduction and expansion of a public pension scheme; the uneven risks and 
resource across sectors provide more advantages to the powerful or 
privileged sector employer; employers are highly likely to use a public 
/collective scheme to shed old workers;  
Proposition 5b: the greater the involvement of unions in public pension 
administration, the higher the level of unionization rates and the higher the 
benefits replacement rate, the more challenging it is to achieve reform;  
Proposition 5c: an embedded economic system (labour market, banking 
system, financial system within capitalism) impacts on the pension system, 
particularly when the interactions between them in the post-retrenchment or 
post privatisation period are studied.  
Proposition 5d: the more power pensioners have or the more organized they 
are, the more challenging it is to carry out retrenchment reform. 
If we are interested in institutional change, examining the change patterns and 
mechanisms is crucial to our endeavour. In general, the concept of path dependence 
is used from two aspects. One is to use it as a perspective and emphasise how past 
decisions have impacted on later reform options and alternatives in general (Pierson, 
2000). The typical argument is that any change is limited and constrained by the 
impact of path dependencies. Therefore, this perspective provides little explanatory 
power to trace the divergence of institutional change experience across countries. 
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And although this concept is employed to understand the change over time in one 
country, it is still restricted in understanding the policy-making process because 
analysis often overlooks key causal mechanisms. Another way of applying path 
dependency is to use it from a theoretical perspective by introducing the increasing 
returns (positive feedback) mechanism in which the installed institutional complexity 
is difficult to alter mainly due to political and/or social costs. The use of such 
mechanisms is valuable when examining cases in detail. The investigation of 
institutional origins and vested interests in the installed system is diverse across 
countries, and explanations of empirical diversities of the lock-in scenario contribute 
to the divergence theory in comparative welfare studies. However, this approach also 
has a problem because it simply leaves the source of change to the major exogenous 
challenges (Ebbinghaus, 2005). 
As a consequence, discovering the transformative capacities of institutional change 
has become a focus for research (Lindblom, 1959; Andersen, 2000; Andersen and 
Larsen, 2002; Hinrichs and Kangas, 2003), while identifying the mechanism of 
gradual change is crucial to improving case understanding. The so-called increasing 
return, sequencing mechanisms built into institutional configuration, sheds light on 
the difficulty of changing the historical path; however, several recent authors 
(Ebbinghaus, 2005; Pierson, 2004; Streeck and Thelen, 2005; Mahoney and Thelen, 
2010) have emphasized that the same mechanism which stabilises the path also 
provides an opening to path departure when the context condition changes and the 
preferences and conception of the actors change. Ebbinghaus (2005) suggested the 
term 'path departure' to denote a situation in which a policy is gradually adapted to a 
changing context and demands. In short, rather than distinguishing between path 
dependency and path-breaking change, this concept provides a general direction of a 
transformative change trajectory. Past decisions constrain future decisions but do not 
necessarily determine them, and the new mechanisms of change will evolve slowly 
and implicitly.  
Streeck and Thelen (2005) summarized different kinds of mechanisms of gradual 
change, namely drift, conversion, layering and replacement, while Mahoney and 
Thelen (2010) built a general theoretical framework to explain the causal links 
between institutional context, actors and modes of change. Thus, ‘layering’ refers to 
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the introduction of new rules on top of or alongside the existing ones; it does not 
introduce new institutions altogether, but provides amendments, revisions or 
additions to existing ones (Thelen, 2003);  ‘drift’ is understood as a process in 
which a new environment alters the demands on existing institutions while the old 
rules remain the same; it may occur in order to accommodate shifts in the external 
conditions (Hacker, 2004); ‘conversion’ occurs when the rules remain formally the 
same but are interpreted and enacted in new ways (Thelen, 2003). However, the 
misinterpretation is not driven by the changed setting; instead, the actors actively 
pursue and explore the inherent ambiguities of institutions. Through redeployment, 
they convert the institution to new goals, functions or purposes to serve their own 
interests favourably.  
Given the short history of institutional gradual change theory, the application of 
these concepts is not so prevalent in the literature. However, I shall attempt to apply 
the gradual change theoretical framework to explore the evolution of the pension 
regime in China, and this will be discussed in detail in the next chapter and the 
subsequent empirical analysis. 
4.5 Concluding remarks 
In summary, the work described in this chapter attempts to clarify the dependent 
variables that affect the study of pension reform and summarizes the possible drivers 
and dynamics of change which are found in the case study literature. This will help 
to guide the empirical analysis of the path of Chinese pension reform. In addition, 
locating the causal factors (independent variables) also helps in the study of this 
particular case by investigating the same (objective) or similar variables in the 
Chinese context, consequently generating an analysis of the dynamics of pension 
reform, identifying the same or equivalent independent variables in China’s case and 
testing whether or not the impact of these variables exists in China's case. These 
causal propositions will be used to form a hypothesis for empirical analysis in the 
Chinese case, and this will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.
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Chapter 5: The China's case context 
5.1 Introduction  
Chapter 4 has discussed the existing institutional analyses of pension reform studies, 
which explain well what has changed or not changed, under what conditions, 
involving what political actors, and in which manner interactions shape the reform 
process and outcomes. The interplays between context, structure and actors 
systematically explain the variations in different types of welfare regime and 
political system across countries. All the propositions regarding the pension reform 
path and dynamics in western cases provide a foundation on which to develop 
hypotheses for the empirical analysis of the Chinese case. This chapter seeks to 
answer the question of whether similar independent variables or similar causal links 
exist in the context of China compared with western cases. Looking for and 
describing the equivalent independent variables in the Chinese context will lay a 
background foundation for the empirical analysis which follows. Another purpose of 
this chapter is to construct an explanatory framework and put these variables into it. 
There is no doubt that the explanatory framework for examining China's case will 
draw inspiration from western cases and will have to be revised according to China's 
special circumstances.  
5.2 The limitations of the Western case framework  
5.2.1 The Western case framework in general 
The characteristics of pension reform in advanced economies can be generalized as 
follows: first, the reform response to the pressure of austerity follows a specific 
sequence: retrenchment first and then refinancing the programmes following the 
liberal template, and then more fundamental restructuring. Second, the extents of 
changes across industrial advanced countries are diverse. Some have changed 
substantially over past decades while others have made very few changes. Third, the 
privatization or the public-private mix of pension provision is the general trend over 
the advanced countries. However, the degrees of the shift differ. As for how to 
explain the divergences of pension reform across countries in terms of the policy 
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design, the extents of change and the difficulties of changes, the pension reform in 
western literature grounded in historical institutionalism provides an institutional and 
policy framework. This was generalized in the literature review in Chapter 4 and 
presented in the framework figures.  
In explaining pension reform in the west, the framework for analysis usually follows 
the institutional framework in which the political institution (the consensus-making 
process) and pension institutions interplay with the macro-context factors and the 
micro-actors and consequently determine the policy outputs and political strategies 
adopted, as well as the policy outcomes. From the literature review, it can be 
concluded that the macro-context changes, including economic-demographic factors, 
are the triggers of pension reform and push politicians to adopt reform as the 
response. In addition, the ideas and paradigms of international organizations are 
diffused as a macro dimension to put forward reform. However, the pressures of 
policy changes have to be diagnosed by the political actors including government, 
organized labour, partisan actors and pensioners. Their preferences, perceptions and 
interests and their capacities for affecting reform options are constrained by the 
political institution and the pension institution. Competition among the actors and 
interest groups within the institutional structure will finally reach a consensus in the 
form of policy design, and the process can be generalized as shown in Figure 5.2.1. 
Figure 5.2.1: Institutional analysis framework of industrialized countries 
 
Macro context (Demography, budgetary, 
international idea) 
Pension institution 
Micro actor: Politicians, parties, organized labour, 
pensioner, economic interests 
Reform policy outputs 
(retrenchment, expansion 
packages) 
Policy outcome (adequacy, 
generosity, privatization) 
Political institution 
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5.2.2 West-China comparison 
The analysis framework described above is mainly focused on western countries 
which have diverse democratic structures and systems to decide their public and 
welfare policies. Different democracies have different political institutions to 
structure the relationship between governments, bureaucracies, social partners and 
interest groups and shape the policy-making process and outcomes, thereby forming 
diverse pension reform paths (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Hay and Wincott, 1998). 
Compared with western democracies, China as an authoritarian state with one party, 
the communist party, ruling certainly has fewer veto players within the political 
system and there is no partisan competition in the electoral cycle. Unlike the 
democratic constitutional mechanisms that produce veto points in polities and allow 
the trade unions or other actors to be involved in the policy-making process to block 
the passing of legislation, there are no real opportunities for social partners to 
mobilize into the policy-making process in real political life in China (Ge, 2007). 
Therefore, when adopting a similar perspective to study China's case, the researcher 
should be cautious when using the concept of veto points and veto players to 
characterize China's political institution. Since the same concepts as in the 
democracy context simply do not exist in China's system, this study will adopt the 
possibility of veto to identify the de facto veto players and veto points existing in 
China's case. 
Second, the analysis in the Western cases tends to focus on the commitment-building, 
coalition-building process, and tries to figure out how the political institutions 
determine the policy-making process and dynamics (Marier, 2008). The 
commitment-building and coalition-building in the decision-making process 
constitute the main political competition. The established stable political institution 
and welfare institution together render any alteration or revision of the status quo 
difficult. Moderate bargaining and compromise over decision-making tells the main 
story of political competition. In contrast, the nature of Chinese authoritarianism 
(Lieberthal, 1992) allows very limited competition between political actors in the 
policy-making stage; the interactions mainly take place between groups of elites and 
bureaucratic agencies. Therefore, the relatively closed decision-making space cannot 
produce as much dynamics as is possible in mature-democracy. Competition and 
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bargaining can take place in the implementation process because of the decentralized 
character of the Chinese political system. Particularly, decentralization defines the 
central/local relationship and power distributions, and local levels have more 
resources and power to impact on policy implementation and the final policy 
outcomes (Steinmo, 2008; Broschek, 2012). Therefore, exploring the political 
competition and dynamics in the implementation is very significant to present a real 
picture of Chinese pension reform, and is very beneficial for locating reasonable 
causal chains.  
There is a range of literature on the politics of mature welfare states from the 
institutional perspective, explaining the emergence, development and expansion after 
the Second World War from the aspects of industrialization, urbanization and 
modernization. The literature shifts to the politics of retrenchment in the period of 
fiscal austerity to explain what changes occurred and the difficulties encountered in 
advanced welfare states. However, China's welfare state did not follow a similar 
evolutionary path to its western forerunners. China adopted an incomplete welfare 
system earlier, before it arrived at the same level of industrialization, urbanization 
and modernization as western predecessors (Frazier, 2006c). Even though the 
welfare regime was not a broad comprehensive one in its scope and benefits, and 
was often hierarchical in nature, these welfare programmes still proved to be costly. 
China began to show economic openness to reform and liberalized SOEs and 
promoted the emerging private sector economy, meanwhile the old SOE welfare 
regime was being dismantled (Gu, 2001). The government and the policy-makers 
were forced to create a new welfare regime in the new background of liberalization, 
and the newly established social insurance welfare system had to be expanded from 
the state sector to the private sector. In short, welfare expansion and welfare 
retrenchment co-existed in China's case. Welfare retrenchment occurred in the form 
of state retreat from welfare provision for state sector workers (SOE worker) in the 
1980s, and welfare expansion was represented in the form of expanding various 
welfare programmes to the private sector and covering a greater proportion of the 
population in the 2000s. Compared with western counterparts, the logic of 
industrialisation and welfare state formation and expansion could not be applied in 
China’s case because the latter started from the retrenchment of state welfare in the 
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context of industrialization. However, China’s welfare retrenchment occurred in 
conjunction with western counterparts and started from the 1980s. Globalization and 
trade openness, labour market changes and the ascendance of conservative ideas 
generated retrenchment reforms across welfare states, while in the old oriental states, 
governments started building modern welfare systems highly embedded in the liberal 
paradigm. From this comparison can be seen the significance of the timing and 
consequence of events when conducting comparative studies. Countries that had 
industrialized earlier and latecomers converged in welfare retrenchment, but with 
different logics. The former sought to reduce the state welfare burden given the 
financial pressure, while the latter’s state withdrawal was aimed at facilitating the 
development of industrialization and the formation of new welfare systems. 
5. 3 A revised framework for China's case 
After reviewing pension reform in the advanced democracies and other countries, we 
have already presented the differences between the West context and China. The 
focus now turns to constructing a framework for analysis to improve the 
understanding of the pension reforms in authoritarian China. The approach taken 
here is based on the historical institutionalist propositions as well as pension reform 
empirical studies, and adds more dimensions to formulate a broader and 
multi-faceted institutionalist framework taking into account the Chinese 
particularities. On the one hand, this approach adopts the established institutional 
framework developed from mature welfare systems to examine political institutions, 
pension institutions and policy outcomes and to map out change paths and dynamics. 
On the other hand, this approach is inspired by the recently developed institutional 
incremental change theory and tries to bring the variable of compliance into the 
investigation, which has been less discussed in the retrenchment literature. How 
reform package design redirected the policy objectives and outcomes in policy 
implementation is crucial when studying China’s case. It could be summarised that 
the new framework was based on institutional and policy process analysis and this 
study will examine the whole process from policy initiation and formation to 
implementation.  
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This approach is grounded in the conventional historical institutionalist assumptions 
that political institutions and previously-enacted policy legacies structure the 
political behaviour and interests of bureaucrats and political officials, and the 
institutional configurations of governments and political party systems shape the 
actions and the competition among different groups (Skocpol, 1992). In the Chinese 
case, there is no equivalent to the veto players and veto points in western democracy, 
because the authoritarian party state constrains the partisan veto players, social 
partners and interest-organized groups' involvement in decision-making, and there 
are no formal rules or informal procedures to facilitate adequate mobilization or 
competition among them. However, the fragmented characteristic of the 
authoritarian state opens veto possibilities for the policy actors to change or redirect 
policy, so I would define the spaces which this opens for de facto veto as de facto 
veto points, and the policy actors who might affect the direction and objectives of 
central policy as de facto veto players. In addition, the ambiguities of policy design 
and the policy legacies from the previous stage on the one hand allow the local 
government actors to manipulate, and on the other hand the feedback effects 
motivate or constrain the actors from pursuing self-interest or avoiding compliance. 
In addition to the central/local conflicts within the decentralized institutional 
structure, there is another dynamic taking place in the implementation process, 
which is that the policy implementers and policy recipients (economic interest 
groups) will also interact with each other and affect the final outcomes (see Figure 
5.3.1). 
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Figure 5.3.1: Analysis framework for China’s case 
 
5.4 Independent variables/explanatory variable in the Chinese 
context 
5.4.1 Macro context and hypothesis 
Socio-economic background 
This study is examining pension reform in China from the 1980s to 2011. From 1978, 
China began a reform of the economy through decentralization, marketization and 
privatization. The economic strategies used by the second-generation leader Deng 
Xiaoping gradually changed the planned market to a market-oriented economy 
(Nolan, 2004). Accordingly, the expansion of the market economy seriously 
undermined the previous SOE welfare model in the planned society (Reich, 2000). 
Since coming to power in 1949, the Chinese communist party had been propagating 
the advantages of socialism through lifetime employment and comprehensive 
welfare provision for urban workers and their families (Frazier, 2006a), and their 
land mainly provided the rural population’s income protection. Since the system 
covered only a limited proportion of the population, the pension provision was very 
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late 1970s seriously undermined the abilities of SOEs to provide income protection 
for their workers. The growing competition from the private sector created huge 
welfare burdens which caused numbers of SOEs to lose money or become bankrupt, 
and made many urban workers unemployed or laid-off(Whiteford, 2003). The 
proportion of workers in SOEs declined from 76.2% in 1980 to 25.3% in 2004 (NBS, 
2005, p.105). Accordingly, the previous welfare provision obligation based on 
lifetime employment had to be reformed in the new social setting.  
The initial restructuring started in the late 1970s. The economic regime shifted from 
the central planned socialist economy to a market-oriented economy, and the 
de-regulation of the centrally-controlled labour market demanded a new form of 
social protection. In 1978, SOEs accounted for 78% of industrial output and 76% of 
employment, and by 2007 the share of SOEs in China’s gross domestic production 
had fallen from 77.65% to less than 30%, and sizable private sector enterprises 
occupied the share previously held by SOEs, particularly in the manufacturing 
industry (Jefferson et al., 2000, p.7). The economic restructuring not only had to deal 
with employee welfare in the declining SOE sector, but also respond to the demands 
of the emerging non-state sector. The trigger for pension reform was the SOE 
restructuring and the socialization of the SOE welfare system. These initiatives were 
intended to coordinate with the economic reform against the background of 
transition. It could therefore be argued that the initial stage of pension reform was 
intended to coincide with the change in the economic system, particularly the SOE 
reform, which resembled the developmental logic which prioritized economic reform 
and social protection as subordinate to economic development. The reform started 
from the economic liberalization and privatization without the corresponding welfare 
arrangements or protection for the people losing their entitlement, which also 
brought about the social dissent in the 1990s (Croll, 1999). This pension reform 
measures shifted to the retrenchment trend by shedding the welfare burden from state 
provision to the joint efforts of the individual, employers and local government. The 
funding and administration of the pension system underwent a fundamental shift 
from the SOE regime to the old-age insurance model (State Council, 1991). 
Despite the increasing growth in GDP, the poverty rate significantly decreased over 
time, from 84.02% of the total population in 1981 to 13.6% in 2008 (see Figure 5.3). 
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However, the economic achievements came at the cost of income disparity and 
inequality (see Table 5.1), which also alerted the government to the need to pay more 
attention to social issues, rather than put too much emphasis on economic efficiency, 
so providing more social protection and decreasing social inequality came onto the 
agenda at the top level (Mok and Ku, 2010). In addition, the development over the 
previous two decades and the deregulation of the labour market also promoted 
urbanization in China, and the urban population as a percentage of the total 
population increased from 19.36% in1980 to 50.5% in 2011(WB, 2013). In summary, 
the development of a market-oriented economy not only increased living standards 
and reduced absolute poverty, but also increased social inequality in terms of income 
distribution and access to welfare provision.  
The economic transition, urbanization, and the dismantling of state and collective 
enterprises and the associated welfare systems brought about new risks and new 
demands for social protection, such as the welfare provision for the unemployed and 
laid off, building the new protection for the new labour entrants in the free labour 
market. This background posed challenges to the CCP and the Beijing government. 
Since the 2000s, the CCP and third- and fourth-generation leadership on the one 
hand embraced liberal reforms in economic domains and legitimized private property 
rights and the interests present in the CCP, shifting the orthodox ideology of 
communism and adding new elements (Guo, 2006; Mierzejewski, 2009). On the 
other hand, the government also responded to the social problems and demands of 
the new risk groups in the post-transition era, particularly the fourth leadership group: 
Hu-Wen's administration proposed the ‘harmonious society’ and ‘balanced 
development strategy’ to deal with the problems emerging in the radical liberal 
transition by extending social protection to the uncovered populations in both the 
rural and urban sectors (Saich and Saich, 2004). If the initial transition was aimed at 
state retreat from welfare provision and encouraging liberalization in every aspect, 
the post-transition era since the 2000s was characterized by the state's re-intervention 
to achieve greater fairness. In terms of pension institution reform, institutionalizing 
the pension system design and expanding the coverage to more of the population, 
particularly the previously uncovered groups, were the main objectives at this stage. 
The change in socio-economic background and the development strategy shift in the 
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CCP provided the macro-context settings for the policy change in the post-transition 
decades.  
Figure 5.4.1: GDP, PPP increase and poverty rate decrease (1981-2007) 
Poverty headcount ratio at 1.25$ a day (PPP)  
 
 
 
 
Source: Word Bank Indicator 
 
 
Table 5.4.1 Gini coefficients, 1993-2005 
 
Year  1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 
Gini 
coefficient 
35.5 35.7 39.23 42.59 42.48 
 Source: Word Bank Indicator 
Demographic aging  
Many countries around the world have experienced demographic aging and China is 
no exception. WB data reveal that in 1980 the population aged 64 and above 
accounted for 5.15% of the total population, and in 2010 the proportion had 
increased to 8.19%. This trend results from different factors including the 
encouragement of marriage in late 1971 and the one-child family policy introduced 
in 1980, bringing the total fertility rate down from 2.63 to 1.59 by 2010 (Herd and 
Koen, 2010, p.5). Increasing life expectancy in the past decades was another factor, 
rising from 66.9 in 1980 to 73.2 in 2010(WB, 2013). These changes in fertility and 
life expectancy altered the demographic structure in China. In the 1980s, the age 
structure was bottom-heavy, typically a young and growing population. By 1990, the 
0	  10	  
20	  30	  
40	  50	  
60	  70	  
80	  90	  
0	  1000	  
2000	  3000	  
4000	  5000	  
6000	  7000	  
1981	   1983	   1985	   1987	   1989	   1991	   1993	   1995	   1997	   1999	   2001	   2003	   2005	   2007	  
GDP	  per	  captia	  ($)	  Poverty	  ratio	  (%)	  
 109 
 
demographic architecture had become more mature, with a relatively small child 
population (Adamchak, 2001). With the low fertility and rising life expectancy, the 
old-age dependency ratio (measured by population aged 65+ as a percentage of the 
population aged from 15 to 64) increased from 7.36% in 1950 to 11.3% 2010, and 
the projected dependence ratio will increase to 41.9% by 2040 (UN, 2011). 
Figure 5.4.2: Fertility rate and life expectancy (1978-2010) 
 
Source: World development indicators: World Bank 
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the future will enable more radical reform, such as privatization. From the projected 
data, demographic aging in China is not positive and the dependency ratio first began 
to decline in the 1980s and then began to increase in the 2010s and will continue to 
rise in the following decades, and will begin to exceed the other compared regions at 
around 2035. It could be hypothesized that the serious projected aging pressure 
might lead to structural pension reform. But considering the data from 1980 to 2010, 
we can hypothesize that as a relatively young country compared with others; 
China might not embark on radical reform straight away, as Latin America did 
in the 1980s.  
Figure5.4.3: Population dependency ratio % (1980-2012) 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank statistics 
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Figure 5.4.4: Projected population dependency ratio % (2010-2050) 
 
Source : World Bank statistics 
Implicit pension debt (IPD) and transition cost 
One of the crucial reform pressures comes from concern about financial 
sustainability (Pordes, 1994), and the extent of this pressure can be measured by the 
implicit pension debt (IPD). The IPD is calculated by the present value of the 
projected liability of the current system, which includes the current pensioners as 
well the contributors who have accrued rights in the system. This measurement 
reveals the stock of all outstanding liabilities, and is usually adopted by the 
international community and experts when comparing different pension systems (Sin, 
2005). The IPD as a percentage of GDP is a reliable indicator of the financial burden. 
However, it should be treated with caution because this indicator is highly impacted 
by factors such as the coverage, dependency rate and benefits levels of the system 
design (Sin, 2005). The IPD is usually adopted to represent the direct and implicit 
liabilities that a government can predict with certainty when it makes fiscal plans or 
reforms a strategy to terminate the unfunded system immediately. Therefore, it has to 
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entitlements of current retirees and those of the current contributors who will claim 
the benefits based on their contribution record and years of service (Sin, 2005). If the 
central government puts the IPD into public debt, the current low level of debt 
around 23% Pension Reform in China: Progress and Prospects of GDP would 
increase significantly (Salditt et al., 2007, p.41).  
Transition cost refers to the financial gap created once the financial mechanism shifts 
from pay-as-you-go to fund-based, which means that the expenditure on pensioners 
and on the accrued rights of future retirees continues while the contributions of the 
current workers are saved in funded individual accounts (Wang, 2001). The 
transition cost stems from IPD, but it is not equal to it, because some of the 
expenditure is for new obligations that are accrued each day, and some of the current 
obligations are covered by on-going contributions (Wang, 2001). Several studies 
have qualified the transition cost of China’s pension reform on the basis of different 
measurements and projected simulations. World Bank (1997) estimated China’s IPD 
at between 46 per cent and 69 per cent of GDP (Agarwala, 1997, p.132). Dofman 
and Sin (2000) estimated the transition cost of China’s pension reform using the 
WB's actuarial model, PROST(pension reform option simulation toolkit) and put the 
IPD estimate at 94 per cent of the 1998 GDP. They also projected that if there were 
to be no reform of the current pension system, the pension deficits would increase to 
0.36%, 0.75% and 0.89% of GDP in 2030, 2050 and 2075, respectively (as cited in 
Wang, 2001, p.10). It was clear that the projected increasing pressure on pension 
sustainability required reform in China. If compare the size of IPD in China with 
OECD countries and transition economies, it is found that in most OECD countries 
IPD ranges from 100 per cent to 200 percentage of GDP. The estimated IPD in Chile 
at the time of reform (1981) was between 40 per cent and 130 percentage of GDP.  
It seems like China has moderate size of IPD when the crucial regulation started at 
1997(as cited in James, 1999, p.10). Therefore, we can hypothesize that China 
may not adopt the radical change option at the starting of reform because the 
size of IPD is reasonable comparing with other countries.  
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5.4.2 International idea diffusion and hypothesis 
The conventional approach to examining social policy models or policy outcomes 
usually cannot ignore the influence from international organizations and the policy 
ideas and policy paradigms which they promote. In the case of pension reform, the 
liberal reformers or technocrats of the World Bank play a important role in diffusing 
policy ideas around the world, especially for developing and less-developed 
countries, by providing technical advice or supporting loans (Holzmann, 2000). 
China had joined the WB in the early 1980s and has been the largest recipient of 
loans and the most successful developing-country member. The WB provided less 
than $20 million loans and project assistance to support China's reform of pension 
programmes in 1995.(Piggott and Bei, 2007, p.4). WB experts discussed the pension 
challenge with government officials, and made various presentations to illustrate the 
pension crisis, carried out field work and eventually presented a reform proposal to 
State Council ministers in 1996 (Hu, 2012). Their report ‘Old age security: pension 
reform in China’ (Agarwala, 1997) was the main study on the pension problem in 
China and it attracted the attention of officials (Hu, 2012). In the following year, the 
State Council issued a milestone regulation in the gradual reform process, and most 
of its contents followed the advice laid out in the WB report, and to an extent China 
subsequently adopted these recommendations and achieved the objectives listed in 
the report. In the empirical analysis chapter, this study will examine further the 
correlations between the policy recommendations in the WB report and the 1997 
regulation, and how that international actor penetrated the Chinese decision-making 
process and sold its policy ideas to government officials in an authoritarian state. 
According to the proposition summarized in the previous chapter, the higher the 
dependence on WB loan support, the more likelihood there will be of structural 
change being adopted. Therefore, we can hypothesize that China might not have 
reformed the pension system so fundamentally had it been given a smaller loan 
than that received compared with other countries facing radical change. 
5.4.3 Political institution and hypothesis  
Decentralized/fragmented authoritarianism in China 
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The “fragmented authoritarianism” is proposed by Lieberthal (1992) and defines the 
Chinese political system from the perspectives of structural dimension and the 
political process. In particular, the structural dimension of centralization and 
decentralization provides a guide to the operation of the political system by 
examining the structural distribution of resources and authority. The policy process 
dimension characterizes the decision-making and implementing process. This 
suggests that China’s bureaucratic system, with its functional division of authority 
between the various bureaucracies at the central level, requires the agreement of an 
array of bodies to pass a new project, and the decentralization also enables the local 
governments and bureaucratic units to pursue their policy preferences because of 
their independence of central budgets. This framework argues that policy outcomes 
are shaped by the incorporation of bureaucratic interests and implementation 
interests. Fragmented authoritarianism explores policy change through vertical and 
horizontal bureaucratic bargaining, since Lieberthal's work is more about 
bureaucratic politics and bargaining in decision-making. Studies on the 
decentralization and central-local relations concentrate on the implementation and its 
consequences for the policy outcomes (Wong, 1991; Zhang, 2006; Zheng, 2006b; 
Zheng, 2007c). For instance, 'decentralized authoritarianism' (Landry, 2008) and 'de 
facto federalism' (Zheng, 2007c) are terms used to generalize the Chinese political 
system. Mertha (2009) proposed 'fragmented authoritarianism 2.0' to depict Chinese 
politics in the recent change by introducing the emerging policy entrepreneurs, 
including bureaucratic officers (mentioned above), the media (journalists and editors) 
and individual activists within NGOs. This updated framework characterises the new 
development of the political system and policy process in China, with a relatively 
open system and more space for the forming and framing of the policy community 
and the proposed policy change. In this section, I shall present a description of the 
Chinese political system based on the formal rule constitution and the formal 
practice of decentralization, as well as the adoption of de facto veto players and veto 
points to conceptualize the political system in China, and this will lay the foundation 
for an examination of how this variable has affected the pension policy changes over 
time. In addition, I shall not sum up the policy entrepreneurs emerging as Andrew's 
framework proposed, but the emergence of these actors as well as their impact will 
be examined in the empirical analysis chapter (see Chapter 7 and 8). 
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Given China’s Leninist history, it is easy to assume that China is rigidly hierarchical 
and authoritarian, but in practice, political power in China is diffused and 
complicated by the different political actors involved in the policy process. The other 
main actors include the key state government bureaucracy in charge of implementing 
and administering state business, the National People’s Congress (NPC) as the 
highest organ of state power, and the sub-national officials who complicate Chinese 
politics (Martin, 2010). However, one important aspect of China's political regime is 
the leading role played by the communist party in the whole policy process in which 
the Chinese communist party (CCP) and government organizations have the central 
role in terms of policy initiation, formation and implementation (Saich and Saich, 
2004). Even though minor political parties do exist, they are authorized by the CCP 
and have no real power over policy design. The CCP, as the only ruling party, has all 
the political power in China to legitimate and control all the political organizations 
and to determine social, economic and political issues. The CCP has an 
unchallengeable leading role in the Chinese political system; it not only determines 
the legislature and executive bodies, but also has the leading role in the formation of 
ideological and social values (Saich, 2001). The central policy-making organization 
in the CCP is the Politburo Standing Committee, which has the authority to 
determine national strategies, and members of this organization hold the key 
positions of the state, such as president, vice-president, premier and vice-premier.  
The interplay between party members and the state leader represents the specific 
nature of the Chinese authoritarian party state. Apart from making the main 
decisions and national strategies, the CCP also has power over law-making. Under 
the constitution, the NPC and its standing committee are the highest state organs of 
policy-making and exercising legislative power (Lindley-French and Boyer, 2012). 
The standing committee, as the permanent body of the NPC, has the authority to 
enact laws apart from basic law. According to the constitution, the NPC and its 
standing committee should be the most powerful body and have the dominant role in 
the decision-making process. However, within real political life, the CCP exerts 
more influence on forming the policy agenda and engendering political competition. 
Many decisions are made by the CCP and passed on to the NPC for consideration 
(Saich, 2001). The NPC’s role does not play out as the constitution defines it, hence 
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it is usually nicknamed a 'rubber stamp' (O'Brien, 1990; Tanner, 1999) because it 
cannot oppose the proposals coming from the CCP. The CCP has different measures 
to influence the law-making process, by controlling the appointment of NPC 
members, having institutional control over meeting agendas, giving prior approval to 
draft laws, and setting the basic principles of legislative debate. As a result, the CCP 
has the dominant role in the policy-making process (Lieberthal, 1995). The State 
Council (SC), as the highest executive organ of state power and the highest organ of 
state administration, is in charge of the carrying out the principles and policies of the 
CCP, as well as the laws enacted by NPC (Lindley-French and Boyer, 2012). The SC 
directly oversees the various subordinate governments in the provinces, and 
exercises a wide range of powers over policy-making, ranging from formulating 
administrative regulations and measures, issuing policies and orders, and monitoring 
their implementation, to drafting legislative bills for the NPC and preparing 
economic plans and state budgets for submission to the NPC. To a certain degree, 
the SC and the CPP hold the central leadership jointly for issuing public policies. 
So the absence of organized and established political parties in the Chinese system 
means that partisan veto players do not exist. Unlike the western democracies with 
institutional veto players such as presidents, second chambers or constitutional 
courts to veto the passage of legislation (Tsebelis, 2002), the Chinese centralized 
regime empowers the party state and its power elite (the political bureau) to have 
monopolistic power over decision-making, particularly over the consideration of 
major policy shifts or the legitimization of ideological change. However, the CCP 
and its leadership are not always able to dictate policy decisions, and the political 
process is infused with a number of bureaucratic and non-central government actors 
who influence and determine policy. The social policy making power in the central 
level is shared by the legislative body (NPC) and its standing committee, and the SC 
and relevant ministries and departments. Under the constitution, the NPC and its 
standing committee are responsible for law enactment; the SC and its ministries have 
the authority to issue decisions, decrees, administrative rules and regulations to the 
national local level. It is certainly the case that pension reform has also been guided 
by the administrative regulations and rules issued by the SC and related ministries 
before the NPC promulgated the social insurance law (Chan et al., 2008). 
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It is difficult to identify the various elements and disentangle the Chinese political 
system in terms of veto points and veto players in a western sense. Based on 
Tsebelis’s definition of veto players (Tsebelis, 1995) and Database of Political 
institution (WB, 2013), China does not have partisan veto players because there is no 
opposition party in China.  However, there are some actors who have the same role 
as veto players, and their agreement is required for any change of the status quo. I 
regard the de facto veto players as those actors who have an impact on pension 
reform, and whose preferences and behaviour determine policy outputs and policy 
outcomes. The SC and other related ministries discussed above are assumed to be de 
facto veto players. Their responsibility, function and role in pension policy decisions 
will be introduced in the next section. Apart from these de facto veto players at the 
central decision-making level, there is another set of actors who can change the 
policy status quo not in design but in implementation in Chinese polity, and they are 
local government actors (at both the provincial and municipal levels). Under the 
process of decentralization, local governments have more discretion over policy 
design and implementation (Zhang, 2006; Wong, 1991). The local governments have 
the decentralized administrative and fiscal ability to develop economic and social 
programmes. Local governments can exert their power over policy implementation, 
and consequently can cause cut-offs or complications in central initiatives (Zhang, 
2006). It is therefore assumed that local governments are able to act like veto players 
and change the central policy objectives and intentions in their implementation. 
Figure 5.4.5: The Chinese central government structure 
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Source: Social policy in China: development and well-being (2008) 
De facto veto players 
The Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (MOHRSS) of the People's 
Republic of China is a ministry under the State Council which is responsible for 
national labour polices standards and regulation and for managing the national social 
security. This includes labour force management, labour relationship readjustment, 
social insurance management and the legal construction of labour (Arza and Kohli, 
2008). MOHRSS stresses that priority in access to work should be given to migrant 
workers, laid-off workers, poor people and graduates from universities and college. 
Since it was established in 1998, the main function of MOHRSS has been to build a 
sound employment-based social insurance system in China (Zhu, 2003), and as the 
active policy-maker in the areas of social security, labour and employment policies, 
MOHRSS has been an active player in formulating policies and programmes to 
create jobs, provide social services for labour and protect workers’ rights (Van Vliet, 
2010). It is also an important player in labour legislation and social insurance law 
enactment. 
The Ministry of Finance (MOF) is the national executive agency of the central 
government; it administers macro-economic policies and the national annual budget. 
It also handles fiscal policy, economic regulation and government expenditure for 
the state (Clasen and Siegel, 2007). Since pension expenditure is the largest 
proportion of social service spending, the Ministry of Finance, as the fund provider 
and public budget controller, has a crucial role in the old-age pension system reform, 
especially in terms of funding sourcing, funding modelling, and funding 
management. This ministry tends to stress efficiency and advocate a reduced state 
role, therefore, it prefers a funded old-age insurance scheme in which the working 
population has to pay contributions and leave the state with fewer responsibilities 
(Shi, 2006). The Ministry of Finance is also likely to back a decentralized pension 
insurance system and shifting the fiscal responsibilities to local governments 
(Duckett, 2003).  
Unlike the MOHRSS which is responsible for social insurance programmes and 
social welfare for the labour force, the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MOCA) is in 
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charge of welfare programmes for marginal groups, including disabled people, poor 
households and individuals without family support (Wong, 1998). Its main function 
is to deal with programmes for vulnerable people, including social assistance for the 
old, orphaned and disabled, poverty reduction, and a minimum living guarantee. In 
addition, the MOCA was also in charge of rural pension schemes from the late 1980s 
until 1998, when responsibilities shifted to the Ministry of labour and social security 
(MOLSS) (now MOHRSS). However, the MOCA was a key actor involved in 
building the rural pension schemes, bargaining and conflicting with other related 
ministries in terms of the philosophy, principles and specific designs of the 
programmes. 
Apart from the ministries with direct pension policy responsibilities, there are some 
central government commissions and offices which control and distribute public 
resources and have a high stake in the policy-making procedures.  These include the 
Ministry of Finance, which manages the financial resources, the National 
Development and Reform Commission, which directs overall economic and social 
development strategy and approves major social programmes, the State Commission 
Office for Public Sector Reform, which controls the establishment of government 
bodies and personnel management, and the Legislative Affairs Office of the State 
Council, which directs the legislative procedures in policy-making. All the other 
ministries have to cooperate with these government bodies when they make policy in 
their individual fields (Carrillo and Duckett, 2012). 
China’s constitution does not provide a power division between different tiers of 
government, and all the power resides with the central government. However, the 
constitution allows local governments to exercise varying degrees of autonomy. In 
the transition era, local governments had more space to innovate and develop their 
own economic and social development programmes (Ebbinghaus and Manow, 2001), 
and since social policy reform experiments or pilot projects allowed the local 
governments to innovate in the implementation process, they often added their own 
detailed parameters under the central guidelines (Chŏng and Chung, 2000). For 
instance, the regulation issued in 1995 allowed local governments to choose from the 
three reform options, the DB, DC and the PDC models, for local pension programme 
design, which was later criticized by the WB (this will be discussed in the case study 
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chapters, see Chapters 6, 7 and 8). The central government and its ministries agree to 
local innovations as long as they do not violate the principle or objectives of central 
policy.  However, local governments have little effect on policy-making at the top 
level. The national laws and regulations are usually deliberated and made among the 
ministries and the State Council. The sub-national governments can act as de facto 
veto players in implementing the policy imposed from the upper levels of 
government, and they can make some adjustments to enhance or redirect 
implementation locally (Martin, 2010). 
In sum, in the one party state, the government executive body and bureaus have to 
make social policy decisions under general party development strategies. Particularly 
in the pension reform field, various related ministries play a significant role in 
promoting policy initiatives by making policy suggestions, organizing research and 
experiments, and drafting policy documents. The ministries are subordinated to the 
State Council, but still have a decisive influence over policy by virtue of their role in 
interpreting, implementing and overseeing the policy goals. These related ministries 
and their sub-offices are often very protective of the perceived interest and goals of 
ministries. Therefore, they could function as de facto veto players when the 
initiatives reach the policy deliberation and formation process. The compromises and 
competition, as well as the capacities for mobilization in the top elites broadly 
determine the design of central policy.  
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Figure 5.4.6: Central-local relations 
 
De facto veto points   
In China's case, therefore, the notion of veto points (Immergut, 1990) refers to the 
opportunities within the decision-making process or specific institutional features 
which allow opposing groups to veto policy projects. They can be generated from 
both formal and informal rules.  I shall now discuss the de facto veto points in the 
Chinese political system and pension reform process. The so-called de facto veto 
points on the one hand reflect the authoritarian nature of China's regime, but on the 
other hand they explain the space there is in the Chinese political system to enable 
change or propose new projects, which conforms to the concepts discussed above. 
The lessened compulsory power of administrative decisions and departmental 
measures  
Unlike western democracies, China's social policy was not institutionalized by 
legislation until 2010 when the social insurance law was passed; before 2010, the 
initiative for or reform of social policy were mainly under the directives, decisions, 
circulars and proposals issued by the State Council or the relevant ministries. There 
was no basic legislation clearly defining the principles, rules, responsibilities or 
duties of the different parts involved in welfare schemes (ILO, 2006). Since this 
current study aims to trace the pension reform path over the past decades, the 
SC (central government) 
Ministry  Ministry  Ministry  Ministry  
Provincial government 
City, prefecture level government 
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recently enacted insurance law cannot be regarded as an institutional indicator to be 
assessed; as a result, all the political competitors in the process were constrained and 
regulated by the vast number of administrative decisions and measures enacted from 
the centre. Before China enacted a national social insurance law, central government 
ministries or departments issued circulars to launch policy initiatives and exercise 
them as law (Chan et al., 2008). Therefore, new social policies were not usually 
required to be negotiated with or approved by the NPC (the law enactment organ), 
and the communist party and relevant ministries could propose new measures to 
address welfare issues. There are several reasons for the prevalence of administrative 
regulations rather than law. First, China was undergoing continuous transition with 
trial-and-error practice, and this situation is not suitable for institutionalized 
legislation. Second, there was no basic principle or philosophy determining social 
policy reform when the welfare reform was first launched. Third, administrative 
measures are more flexible than law and left space for the local governments to 
manoeuvre according to the local conditions. Fourth, this practice also facilitated the 
central government to revise or readjust the policy according to its implementation 
practice. However, because of the loose measures issued by the policy makers, local 
officials were able to find a lot of room to operate or implement according to their 
own interests, or to take advantage of the ambiguities in the policy design and 
reinterpret the policy in their implementation, or the less powerful decisions or 
measures might produce non-compliance problems in different local levels. All in all, 
all the relatively lax decisions and measures created a gap between policy goals and 
policy implementation. The agreed policy principles were proclaimed by the central 
government, and the implementation of the policy was mainly shaped by the local 
governments according to their own interests and perceptions and to the local 
conditions (Chan et al., 2008). The loose restrictions of directives from the higher 
officials generated de facto veto points for the local authorities to distort the policy 
goals based on their own best intentions or self-interest. The goals and objectives of 
the central authority may therefore not be adequately achieved at the local level. 
The spaces in the decentralization process  
A more complete understanding of China’s political system requires an examination 
of the central-local relationships, particularly through the decentralization process. 
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Lieberthal commented that decentralization increased the looseness of the political 
system and permitted bureaucratic bargaining. Bargaining involves negotiation over 
resources among the actors who effectively have mutual veto power. In this sense, 
these openings or spaces in the political system could be regarded as veto points. The 
fiscal and administrative decentralization process since the 1980s initiated the 
promotion of regional economic development by granting considerable power and 
autonomy to local governments. The 1994 tax-sharing system reform sought to 
recentralize by increasing the central share of revenues from 33% to 53%, but this 
1994 taxation reform also required that all social projects at sub-national level should 
be paid for by local governments (Li, 2005). With this further localizing of the 
central government organization and institution, the welfare expenditure 
responsibilities were further increased. However, revenues were centralized but the 
responsibility for expenditures remained highly regionalized. This mismatch of 
revenue centralization and spending decentralization generated fiscal problems at the 
local level, particularly in less-developed regions, in terms of fulfilling their welfare 
provision responsibilities (CAI, 2008; Carrillo and Duckett, 2012; Li, 2010). 
Therefore, they could function as de facto veto players to distort or re-interpret the 
central policy according to their own conditions and interests. 
After this disentangling of the Chinese political system with regard to the tools of 
veto players and veto points, it is clear that China may not fit these concepts as strict 
criteria. However, within China's fragmented and decentralized authoritarianism, the 
bureaucratic actors and the looseness of the system do provide the space to veto the 
policy process informally. And the consensus of the bureaucratic actors required in 
decision-making also empowers them as de facto veto players who can affect policy 
outcomes. The term de facto means that their role and their impact on the informal 
rules implicitly reflect that their roles are much less than those of their counterparts 
seen in democracies. Therefore, we propose a hypothesis that China, with its 
comparatively strong executive and less powerful veto players and veto points, 
might face relatively few barriers to changes of the status quo.  
5.4.4 Old age pension institution and hypothesis  
Fragmented welfare systems 
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China's welfare system was established at the very start of the communist party 
coming to power, when social welfare programmes for the employees in SOEs and 
public sector organizations were introduced. This welfare scheme was copied from 
the socialist model of the Soviet Union, and was aimed at illustrating the ideological 
priorities of socialism, including comprehensive welfare provision, old-age pensions, 
health insurance, paid sickness leave, maternity leave for women, and other social 
services (Gordon White, 1996). Expanding this socialist welfare system was beyond 
the country's economic capacities; hence these welfare provisions were restricted to a 
particular part of the population and to the privileged state sectors (Philion, 1998). 
As a result, a fragmented welfare system was formed in the initial stage, and the 
historical legacies exerted a significant influence on the later reform decisions. 
In particular, the fragmentation was represented in the dual split in the welfare 
system and was divided into three main types when the welfare system first 
established (Saunders and Shang, 2001). Each type had different principles in term 
of financing, administration and entitlements and benefits level.  The first split was 
an urban-rural divide based on the household registration system (the Hukou system), 
and urban and rural residents were covered by different systems each with its own 
principles. Within the urban system, the state was the main provider and regulator in 
the era of planned economy, and the main administration work was handed to 
state-owned enterprises or government organizations. In the rural system, the state 
took only residual responsibility for rural residents, mainly through the basic social 
relief system (the five guarantees) for the most vulnerable rural groups, leaving 
family, kin or the local community to supplement the land guarantee and provide 
mutual welfare benefits under the household responsibility system (White, 1998). 
The household registration system initially structured the urban-rural welfare divide 
and further enforced the split to prevent movement between urban and rural areas. 
The second split reflected that the urban system was divided into public sector 
workers and other sectors. Before the economic reform of 1978, the public sector 
included SOEs, non-profit-making agencies, and social and government 
organizations, and the employees were covered by the state welfare system in which 
SOEs or the state bore the main responsibility for providing benefits and making 
ends meet, while the roles of the individual and the market were very limited. So in 
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the time of the planned economy, most of the urban population was covered by the 
state welfare system. Unlike employees in the public sector, individuals in other 
sectors were expected to rely on themselves, their families or the market to provide 
social support, and the state provided residential protection to the most vulnerable 
groups through different social relief schemes. 
However, after the economic reform and the restructuring of SOEs in the late 1970s, 
the number of state-sector employees decreased dramatically because of the 
unemployment and the numerous lay-offs which occurred in the transition period, 
and accordingly, the SOE welfare system and the state welfare system were 
dismantled, with the role of the state shifting from provider to regulator (Gu, 2001). 
After shifting the welfare burdens from SOEs to the urban governments and 
re-establishing social insurance schemes in the market economy era, the urban 
welfare system was divided into a public sector worker scheme and an urban 
enterprise worker scheme. The public sector scheme only included government and 
party organs and some public sector units which were mainly funded by the state, 
and those employees who were still in the previous state welfare system. By contrast, 
SOE employees and workers in the private sectors, including foreign enterprises, 
private enterprises and the self-employed, were covered by a social insurance system 
in which the employers and employees jointly bore the funding responsibilities, and 
the schemes were managed by social insurance agencies (Saunders and Shang, 
2001).  
In short, the Chinese current welfare system could be summed up as 'one country, 
three systems' in which the whole population was separated into different welfare 
systems according to occupational status (Frazier, 2006a). Specifically, communist 
party members, government officials, and some other public sector workers enjoyed 
generous welfare benefits, ranging from pensions to health care, financed by state 
budgets. A second category, the urban workers, enterprise employees and the 
self-employed were under a social insurance welfare system mainly financed by 
contributions from employees and employers. The third category, the rural 
population, was mainly covered by various rural welfare schemes or not covered at 
all; in some regions, migrant workers could participate in the urban welfare system 
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in the city where they worked, however, not all migrant workers in any urban city 
were entitled to the benefits. 
The pension system structure in pre-reform era meant that the starting point for 
pension reform only affected a small proportion of the population (SOE workers), 
and their pension programme was entirely based on a pay-as-you-go mechanism. In 
addition, this state pension programme did not have a funded scheme. Therefore, the 
maturity of the PAYG system was very high at the starting point, and the transition 
cost was always a concern at the beginning and later on. We would hypothesize 
that radical structural change may not be possible because of the maturity of 
the PAYG system and the absence of a funded scheme.  
5.4.5 Key stakeholders and hypothesis  
Employers and business interest  
Enterprises located in territorial jurisdictions with high social programme costs may 
be motivated to relocate their capital to other regions. The resulting competition 
between jurisdictions creates strategic opportunities for the economic interest actors 
who oppose the extensive, redistributive social policies. The business interest is 
highly likely to have more options in the fragmented system, and there is much 
empirical evidence which testifies to this in western cases (Pierson, 1995). In 
China’s context, the growth-oriented strategy and the fiscal incentive in the 
decentralization further put the economic interest as the priority rather than social 
programmes (Zhang, 2006). In this context, businesses may have more advantages 
and opportunities to deregulate the social policy and they have more bargaining 
power to evade the social welfare duties Therefore, according to the discussion 
above, we propose the hypothesis that the employers with their associated high 
interest would oppose the introduction and expansion of the public programme.  
In addition, in China's case, the uneven development level and uneven risk across 
employers were very diverse. The difference between privileged SOEs and general 
SOEs in profit making and central budgetary subsidies determine their preferences 
and interests when it comes to complying with or conflicting with pension reform. 
Before 1998, the workers in these privileged SOEs contributed less and enjoyed a 
higher replacement rate because these SOEs were in the key industries and were 
 127 
 
managed by the relevant central ministries (Frazier, 2010b).  Therefore, it can be 
hypothesized that the privileged SOE had more advantages to oppose any 
reform which might deteriorate their interests.  
Unions 
Historically, Chinese labour unions have been viewed as corporatist interest groups 
with their roles and their interests defined by the state and subordinated to the 
interests of the state. Therefore, the unions were usually viewed as being dependent 
on the state (Unger and Chan, 1995). The ACFTU (All-China Federations of Trade 
Unions) functions as the representative body of labour interests as well as the state 
institution responsible for social stability. According to the law, a union has three 
main functions: the first is to assist the government administration, the second is to 
collaborate with enterprise management and the third is to protect the interests of the 
labour force (Ge, 2007). The ACFTU is a state institution formally controlled by the 
state, and its officers are delegated and appointed by the state (Chan, 2000). In the 
transition stage, the economic restructuring had a significant impact on the unions, 
causing a decline in union membership. The ACFTU promoted union membership in 
the emerging private sector to reverse the trend. However, membership numbers did 
not rise as much as had been expected. Chan (2000) reported that it was not only the 
state which affected the unions, but that the unions' role further decreased because of 
their financial and personnel dependence on enterprise. Therefore, the unions could 
not represent the interests of the labour force and generally functioned as 
pro-management bodies or played the role of management whenever labour disputes 
occurred (Taylor and Li, 2007; Rathke, 2006). Unlike their counterparts in 
industrialized countries, labour unions protected welfare interests to counter the 
various risks in the labour market, not only in welfare expansion but also in opposing 
welfare retrenchment. The absence of labour union involving in the welfare reform 
in China context may present another scenario. Therefore, it is hypothesized that 
the absence of any union involvement in the pension reform and administration 
in China means that there are fewer barriers to change.    
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5.5 Operationalizing empirical case analysis 
As previously mentioned, China's welfare system took the form of 'one country, 
three systems', with separate systems for the urban, rural and public sectors pension 
systems. The public sector system covered Communist party and government 
officials and public service organisations amounting to between ten and eleven 
million beneficiaries; it was financed by state funds and provided relatively generous 
benefits. Given the short history of public sector reform, this study will not provide a 
detailed analysis but will examine recent initiatives and policy assessment in general. 
This will be integrated into the analysis of the urban sector. In addition, the new 
urban residents' pension system introduced in 2009 will be examined, and the 
development and outcomes will also be briefly addressed. The majority of the 
analysis of the urban system will be focused on the system for urban enterprise 
workers, which covers 275 million urban workers; it is the core of pension reform as 
well as the institutionalized template for other schemes in the urban sector.  
Roughly 500 million rural workers have incomplete welfare benefits, and even 
though the new rural pension schemes have been implemented in some regions, most 
rural residents have no access to pension benefits (Frazier, 2006a). This case study is 
based on the urban-rural dual system and offers a historical institutionalist analysis 
of the reform of the two sectors in China. To be specific, the system for urban 
enterprise workers was the first pension scheme and has undergone three decades of 
restructuring and revision, and during this historical process, different punctuation 
points have witnessed different dynamics. The pension scheme for public sector 
workers was the most recent one to be reformed in 2009 and it provides little 
evidence to form a good understanding about the long-term process and dynamics, 
but this study will draw upon the existing documents, academic literature and media 
resources to map out a preliminary investigation of the path of change. The rural 
pension system was initiated in the 1990s and suffered stagnation during the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997, and again in the global recession of 2009. So it is difficult to 
form a consistent and comprehensive analysis as with the urban system, but even so, 
this study will try to construct a complete picture of the change path and its 
dynamics.  
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Within each system, we shall carry out both an empirical analysis and an institutional 
analysis. Given the short history of the rural sector programme, the two sets of 
analysis will be put together into one chapter (see Chapter 8). The urban sector study 
will be divided into two chapters (see Chapters 6 and 7). The empirical analysis will 
trace the proposed and enacted policy change over time and evaluate the policy 
outcomes over time. The case study of the reform of the two-sector system starts 
with a review of the historical development comprising a detailed tracing of policy 
documents, regulations and legislations. The data mainly come from national 
administrative archives and databases, including the China Labour Year Book 
(1988-1998), the China Labour and Social Security Yearbook (1999-2008), and the 
China Human Resources and Social Security Yearbook (2009-2011). The database 
includes the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China online 
database of officially released documents, and the regulation and policy online 
databases in the official websites of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security and 
the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security. The review of these archives 
and documents will identify the development of the pension system over the past 
decades at the national policy level. 
The institutional analysis will follow the conceptual and explanatory framework (see 
Chapter 4 and 5) to explore the institutional change causal relations behind the 
policy pressure and policy formation, as well as the intended and unintended 
consequences of the implementation. This process involves addressing the dependent 
variable problem (tracing the institutional change) by examining changes in the 
pension programme structure (pillar-tier architecture), and the programme 
parameters and institution outcomes. In terms of structure, the absence or existence 
of particular pillars and tiers, and the addition of new pillars or tiers, will be 
examined to study the architecture change over time. In addition, the system design 
is another aspect from which to locate change based on our coding framework 
described above. The pension institution outcomes will be examined through the 
generosity and privatisation index based on quantitative evidences (see Chapter 4).  
After dealing with the issue of dependent variable, the reform dynamic is another 
question which has to be explained. We shall identify the independent variables 
including context, institution structure and actors at different punctuation points and 
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explain their interactive impacts over time. Here, the study uses secondary data, 
including international organization reports, media coverage and academic surveys 
to help to trace the causal links between policy demands and policy design, policy 
outputs and policy outcomes. Incorporating the evidences into the explanatory 
framework will test the hypotheses proposed in this chapter and offer an explanation 
of these independent variables in China's context, which will also provide the 
possibility of eventually bringing China into a comparative analysis.  
5.6 Concluding remarks  
This chapter has developed an explanatory and analytic framework for studying 
Chinese pension reform based on China's specific circumstances. In addition, based 
on the causal proposition generated from other countries' experiences (European and 
international), the hypothesises were proposed about the impact or role of 
independent variables on pension reform and its extent in China, which guides the 
institutional analysis in both sectors as well the comparative analysis in the end. 	  	  	  	  	  
 
 
 131 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part three:  case analysis 	  	  	  
 132 
 
 
Chapter 6: The urban case 
6.1 Introduction  
I shall first divide the long-term historical development into four periods based on 
the changes in leadership generation in post-Mao China. China is a single party state 
but this does not mean that the government pursues the same social economic 
strategy all the time; differences between different governments with different 
leadership generations are distinct from one another in terms of development 
strategy, political discourse, critical contribution and their legacies for their 
successors. Second, the changes in leadership/government within the communist 
party state and their distinct social economic development agendas and strategies 
also involve changes to the social programmes. This study covers the political 
generations from the 1980s to 2010s. According to the official discourse, the second 
generation of leadership lasted from 1976 to 1992, with Deng Xiaoping as its core 
leader. The third generation lasted from 1992 to 2003, with Jiang Zemin as the core 
leader. The fourth generation is officially regarded as beginning in 2003 and it lasted 
until 2012 under the leadership of Hu Jintao, and this generation is also known as the 
'republican generation' or the Hu-Wen Administration (Wikipedia, 2013). Based on 
these shifts in government as well as the policies, regulations and documents issued 
by the different leadership generations, the reform process (1980s-2000s) can be 
divided into three stages. The 1980s were the period of Deng Xiaoping's leadership, 
who turned to economic development, pioneering the reform of China's market 
economy and bringing about profound changes in socio-economic development. The 
principles, nature and mechanism of the social protection system in China have 
changed a great deal over the past decades. The collective and state-provided welfare 
system (including pensions) for a small fraction of the population failed to adapt to 
the new social and economic context in China. The reform was the policy response 
to the economic reforms of the 1980s and was the first stage of exploring a proper 
pension provision model for the labour force in the market economy. The 1990s, 
mostly within Jiang Zemin's leadership, saw the economic development continue and 
more social issues emerge in China. In this decade, social policy-oriented reform 
gradually formed the partially-funded pension insurance model in urban areas; 
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however, the target group was mainly the crucial constituencies, the workers in the 
state sectors or the formal employment workforce in the market. The 2000s, under 
the fourth leadership generation, witnessed the expansion of public pensions and the 
building of the multi-pillar system. 
6.2 Historical development overview  
6.2.1 State retreat and SOE welfare model crisis in the 1980s 
Generally speaking, the pension system in the socialist period was characterized by 
the state-owned enterprises' (SOEs) welfare system in urban areas. The SOEs 
provided their employees with a welfare service from cradle to grave based upon 
lifetime employment. Certainly, the cradle-to-grave service also included the 
provision of old-age pensions, in which the SOEs had to pay the retired from the 
current revenues (Salditt, 2007). So the whole system was not operated on either a 
funded or a pay-as-you-go system. The SOEs' pension system had generous 
eligibility criteria and a replacement rate as high as 80% (Whiteford, 2003, p.23). 
Because the system only covered SOE urban workers, only a small fraction of the 
whole population of pre-transition China, it could be sustained financially and 
practically until the economic reform. 
In 1979, China began its market economy reform, transforming the centrally planned 
economy into a more liberal market economy, albeit with a high level of state 
ownership in key industries. The economic liberalization began with the 
establishment of free economic zones along the east coast, and then gradually 
diffused into other urban areas (Démurger et al., 2002). Within the reform package, 
the restructuring of the SOEs was a crucial and complex task, starting in the early 
1980s. The SOEs began to have more autonomy in management decisions, and 
became more independent entities in the market, and gradually encountered 
competition from emerging private sector enterprises (Li, 1997; Chan et al., 2008). 
One of the important changes for the SOE management at that time was to solve the 
issue of the unemployment problem in urban areas because many young members of 
the workforce flowed back to urban areas after the reform had been initiated (Davis, 
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1988).2 One of the strategies was early retirement, reducing retirement eligibility 
criteria from twenty years to ten years of employment, and increasing the pension 
benefits to incentivize early retirement and free up more jobs for the unemployed 
young workforce. Therefore, the worker-pensioner ratio dropped from 30 to 1 in 
1978 to 7.1 to 1 by 1986 (West, 1999, p.13). Another incentive for SOE workers was 
that they could designate a son or daughter who was of working age to take over 
their position in an SOE (Williamson and Deitelbaum, 2005). The number of 
pensioners increased from 2.14 million in 1978 to 21.20 million in 1988; pension 
expenditure rose around twenty times over the same period (Hu, 2006c, p.11). 
Meanwhile, the early retirement incentive coincided with the one-child policy, which 
further increased the financial pressure on the pension system.  
In 1986, the government began to experiment with reforms which introduced social 
pooling as well as employee contributions to the pension scheme in some areas. The 
social pooling funds were managed by newly-established social insurance agencies 
(the Bureaus of Labour) at the city or county level which replaced the SOEs in 
managing pension programmes, which was the initial step to establishing 
contribution-based old-age insurance (State Council, 1986). The SOEs were required 
to contribute to local pension funds, and the larger and older SOEs were enthusiastic 
about the cost-sharing in the local pooling because they had a heavier burden with 
more workers close to or at retirement age and the local fund could pay all the 
pension costs. However, the local pooling only covered the formal permanent 
workers in SOEs. With the introduction of the contract labour system in 1986, 
contracted workers were required to pay 3% of their wages to the pension funds 
(State Council, 1986). These two important initiatives were mainly intended to 
alleviate the increasing burden on SOEs, especially the pooling fund, which could 
help to share the pension commitment burden among prosperous SOEs and those not 
making a profit (Sander, 2010). The introduction of the employee contribution 
coincided with labour market reform and represented a shift from the SOE welfare 
model. The two measures were aimed at reducing the financial pressure on SOEs and 
harmonizing with the labour market change. However, the debate and consideration 
regarding the new pension system did not come onto the agenda.  
                                                
2 Educated young people were sent to the countryside in the years following 1968, but after the introduction of the reform 
policy, they were allowed to return to the cities, which generated huge unemployment pressure in urban areas. 
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6.2.2 The formation of the old-age social insurance model in the 1990s 
In 1991, the State Council issued document No.33 (State Council, 1991) entitled 
Decision on Enterprise Employee Pension Insurance System Reform, which 
proposed a multi-tier pension system. The first tier was a basic pension jointly 
financed by the state, enterprises and workers. The second tier was a supplementary 
scheme funded by the enterprises from their profits. The third tier was an individual 
account funded by individual workers on a voluntary basis and paid as a lump sum. 
Due to the income disparities and price differences among the regions, the regulation 
allowed local governments to set the contribution rates according to local conditions. 
In addition, it also planned to advance social pooling from the provincial to the 
national level, but it only laid down the reform direction rather than clear procedures 
(Haico Ebbers, 2009). As a result, this regulation brought the first fragmentation 
trend in the building of an old-age insurance system. In addition, even though the 
regulation stated the intention to advance pension pooling from city level to 
provincial level, it did not set consolidated rules to guide the practice and no penalty 
measures were established to curb non-compliance. The 1991 regulation was the first 
formal policy document to address pension reform in the new socio-economic 
context.  Unlike the previous policy response to the SOE pressure and the new 
labour forces in the SOEs, this regulation was the first policy initiative to explore the 
creation of a pension system in transitional China. However, as for the explicit 
policy model and parameter sets, there was no definite design at that time.   
In 1995, the State Council issued document No.6 (State Council, 1995a) entitled 
Notification on Deepening Enterprise Employee Pension Insurance Reform, which 
aimed to set down a solid measure on public pension reform by establishing 
individual accounts. The newly-established social insurance system was jointly 
funded by state, employers and employees and all the contributions went into 
pension funds, which were intended to share the pension costs, tackle the financial 
pressure and decrease the burden on state budgets. The 1995 regulations explicitly 
introduced the concept of individual accounts for all workers in SOEs and attempted 
to increase individual contributions to reduce the fiscal pressure both currently and in 
the future. However, in terms of how to integrate and manage the social pooling fund 
and individual accounts, the 1995 regulations allowed 32 provinces and eleven SOE 
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funds run by the industrial ministries to select from two options as an experiment in 
local areas (State Council, 1995a). One option was a defined benefits model which 
was advocated by the Ministry of Labour. Within it, the pension benefits were based 
on pre-retirement wages, the number of service years and the accumulated individual 
account fund based on a fixed-asset maintenance ratio.3 The other option was a 
defined contribution model advocated by the State Structural Reform Commission, 
which was different from the first option in that the individual account fund was 
accumulated by the return on real investment rather than a fixed interest rate. So the 
pension benefits were highly determined by the personal contribution record and the 
asset investment profits (State Council, 1995a). Allowing the provinces to choose 
one of these two options further deepened the fragmentation and division in the basic 
pension scheme. Hundreds of city and county pension funds were run under different 
rules in terms of funding method, benefit calculation, contribution rate and so on, but 
they all resembled more or less either the DC model or the DB model, or some small 
variants of them (Frazier, 2010a). For instance, Shanghai adopted the DC model 
mainly based on contributions from employer and employees, accounting for 14% of 
the payroll. To summarise, the DB model was run as a traditional social insurance 
system based on the PAYG principle, while the DC model was an attempt to 
partially privatize pensions by shedding the responsibilities to individual 
contributions and asset market performance and by altering the role of the state to 
one of regulator or supervisor rather than the provider or trader in funds. The 
emerging local trials of the DC model and the formal regulation of justifying it 
represent a trend towards retrenchment based on our conceptual coding framework. 
The financial mechanism shift from PAYG to pre-funded DC indicates the sharing 
of financing responsibilities between state, market and individuals.  
In 1997, the State Council issued Document No.26 entitled Decision on Establishing 
a Unified Enterprise Employee Pension Insurance System (State Council, 1997) and 
began to unify the urban pension schemes and extend the coverage from traditional 
SOEs to all other types of enterprise, including the private sector and foreign 
investors. Rather than having separate individual accounts as the second pillar as in 
                                                
3 The ratio is defined by the bank deposit rate, with reference to local average in the last year. 
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the WB model, Chinese policy makers adopted a conservative strategy, integrating 
individual accounts with a social pooling fund (Feldstein, 1999). The two elements 
together constituted the first public pillar and were named the partially-funded model. 
The concept of the partially-funded model can be explained as that the social pooling 
part is based on the pay-as-you-go principle while the individual accounts are 
operated according to funding rules (Williamson and Deitelbaum, 2005). The 
partially-funded model was a compromise between the traditional PAYG and the 
defined contribution models and could smooth transition costs and avoid the risks 
which the rapid change might cause (Williamson and Bingwen, 2009; Williamson, 
2004). In terms of greater unity, the regulation stipulated that the contribution rate 
for employers should be less than 20%, while the employee contribution rate was 
capped at 8% (State Council, 1997). The individual account size was set at 11% and 
the benefit formula was set too. Therefore, various urban pension schemes at the 
local level had to revise the model and parameters according to central regulation, 
which provided preconditions for advancing social pooling and establishing the 
urban universal pension system. In terms of extension, the regulation proposed to 
expand the coverage of the system, gradually covering all types of ownership of 
enterprises and all types of worker. Self-employed workers were also mentioned in 
the expanding range, but there were no unified consolidated rules set in this 
regulation. In summary, the 1997 regulation was an important milestone for pension 
reform in China. On the one hand, this regulation resolved the issues which occurred 
in the transition process and was the first attempt to unify the local fragmented 
schemes by setting the pension insurance design and parameters. On the other hand, 
beyond solving the legacy problems which had occurred in the previous stage, the 
regulation also considered the direction of further reform, presenting an explicit 
determination to expand coverage to all enterprises, even to all urban workers. 
In 1998, an additional policy document No.28, Notification on Prompting Provincial 
Pooling of Enterprise Employee Pension Fund and Transferring the Management of 
Industrial Pensions to Localities (State Council, 1998) was issued to integrate the 
ministry-managed industrial eleven pension funds into the urban system. With the 
privatization of SOEs prevalent nationwide, the fragmented basic pension system 
was operating with high deficits. How to shoulder and share the welfare burdens 
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from the laid-off workers and early retirees which occurred in the liberal reform 
became a more pressing issue. This regulation aimed to enlarge the redistribution 
base of the pension system and dealing with the emerging pensioner discontent in the 
privatization process.  To a certain extent, this measure was another attempt to 
unify the urban system by integrating the general SOEs and privileged SOEs into 
one system.  
6.2.3 the reform of the old-age insurance model in the 2000s 
Contribution and benefit parameters change 
In 2000, the State Council regulation No.42 and in 2005 No.38 began to adjust and 
improve the urban worker pension system (State Council, 2000; State Council, 2005). 
The basic rule set in 1997 did not change, with the social pooling and individual 
accounts components as the basic public pension design. The employer contribution 
remained at the ceiling of 20% of payroll and the individual contribution changed 
from 11% to 8%. The employee’s contribution was credited into the individual 
accounts and the employer’s contribution (around 20% of payroll but varying by 
locality) should be put into the local pooling account for basic pension payments. 
The individual account benefits were previously calculated on the basis of ten years 
of life expectancy, adjusted in accordance with the actual local circumstances. In 
addition, the 2005 regulation added the incentive measure: an employee contributing 
for more than fifteen years was entitled to one additional per cent of the pension 
benefits for each additional year of contribution. The pension benefit was calculated 
on the basis of the previous local average wage and the individual indexed 
contributable wage. Compared with the previous policy, the basic pension benefit 
was set at 20% of the previous year’s average local wage regardless of contributing 
for fifteen years or more. Therefore, the new incentive policy could curb early 
retirement and improve the compliance rate. The pension benefits were adjusted to 
price and wage increases. It was also proposed to reform the pension system for 
public sector workers (except for civil servants), but there was no specific measure to 
direct this reform. Even so, this proposition was significant because for the first time 
it put public sector worker pension reform onto the agenda (State Council, 2000, 
2005). From 2005 to 2007, the government raised the pension benefits for retirees 
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continuously. The average per capita monthly benefits went up from 719 Yuan in 
2005 to 815 Yuan in 2006 and 963 Yuan in 2007. The government aimed to increase 
the pension benefits for urban workers through another three years, and average per 
capita monthly benefit was expected to exceed 1200 Yuan by end of 2010 (ISSA, 
2007, p.1). 
NSSF 
In 2000, the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) was created in China, and at the 
same time the National Council of the Social Security Fund was established as the 
supervisory and management body of the NSSF (Hu, 2006a). The NSSF in essence 
was a national pension reserve fund with the objective of preparing for the 
forthcoming demographic aging and dealing with large pension deficits. Since 2000, 
central subsidies for the local pension deficits have not come from central budgets 
any more, and the strategic reserve fund can be run according to its specific aims 
(James, 2001). In one sense, the NSSF became a last resort to pay the pension 
shortfalls of provinces. The NSSF received revenues from three sources, the 
payment transfer from the Ministry of Finance (central government budget), the 
social security lottery income and investment returns, and most significantly a 
proportion of the share sales in SOEs (Hu, 2006a).  
Recapitalizing individual accounts and provincial pooling  
After 1997, a uniform urban enterprise worker pension system was formed, as can be 
seen in policy documents, and local authorities also implemented the regulations 
according to the demands and conditions of their own localities (State Council, 
1997). One of the most severe problems was that withdrawing the individual 
accounts funds to pay the current retirees and left the individual accounts to run on a 
purely notional model. The practice of withdrawing individual accounts was 
prevalent because the local authorities did not have sufficient revenues to pay the 
current retirees and save for the current active workers (Sun and Maxwell, 2002). An 
easy way which they came up with to solve the double payment issue was to transfer 
the accumulated individual accounts funds to cover the current payment deficits 
(Baidu, 2013). Therefore, even though the policy design claimed that the individual 
accounts should be run on the defined contribution basis, in practice, the funds were 
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jointly used with social pooling funds to pay the current retirees. In this sense, the 
whole public pillar was still operating on the pay-as-you-go principle, and the 
so-called partially-funded public pillar was nothing but an idle phrase (Zheng, 
2007a). Aware of this issue, in 2001, Chinese policy makers began a pilot project for 
recapitalizing individual accounts in Liaoning Province, which is a heavy industry 
hub with heavy pension burdens (Piggott and Bei, 2007). In this pilot project, 
employees’ 8% contribution would all go into individual accounts, and the 
employers’ 20% contribution would go to the social pooling portion, and the fund 
management for social pooling and individual accounts were separated, forbidding 
further withdrawal from individual account funds; meanwhile, the provincial and 
central government used budget transfer to recapitalize the empty accounts (State 
Council, 2000).  
Adding a second pension pillar 
In 2004, in order to achieve a multi-pillar pension model, the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Security (MOLSS) issued decree 20 which referred to the occupational 
pension for enterprise workers. A trial implementation measure clarified the 
objectives, requirement eligibility and procedures to set up occupational pension 
plans. It also provided the administration and fund management of occupational 
plans (MOLSS, 2004b), and set up trial measures for the management of enterprise 
annuities funds (IRC, 2004). The two decrees set up the framework for the 
development and administration of an enterprise annuity (EA). The EA plans were 
supposed to be run under a service provided by trustees, custodians, investment 
managers and administrators (Murton, 2005). In particular, EAs were established as 
a trust that can take the form of either an internal or external trustee model. In the 
internal trustee model, the trustees should appoint investment managers and 
administrators, and offer custody of the service to other financial institutions. In the 
external trustee model, the trustees can also carry out administration and asset 
management work, but not custody. Furthermore, the EA schemes should be 
negotiated directly between employers and employees or unions, and governments 
should regulate and supervise the system to ensure that the schemes comply with 
state documents (CIRC, 2004). More recently, regulation 25 about EA investment 
guidelines was issued to ensure the financial safety of funds and promote the 
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development of EA schemes, such as increasing the supervision, adjusting the 
investment options, increasing the fixed-return investment limit from 50% to 95%, 
decreasing the liquid investment limit from 20% to 5%, and ensuring that the 
investment in stock is less than 20% of fund assets. In addition, in order to increase 
the reserve fund administration, the regulation clarified the condition for using it, 
that is, the fund management procedures. The articles of audit and information 
disclosure were also listed in the regulation (MOHRSS, 2011d). All these measures 
were aimed at increasing the security of corporate pension funds and regulating the 
development of a secondary pension scheme in China. Employers who plan to 
sponsor EAs should meet the following preconditions: first, the enterprise must 
participate in the basic public pension system. Second, the enterprise's financial 
performance must be sound. Third, a collective negotiation system should be 
established before initiating an EA. In addition, apart from the new enterprise 
annuity introduced in 2004, there have also been industry pension schemes since 
1991, and these funds had assets of EUR 7.3 billion (RMB 75 billion) and were 
managed by the local social security agencies rather than trustees. In April 2007, the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Security issued a temporary guideline to transfer these 
industry funds to the EA schemes (AG, 2007, p.3). 
Extending the coverage 
In 2005, the State Council issued Document No.38, Decision on Improving the Basic 
Social Insurance System for Enterprise Employees (State Council, 2005). There were 
two important changes in this new document: the first was to expand the system 
coverage, clearly laying down the rules for private sector workers, the self-employed 
and flexible workers who wanted to participate in the urban system. Rather than just 
give a vague direction to pension extension, this regulation formulated clear 
parameters for these groups. These workers had to contribute at the rate of 20% of 
the average local wage, in which 8% went into an individual account. The insured 
were entitled to the basic pension following the regulations for urban enterprise 
workers. The urban enterprise pension system gradually expanded from the SOEs to 
the emerging private sector workers and to the marginalized fraction of the labour 
workforce, which offered a foundation for the establishment of a uniform urban 
pension system and ultimately a national pension system. 
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Provincial pooling measures  
Although the State Council called for the gradual provincial pooling of pension 
schemes in 1998, only a few provincial level governments such as Shanghai, Beijing, 
Tianjing, Shanxi and Fujian, achieved that objective (Bottelier, 2002). Most of the 
provinces still ran separated pension funds at municipal or county level, which 
impeded solidarity across region and country, as well as labour mobility. In 2007, 
the MOLSS began to set out clear-cut criteria and management measures regarding 
provincial pooling and launched a campaign called the 'Golden social insurance 
information project', which was intended to standardize the management of 
insurance information and provide technical support to achieve pension fund 
management as a provincial management function (MOLSS, 2007a, 2007b). The 
provincial pooling standards included several specific aspects: first, the provincial 
government had to issue a paper to implement the unified urban worker pension 
system and policy. Second, the contribution rates for the informal urban workers had 
to be unified within the provincial pooling region, which was decided by the 
provincial government. Third, the pension benefits formulas and payments had to be 
unified within provincial pooling, and the basic pension was adjusted by the 
provincial government. Fourth, the basic pension fund had to be administrated or be 
accounting by the provincial level financial department. Fifth, the pension fund 
budget had to be planned and implemented at the provincial level. Finally, the 
pension insurance operation measures and administrative rules had to be unified 
within the jurisdiction of each province. 
Integrating the public sector workers into the urban worker scheme 
In 2008, the State Council began pilot projects in five provinces and municipalities, 
Shanxi province, Shanghai, Zhejiang province, Guangdong province and Chongqing, 
to carry out public sector pension reforms (State Council, 2009b). The target was to 
create a universal public sector (except civil servants). The reform design followed 
the template of the urban worker scheme combined with social pooling and 
individual accounts. The former was to be funded by employee contributions with a 
ceiling of 20% of payroll; the specific parameter is decided by the provincial 
(municipal) government. The personal contribution rate started at 3% of payroll and 
 143 
 
was to increase annually to 8%. In addition, the central government encouraged the 
establishment of a second-pillar occupational pension to provide an adequate income, 
but as for the specific design and implementation measures, there were no details in 
this regulation. The pilot projects started from the local level and were intended to 
achieve provincial pooling. This also encouraged the pilot regions to start from 
provincial management and pooling if the local conditions permitted, but it allowed 
the pilots to be managed at the same pooling level as the urban worker system. 
New stipulations on pension portability  
In 2009, the State Council implemented a policy on pension portability policy 
entitled 'The provisional measures on transfer and continuity of the basic old age 
pension' for urban enterprise workers (State Council, 2009c). The document was 
compiled jointly by the MOHRSS and the Ministry of Finance (MOF). It was aimed 
at enhancing inter-regional labour mobility. When an insured person moves to 
another province, the social insurance agency in the original place should issue 
certification and facilitate the transfer of the insurance records to the place of 
destination. The amount of contributed funds which could be transferred included 12% 
(rather than 20%) of the employer's contribution as well as the total individual 
account. As for the benefit entitlement, when an insured person fulfils the 
requirements for eligibility, the contribution records in various places will be taken 
into account in calculating the benefit. If the pension records are outside the place 
where the household is registered and the contribution record in the candidate's base 
region is more than ten years, he/she can claim the payment locally.  If it is less 
than ten years, the pension records will be transferred to the previous place(s) where 
the contribution history is more than ten years and the applicant can claim the 
payment there. If none of the contribution history exceeds ten years, the records will 
be transferred to the region(s) where the household is registered and the applicant 
can claim pension benefits there. In addition, rural migrant workers in urban areas 
were not allowed to withdraw the individual account savings when they moved to 
other cities or back to their home villages. The pension records will be maintained by 
the social insurance agency and applicants can claim the same benefits as their urban 
peers when they fulfil the eligibility requirements. In certain cases, the records could 
be transferred to the new rural pension scheme (State Council, 2009c).  
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Social pension - Senior citizens' allowance  
In 2010, the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MOCA) disclosed that residents aged 80 and 
above will receive an old-age allowance across China, which showed the 
government’s determination to end the senior allowance trial projects at the local 
level and establish universal social pensions for senior citizens in the future. The 
general rules and parameters of the Ministry of Civil Affairs scheme included a 
unified design at the provincial level, an eligibility age of 80 and above, and monthly 
payments (Wang, 2010). However, to the present, there has been no official 
document published to propose a uniform design for the senior allowance scheme. 
Increasing the retirement age 
In 2011, Shanghai‘s Human Resources and Social Security Bureau launched a trial 
programme to allow older workers to defer retirement beyond the retirement age of 
60 (for men) and 50 (for women). The dependency ratio in Shanghai had decreased 
from 2.8:1 to 1.4:1 (Qian, 2010). If retirement is deferred, the employee and 
employer should both continue to make contributions to pensions insurance. 
Currently, the trial programme is limited to private sector workers and it will later be 
extended to other groups of employees. This measure is expected to ease the 
financial burden by increasing the mandatory retirement age. At the central level, the 
debate regarding increasing the retirement age is still going on and there is no settled 
consensus in the policy documents. According to speeches made by officers from the 
MOHRSS, the research, the proposal and the policy design are still in preparation. 
Expanding to the uncovered urban population - the urban resident pension 
pilot project 
In order to achieve universal coverage of the pension system and gradually solve the 
old-age support issue in contemporary China, the State Council started the urban 
residents' pension pilot projects in 2011 by targeting the populations without 
employment (State Council, 2011). This new scheme was based on the principles of 
basic protection, broad coverage, flexibility and sustainability. The new system was 
voluntary in nature with individual contribution accounts and public subsidies 
(central and local). The individual contributions went to an individual account and 
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would be paid out as benefits after retirement at the age of 60. The central subsidy 
will pay the basic pension at the 55 Yuan monthly; the local subsidies could pay an 
additional according to the local financial capacity. The government subsidy 
constitutes the basic pension and the pension benefit is indexed according to prices. 
The pilot projects started from the county level, and the pension system governance 
and fund management are located in the country-level social insurance agencies 
(State Council, 2011). 
Since this document was intended to initiate the pilot projects at the local level, there 
were no specific measures for its design and implementation; the central government 
allowed the local areas (at all levels, provincial and municipal) to design their own 
pilot programmes based on local conditions. This initiative was another step to 
achieving universal coverage, even though the principle of the system was still at the 
low level with basic pension benefits at the national poverty line (Dorfman et al., 
2012a). 
6.2.4 Social security legislation in 2010 
After reviewing the crucial policy documents issued in the past decades, it can be 
concluded that the urban workers’ pension system was established and developed in 
line with the various regulations, decisions, and notifications. In the Chinese legal 
system, the legal authority of administrative regulations issued by the State Council 
overrides the formal legislation passed by the NPC or its Standing Committee. 
Therefore, the local reform experiment practices as well as the less authoritative 
policy documents did give local governments enough leeway to implement the 
policies taking local particularities into account. It is no surprise that nearly three 
decades of accumulated regulations had brought about the fragmentation and 
affected the implementation of a coherent pension system. In 2010, the social 
insurance law was finally approved by the Standing Committee of the NPC after 
revising it four times between 2007 and 2010, which shows how the social security 
system began to be legalized and institutionalized. The Chinese social insurance 
reform shifted from a long-term experimental stage to a stable development phase. 
With respect to pension legislation, this Law explicitly spelled out the intention to 
gradually advance the pension fund pooling to national level. As for the extent to 
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which the integration of public pensions has been achieved, the academic view and 
the official statements contradict each other. According to the minister of the 
MOHRSS, Yin Weiming, the provincial pooling of public pensions was achieved in 
2009. The evaluation from MOHRSS shows that 27 provinces had achieved the 
goals and some remaining provinces still needed to improve (Xinhua News, 2012). 
However, the pension expert Zheng Binwen argued that only Shanghai, Beijing, 
Tianjing and Shanxi provinces had achieved the proposed pooling and that their 
pension funds were administrated by provincial governments, and also that other 
provinces which claimed the achievement had only built the pension reserve fund at 
the provincial level, and the pension fund management was still located in the 
various level of local governments. He therefore suggested that the objective of 
provincial pooling had not been realized in strict accordance with the criteria (Guo, 
2013). In addition, the law formulated the rules and procedures of pension insurance 
transferability and portability when participants change their work place or move to 
other regions, which facilitates labour mobility and national social pooling in the 
long run, further lessening the resistance to a universal urban pension system.                        
6.3 Current urban sector programme: a description and evaluation 
6.3.1 System architecture  
Currently, in the urban sector, China has four types of programme providing 
retirement benefits for different target groups: enterprise workers, public sector 
workers, self-employed workers and urban residents (non-employed). In this section, 
the general pillar-tier structure of China’s pension programme will be described, and 
the proposed national template for the long term will be presented. However, until 
now, only the urban workers' programme has achieved the multi-pillar structure, and 
the other schemes are in the trial process.  
For urban enterprise workers, the multi-pillar pension system has been established. 
The first pillar consists of a basic defined-benefits pension (tier 1) financed by 
employers' contributions at 20% of payroll. The theoretical replacement rate from 
this tier is 35% for pensioners with a full contribution record (35 years). The second 
tier (tier 2) is DC-funded individual accounts with the employees' contributions at 8% 
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of payroll. The theoretical replacement rate is set at 24.2%. The qualifying condition 
is 15 years of contributions, and the retirement age is 60 for males and 50 for 
females.  The second pillar comes from the enterprise annuity (EA) introduced in 
2004, which is the main component of occupational pensions. EAs are fully-funded, 
voluntary-defined contribution schemes established by the employers and governed 
by the regulations issued by the MOHRSS to manage the different legal entities in 
the service provision (MOLSS, 2004; MOHRSS, 2011d). The third pillar is based on 
voluntary plans, such as commercial or personal insurance contracts. 
For the urban public-sector workers scheme 4  (except for civil servants), the 
multiple-pillar pension design is the same as for enterprise workers, but this scheme 
started in 2008 as a pilot project, and was implemented in five provinces and 
municipalities: Shanxi, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Guangdong and Chongqing. From 2012, 
an occupational pension for this group was introduced, and this was co-funded by 
employers and employees. The employers' contribution could not exceed 8% of 
payroll and the individual contributions were subject to a cap of 4% (GOSC, 2011, 
p.21). For self-employed workers, the scheme is voluntary and the design is similar 
to that for urban enterprise workers, with basic pension insurance and mandatory 
individual accounts.  Both are funded from individual contributions at 12% and 8% 
of the local average wage respectively. 
The urban residents (unemployed) scheme is in the form of a non-contributory 
universal scheme plus individual accounts. It is a voluntary programme still in the 
pilot process. The non-contributory component is funded by the central and local 
governments. The central government will subsidize at least 50 Yuan a month in the 
central and western region, and 50% of the cost for the eastern region. Local 
governments can make additional contributions. The individual accounts are 
co-funded by the local governments and individual contributions. The local 
governments contribute 30 Yuan monthly and individuals contribute from 100 Yuan 
to 1000 Yuan a year according to ten scales5 based on personal choice. The higher 
they contribution, the more entitled.  
                                                
4 Government funded employer-administered systems for public sector workers in cultural, educational and scientific 
institution. 
5 The contribution rate is set at 10 scales: 100, 200, 300,400, 500, 600, 700,800, 900, 1000 yuan/per year. The local 
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Table 6.3.1: The multi-pillar pension system in China 
 
First pillar Second pillar Third pillar 
Third tier: 
 None 
Third tier: voluntary 
occupational pension  
Types: company DC 
planes 
Third tier: voluntary 
additional plans 
Types: housing assets, 
retirement saving, family 
support, etc.  
Second tier: 
mandatory saving 
account 
Types: 
earning-related DC 
individual accounts 
 
Second tier: 
government subsidies 
or promoted 
quasi-mandatory or 
voluntary schemes  
Types: occupational 
plans (public sector 
worker and enterprise 
workers) 
Second tier:  
government regulated 
insurance products  
Types: lump sum, 
annuity products, life 
insurance, etc. in private 
market 
First tier: mandatory, 
basic public pension 
Types: minimum 
pension (urban 
residents), basic 
pension (urban 
workers) 
First tier: mandatory 
schemes  
 
None 
First tier: mandatory, 
quasi-mandatory private 
pensions  
 
None 
Note: made by author based on current policy documents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
governments could add more scale based on the local conditions. 
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Table 6.3.2: The public pension institution framework 
 
Population 
category 
Qualify conditions Benefits  Financing  
Urban 
enterprise 
workers 
(Group 1) 
Aged 60/50 for male/female 
At least 15 years of 
contributions 
The basic pension is calculated on the accrual 
rate6 of 1%, and it is related with years of 
contribution. The individual account benefit is the 
balance of the insured’s contributions plus 
interest rate returns, and divided by 139 (139 in 
2012). 
20% of payroll from employers 
and 8% of payroll from 
employees 
Urban 
public-sector 
workers 
(Group 2) 
Aged 60/50 for male/female 
At least 15 years of 
contributions 
The basic pension is calculated on the accrual 
rate7 of 1%, and it is related with years of 
contribution. The individual account benefit is the 
balance of the insured’s contributions plus 
interest rate returns, and divided by 139 (139 in 
2012). 
8% of payroll contribution from 
employers and 4% of payroll 
contribution from employees 
Urban 
self-employed  
(Group 3) 
Aged 60/50 for male/female 
At least 15 years of 
contributions 
The basic pension is calculated on the accrual 
rate8 of 1%, and it is related with years of 
contribution. The individual account benefit is the 
balance of the insured’ contributions plus interest 
rate returns, and divided by 139 (139 in 2012). 
8% of local average payroll 
contributed to social pooling, 
12% of local average payroll 
contributed to individual 
account  
Urban residents  
(Group 4) 
Aged 60 for both females and 
males. Those aged 60 and 
above are entitled to a flat basic 
pension (with or without 
contribution records) 
Flat basic pension (55 Yuan/month), plus 
monthly payment of 1/139th individual account 
fund 
Individual contribution 
(100-1000 Yuan) per year 
Sources:(Barr and Diamond, 2008b, State Council, 2005a, State Council, 2011, GOSC, 2011) 
6.3.2 Current system description - parameters and rules 
Qualifying conditions 
According to central government guidelines, insured people are entitled the basic 
pension at age 60 for men and 55 for women with at least fifteen years of 
                                                
6 Shows the rate at which benefit entitlements build up for each year of coverage, it is expressed as a percentage of earnings 
that are covered by the pension scheme. (Pension at a glance, 2011, p.110) 
7 Shows the rate at which benefit entitlements build up for each year of coverage, it is expressed as a percentage of earnings 
that are covered by the pension scheme. (Pension at a glance, 2011, p.110) 
8 Shows the rate at which benefit entitlements build up for each year of coverage, it is expressed as a percentage of earnings 
that are covered by the pension scheme. (Pension at a glance, 2011, p.110) 
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contributions (Barr and Diamond, 2008b). Insured persons who reach retirement age 
with less than fifteen years of contributions can continue to contribute until fifteen 
years, or can transfer their entitlements to the urban residents' scheme. Mandatory 
individual accounts will be paid in a lump sum when the contribution record is less 
than fifteen years. As for the early retirement condition, men aged 50 and women 
aged 45 who have at least ten years of contributions and also have total disability 
could be entitled to an early pension. Alternatively, men aged 55 and women aged 45 
who have eight to ten years of continuous contributions and are employed in 
unhealthy work could also be entitled to early retirement. For the newly-established 
urban residents' programme, people aged 60 are entitled the basic pension (55 Yuan). 
With at least fifteen years of contributions, they are also entitled to the individual 
account (State Council, 2005). Insured people with a contribution record of less than 
fifteen years can continue to make contributions to their individual accounts until 
they become eligible or they can make a lump sum contribution in order to become 
eligible.  
Benefits formula 
According to the recent central government guidelines (State Council, 2005), the 
basic pension (groups 1, 2 and 3) formula is calculated as follows. The earnings 
measure (for groups 1, 2 and 3) which is used to calculate the benefits is the average 
local wage in the previous year plus the average individual monthly wage, and the 
total is divided by two. For the group 2 scheme, the policy set a ceiling at 300% of 
average local earnings. For the group 1 scheme, there is no ceiling on the public 
pension. The accrual rate9 is 1%, and it is related to years of contribution. This 
means that the insured are entitled 1% of the total value for each year of contribution. 
The longer the history of contribution, the more benefits they are entitled to. For 
example, if an insured person has a ten-year contribution record, he or she can only 
receive 10% of the calculated base (the average of the local wage and the individual 
wage) as the basic pension.  The individual account benefit is the balance of the 
insured’s contributions plus interest rate returns, and divided by 139 (139 in 2012). 
The actuarial month is determined by the retirement age, the average life expectancy 
                                                
9 This shows the rate at which benefit entitlements build up for each year of coverage; it is expressed as a percentage of 
earnings that are covered by the pension scheme. (Pension at a glance, 2011, p.110) 
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and the interest rate for the urban population.  The earnings measure used to 
calculate the contribution is the individual payroll (Groups 1 and 2), and the local 
average wage in the previous year (for group 3). For group 4 (urban residents), the 
benefits include the universal 55 Yuan and individual account fund which includes 
contribution and investment returns and is divided by the actuarial month (139 in 
2012). 
Transition pension benefits 
Local governments pay the transition pension on top of the basic pension for workers 
in group 1 without a full contribution record because of the reform; in particular, 
people who joined the system before 1997 (and who therefore have no individual 
account) and who retired on or after 2006 with at least fifteen years of contributions.  
The local government pays the transition pension too for public workers in group 2 
without a full contribution history. People who joined the new scheme in 2008 and 
who have at least fifteen years of contributions would be provided with the transition 
pension when they retire. The insured in Groups 1 and 2 with less than fifteen years 
of contributions will be paid the lump sum from the individual account. 
Indexation  
Indexation refers to updating pensions in payment after retirement. There are three 
indexation rules in general: price indexation, wage indexation, and a mixture of the 
two. Specifically, if workers’ past earnings are indexed to prices, the initial pension 
depends on their nominal earnings in each of a number of years, adjusted by the 
increase in the price level from each year up to the year when the initial pension is 
calculated. Wage indexation is based on the history of a worker’s earnings in each 
year relative to average earnings in that year, and the initial pension is calculated 
based on the worker’s earnings and average earnings in each year. The mixed 
method refers to the use of an appropriate weighted average of the price and wage 
index (Huber et al., 1993). For the urban enterprise workers' programme (group 1), 
the basic pension benefit is indexed with a mixture of inflation and wage growth 
(State Council, 2005a). The adjustment range is based on the average growth rate of 
the local-wide (provincial, municipal) earnings. The local government proposes the 
benefit adjustment plan to the MOF and the MOHRSS. For the urban public-sector 
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workers' programme, the benefits are indexed using a mixture of inflation and wage 
growth, but the State Council will decide any adjustment plans. For the urban 
residents’ scheme, central government will adjust the basic pension level (55 Yuan) 
according to domestic economic development and inflation. 
Administration and fund management  
At the central level, the MOHRSS provides overall policy regulation and supervision 
(Arza and Kohli, 2008). Provincial and local social insurance agencies are 
responsible for the administrative procedures including the social insurance register, 
the insured contribution record management, benefits payments and other 
consultancy issues and inquiries. In some regions, they are also responsible for 
collecting the insurance contributions. In the current system design, old-age 
insurance fund management and procurement are not unified and follow one of two 
procedures according to local choice (see Figure 6.3.1). In the contribution collection 
stage, some regions delegate this to a tax administration agency responsible for the 
collection; some choose the social insurance agency to do it. In the administration 
process, the social insurance agency deposits the fund into a special account in the 
state banks, while the tax agency submits the fund to the national treasury first and 
then transfers it to a financial special account. As for the investment vehicles, 
currently the pension fund can only invest in bonds and deposit cash. In addition, 
provincial labour and social security authorities are responsible for fund regulation 
(establishing special reserve funds) to pool the payment risks within the local 
jurisdiction. The local pooling funds have to pay a percentage of their revenue to the 
provincial reserve fund.  Local governments administer the urban residents' 
programme.  
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Figure 6.3.1: Pension fund management flow chart 
 
6.3.3 Performance evaluation  
Using international reports and administrative data, this section will discuss 
performance evaluation in terms of coverage, adequacy of benefit levels and 
financial efficiency. These evaluations will help in problem-spotting and in 
providing a diagnosis of the pension system. On the one hand, this evaluation can 
monitor the effectiveness of policy change; on the other hand, it provides a 
challenging analysis for further policy reform and suggestions. In addition, the 
evaluation can help to document progress or the impact of policy changes.  
Coverage  
Extending coverage is always the main objective and challenge not only in China’s 
public pension reform, but also internationally (ILO 2010, 2013). The coverage of 
formal pension protection is an effective way to counter the poverty risk in old age, 
and it is an important indicator of pension system performance.  It is measured here 
as the proportion of the active members of the working-age population (15-64) 
(coverage rate 1). In addition, the number of beneficiaries as a percentage of the 
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urban population is another measure used to calculate system protection coverage 
(coverage rate 2). The coverage rates of the urban pension system presented here 
include all public pension schemes of each group and measure the scale of pension 
protection. Figure 6.3 gives information on coverage rates over the past decades. It 
can be observed that the numbers of retirees and beneficiaries have been increasing 
over the past decades. Also, the number of contributors to public pension schemes 
can be seen to have decreased in the late 1980s and early 1990s, but from 1997, the 
number has been increasing continuously. However, the total coverage rate 
(contributors and beneficiaries) of the urban active population is around 75%, and 
the coverage rate of the urban population is around 40% (MOHRSS, 2011a). The 
aim of universal coverage for the pension scheme has not been achieved in practice 
even though the institution design has covered the different population groups.  
Figure 6.3.2: The coverage rate of basic pension insurance in the urban sector (1989-2010) 
 
Notes: Coverage rate 1: contributors as a percentage of the urban working population 
Coverage rate 2: retirees as a percentage of the urban population 
Total coverage means the total number including contributors and beneficiaries. 
Sources: China Human Resources and Social Security Yearbook, 2011; China Labour Statistics Yearbook, 2011 (MHRSS, 2011a, NBS, 
2011); Author's own calculations. 
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adopted by the large, profitable, mostly state-owned enterprises. The coverage rate 
was very low, as only 0.61% of China's enterprises had a supplementary pension 
plan. As for the coverage rate of workers, the participants only accounted for 2.06% 
of the urban working population. Since the pre-condition of establishing corporate 
pensions is that the enterprises had to join the basic pension system, the number of 
insured with first- and second-pillar pensions was 5.55% of the basic pension insured 
people in 2012; the fund balance in the second pillar was 18.31% of the basic 
pension fund (NBS, 2012,p.77). 
Figure 6.3.3: Comparison of the number of participants in the first and second pillars 
 
Source: The bulletin of human resources and social security (2007-2012) 
 
Figure 6.3.4: Comparison of pension funds in the first and second pillars  
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Source: The bulletin of human resources and social security (2007-2012) 
As for the coverage of the social pension (the senior citizen's pension), until 2011, 
there were fifteen provinces which had established the social pension system at the 
provincial level and these covered 900 million senior citizens.  According to the 
bulletin of the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MOCA) about establishing the senior 
citizen's allowance (MOCA, 2010), until 2010, six provinces had standardized the 
senior citizen's allowance scheme at the provincial level in terms of eligibility, 
benefit level, seven provinces had not standardized the scheme, and sixteen 
provinces were only providing the senior citizen's pension for those aged 100 and 
above. According to the results of an investigation by MOCA, the senior citizen's 
allowance eligibility varied across regions (see Table 6.3.3): 45% of the regions 
provided the scheme for elder citizens aged above 100, and 26% of the regions had 
adopted an eligible age of 90. Overall, the eligibility age in the majority of schemes 
(75% of the regions) was 90 and above (MOCA, 2010,p.12). 
 
Table 6.3.3 A comparison of eligibility conditions 
 
Eligibility age 60 65 70 75  80 85  90 95 100 Total  
Number of regions 12 2 8 5 41 4 77 13 134 296 
 % of total 4% 1% 3% 2% 14% 1% 26% 4% 45% 100% 
Source: The report of Establishing the Senior Allowance System in Local Areas (MOCA, 2010) 
Adequacy  
The adequacy indicators are based on the replacement rate. The replacement rate is 
the ratio of the pension entitlement when retired to individual earnings when 
working. There are two indicators to measure the ‘adequacy of pensions’. One is the 
forward-looking replacement rate based on the current legislative rules, which is the 
projected data based on the assumption model. According to the result obtained from 
the APEX model(analysis of pension entitlements across countries), 10  the 
                                                
10 See the pensions panorama published by the World Bank and in Pensions at a Glance and issued by the OECD 
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calculation of the gross replacement rates at the different level of earnings, half, (1) 
and 1.5 times the average and the averages are 97.9%, 77.9% and 71.2% in 2011 
(OECD, 2011, p.334). In addition, the empirical replacement rate rather than the 
expected benefit level measures the current benefit level. However, it is based on the 
past contribution pattern and the system design. It is measured by the average 
benefits received by recent retirees as a percentage of average earning (Bonoli, 2001). 
It can compare the incomes of retirees with those of current workers, and reflect the 
extent to which the pension provision achieves the adequacy of retirement incomes. 
The data mainly come from administrative records domestically. From the view of 
pension benefits level, the pension is increasing over time; in particular, from 2005 
there was rapid growth in the benefits level for both sectors (see Table 6.3.5). 
Overall, the civil servants and public sector workers enjoyed higher-level benefits 
than enterprise workers, and the latter group received lower than the national average 
level. The replacement rates of each sector and the national average level were 
decreasing from 1997, and the national level was 56.41% in 2010. Comparing the 
different sectors, the number of urban enterprise workers was lower than the other 
two groups (public sector workers and civil servants) and lower than the 
national-level data; it decreased from 76.21% in 1997 to 45.08% in 2010.  
 
Table 6.3.4 Gross pension replacement rates from public pension schemes (as percentage of 
individual earnings) 
 
Public pension scheme, 2011 
Earning level 0.5 0.1 1.5 
Gross replacement rate 97.9 77.9 71.2 
Sources: Pensions at a Glance, 2011: Retirement-income Systems in OECD and G20 Countries 
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Table 6.3.5: Empirical replacement rates from public pension schemes by sector (as % of 
average individual earnings) 
 
Year  Urban worker scheme Public sector worker scheme  Civil servant scheme National average  
1997 76.21% 95.89% 94.13% 92.65% 
2000 66.84% 100.22% 94.32% 89.81% 
2005 47.05% 75.64% 68.91% 67.00% 
2010 45.08% 59.20% 58.71% 56.41% 
Sources: China Human Resources and Social Security Yearbook, 2011 (MHRSS, 2011); Author's own calculations (average retirees benefits 
as a percentage of individual earnings) 
 
 
Figure 6.3.5: The replacement rate change by sector (1997-2010) 
 
Source: China Human Resource and Social Security Yearbook, 2011 
Note: as % of average individual earnings 
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Figure 6.3.6: The pension benefits disparity across professions and sectors (1997-2010) 
 
Source: China Human Resource and Social Security Yearbook, 2011 
Distribution effect 
For the distribution effects, two sets of measurements should be observed: the 
incomes of older people and old-age income poverty. The first is measured by the 
older people’s disposable incomes relative to those of population incomes. From the 
survey data in the past decades (2000-2010), it can be observed that the monthly 
income levels had increased and the average income of the elderly population (aged 
60+) had increased from 616 Yuan in 2000 to 1491 Yuan in 2010, rising around 2.4 
times (China Research Center on Aging, 2000, p.2; 2010,p.3). The rate of the 
pension beneficiaries increased from 69.1% to 84.7% (see Table 6.3.6) (China 
Research Center on Aging, 2000, p.2; 2010, p.3).  It can be seen that the pension 
benefits almost covered the expenditure by 2006, which reflects the fact that the 
pension benefits began to be adequate for the expenditure in 2006 (spending 
exceeding income) (see Figure 6.3.7). 
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Table 6.3.6: Urban elderly population average income and pension benefits 
 
Year Average income 
monthly 
Average expenditure 
monthly 
Average pension 
monthly 
Beneficiary coverage 
rate 
2000 616 724 618 69.1% 
2006 996.92 835.67 900 78% 
2010 1491.00 1318.25 1527 84.7% 
Sources: Elderly population survey in urban/rural China, 2000; Elderly population survey in urban/rural China, 2006; Elderly population 
survey in urban/rural China, 2010 (China Research Center on Aging, 2010, China Research Center on Aging, 2006, China Research Center 
on Aging, 2000). 
 
 
Figure 6.3.7: The adequacy of pension benefits 
 
Sources:  Elderly population survey in urban/rural China, 2000; Elderly population survey in urban/rural China, 2006; Elderly population 
survey in urban/rural China. 2000. 
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At the end of 2011, the fund's accumulated balance was 1850.04 billion Yuan, an 
increase of 4.13 times compared with 2005. The revenue resources include employer 
and employee contributions, public finance transfer and other incomes. The 
resources Incomes were 787.894 billion Yuan, 494.229 billion Yuan, 208.239 billion 
Yuan and 69.996 billion Yuan, accounting for 50.49%, 31.67%, 13.35% and 4.49% 
of the whole revenue (see Figure 6.3.9). In terms of public finance transfer, the 
central and local governments invested 184.686 billion Yuan and 23.553 billion 
Yuan respectively, accounting for 88.69% and 11.31%, increases of 239.27% and 
107.85% respectively compared with 2005. At the end of 2011, apart from 7.183 
billion Yuan in the state banks (the People’s Bank and the Agricultural Development 
Bank) and the central fiscal special account, the provincial-level, city-level and 
county-level balances were 905.383 billion Yuan, 561.315 billion Yuan and 376.16 
billion Yuan respectively, accounting for 49.13%, 30.46% and 20.41%. In terms of 
the geographic regions, eastern, central and western balances were 40.103 billion 
Yuan, 398.191 billion Yuan and 404.564 billion Yuan, accounting for 56.44%, 21.61% 
and 21.95% respectively. The fund's portfolio, time and deposit accounts and other 
forms were 580.318 billion Yuan, 1177.617 billion Yuan and 92.106 billion Yuan, 
accounting for 31.37%, 63.65% and 4.98% respectively (National Audit Office of 
China, 2012, p.2-3). 
In sum, it can be seen from the line chart that the pension funds increased quickly 
after 1995. A rapid growth can be seen from 2005 in the fund revenues and 
accumulated balances. In addition, most of the revenues came from the employers' 
and employees' contributions, accounting for 83% of the total revenues.  As for the 
public finance transfer, the central state contributed more than all the local level 
governments. However, the accumulated pension funds were mostly located at the 
local level (provincial, city and county), accounting for 99.51%.  The target 
provincial-level fund management was half achieved, with 49.13% of the fund 
controlled at this level, and the remaining 50.87% still managed at the lower 
sub-national level. 
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Figure 6.3.8: Pension fund balance (1990- 2010) 
 
Source: China Human Resources and Social Security Yearbook, 2011 (MOHRSS, 2011a) 
 
Figure 6.3.9: The financial source portfolio of pension funds (2011) 
 
Source: Audit results of the National Social Security Fund, 2012 (National Audit Office of China, 2012) 
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The social insurance pension scheme, as well as the multi-pillar model, has been 
gradually formed and reformed over the course of the past three decades. First, the 
old-age insurance model replaced the SOE welfare model and the building of the 
modern social insurance welfare system was also an important aspect of the 
transition to a market economy. Second, the old-age insurance model has been 
reformed following the global trend, and the formation of a partial DC model and 
multi-pillar pension system in China represents a convergence with global pension 
reform trends. Third, the recently advocated senior citizen's allowance is on the 
policy agenda and various practice and trial measures are in progress at the local 
level. The making of a social pension pillar to target the vulnerable within the 
multi-pillar model is another direction which China is now heading towards. Fourth, 
the integration and harmonization of pension schemes is another effort to 
institutionalize the pension programme at the national level. Not only has the social 
insurance law been legislated to consolidate the implemented procedures, but also 
more initiatives and plans have recently emerged from the top-level to 
institutionalize the programme. 
More coverage protection  
The central government has a strong political will and financial commitment to 
extend the social insurance scheme, particularly pension schemes for vulnerable 
social groups. First, the central government has always emphasized the importance 
of expansion as well as public budget allocation to cover the extension, such as 
financial subsidies for the social insurance contributions for the vulnerable groups, 
including the laid-off and unemployed and other low-income groups, and gradually 
raising the social security benefits level. Second, the government has strong 
motivation to improve the existing social insurance system framework. The urban 
worker scheme has been extended to self-employed workers and flexible workers, 
and a new scheme for urban residents was launched in 2009. All these projects have 
brought the targeted population group into the pension coverage in the top-level 
institutional design. Third, the government has also introduced social security 
legislation with the aim of enhancing the authoritativeness of the scheme and 
improving implementation and compliance. In 2004, improving the social security 
system was explicitly incorporated into the amended version of the constitution. The 
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social insurance law was promulgated in 2010 and came into force in July 2011. 
Finally, there is a combination of incentives and punishments to encourage 
participation. In accordance with 'The Provisional Regulations on the Collection of 
Social Insurance Contributions', 'Regulations on Labour and Social Security 
Inspection' and 'Measures on Social Insurance Auditing', efforts have been enhanced 
to improve the enforcement of inspection and audit reviews to punish the enterprises 
which are non-compliant (Zheng, 2010; Mok and Ku, 2010; Guo, 2006). In addition, 
many incentive systems have been launched at the local level, and local governments 
provide bonuses to the agencies and personnel who have been fulfilling the coverage 
extension work. Alternatively, there are periodical assessments of creditable 
enterprises joining the scheme, fulfilling the obligation and disclosing the 
discreditable employers, which create an enabling environment to encourage 
compliance (ISSA, 1999).  
More solidarity and equity 
Provincial pooling measures and the parameter adjustment regarding pension 
portability on the one hand provide a foundation for the construction of a 
national-level pension scheme; on the other hand, they can promote social solidarity 
and equity through higher-level social risk pooling, and reduce the regional 
inequality. The national pooling of the basic pension will be realized by 2015 (State 
Council, 2012). 
More administrative efficiency  
The government-funded 'Golden social insurance information system project' as an 
information network connecting different levels of governments was implemented in 
2011.  The social security card for registration, recording contributions and 
claiming payment has been in use since 2011. In addition, the central government 
invested 5 billion CNY to build grass-roots employment and social security services 
in less-developed regions. Two national standards, 'General provisions of the social 
insurance service and 'Facility and equipment requirements of social security service 
centres' were introduced to improve service delivery.  Training courses and 
seminars have been organized at different levels to build the capacity of social 
security staff and ensure a proper, standardized service (ISSA, 2012). All these 
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initiatives are aimed at building a standardized, professional and digitalized service 
network and social security professionals.  
In sum, in terms of institutional architecture, the social insurance pension scheme has 
been constructed over the past decades, and the multi-pillar model has gradually 
been formed even if does only cover only a small fraction of the working population. 
The senior citizen's allowance as a rudimentary social pension is currently in a trial 
and pilot phase, but it is expected that a nationwide regulation settlement will be 
realised soon (Saich and Saich, 2004). In terms of institutional outcomes, the new 
old-age insurance programme has gradually been extended from state-owned 
enterprise workers to more employees in various industries and enterprises. The 
coverage has expanded to collective enterprises, the private sector self-employed and 
flexible workers, as well as to urban residents previously uncovered. Plans for 
greater coverage are in progress to gradually build a universal social insurance 
security net in the urban sector. In addition, according to the urban/rural elderly 
survey data, the public pension programme plays a role in providing resources for 
incomes and consumption, and the growing pension benefits also help to increase the 
purchasing power of the elderly. Finally, public opinion is becoming more inclined 
to require a public pension programme for old-age support. Wang and Hou (Wang 
and Hou, 2012) found that public opinion on the pension system is positive in 
general; 23.6% of their respondents claimed to be 'unsatisfied' with pension 
provision, while 76.4% were 'satisfied' with it. Although the surveyed citizens 
thought that the benefits level is low, they did not feel dissatisfied or that there was 
unequal (Adamchak, 2001). The reform process in the past decades has changed the 
public perception regarding old-age welfare, particularly for those groups who were 
excluded from the previous welfare system and the new groups which emerged in 
the market economy era. The demands for and dependence on the public pension 
programme reflect the public dependence in public old-age welfare provision, which 
may facilitate the further expansion and contribution collection in the future. 
6.4.2 Problems 
In summary, the achievements are mainly in the institution building through various 
central government initiatives. However, problems also exist, not only in the 
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implementation of reform policy, but also in the policy outcomes. The partial DC 
model is in crisis because unfunded individual accounts continue to exist and the 
expected partial DC model is operating only in a notional DC manner. The debate 
regarding whether NDC should be adopted or not is still in discussion even though 
re-capitalization has been carried out in the pilot provinces (Mierzejewski, 2009). 
These pending issues will have to be addressed in the future design. In addition, 
while the fragmented schemes at the sub-national level retain the status quo, there is 
significant improvement in the national programme and the province-level uniform 
design and administration, but the fund pooling and management is in fact located in 
different local levels. In terms of institutional outcomes, the declining replacement 
rate in the reform process may reduce the pressure on public financing, but providing 
adequate old-age benefits calls for greater effort to develop the multi-pillar model. In 
addition, the inequality of benefit levels in the segregated programmes 
(public-private, urban-rural) is always an issue in policy debates and in public 
opinion. The higher replacement rate and favourable institution design for the 
privileged groups (civil servants and public institution workers) are constantly 
criticized by the general public, and the new round of reforms will integrate this 
group’s scheme into the national institution design as well as perfect the social 
pension provision targeting the vulnerable groups.  
6.5 Outlook- the 12th Five Year Plan 
In 2011, the NPC passed the state '12th Five-Year Plan' which laid out the basic 
economic and social development strategy and objectives for the next five years 
(State Council, 2012). Five-year plans started at the beginning of the CPC as the 
main development manager to direct China's development. This new plan for the 
first time puts the indicator 'people’s well-being' into the development objectives, 
and its main feature is that it became pro-welfare rather than pro-economy. After 
three decades of high-speed economic development, the state has begun to reverse 
the GDP-focused development strategy and to put more welfare indicators into the 
development plan, such as raising disposable incomes, increasing public expenditure, 
and extending social security protection. 
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The state development plan provides an outlook for future socio-economic 
development. The past three decades of rapid economic growth and two decades of 
social security system reform have provided the financial resources and practical 
experiences for the next round of social welfare development. In terms of old-age 
protection, this plan has established a set of special initiative projects for the next 
five years. The first set of plans includes adding new policy design and patching up 
the existing institution. First, designing the civil servants' pension programme reform 
package and integrating this group of workers into the national programme. Second, 
adding survivor pension schemes and the disability allowances for the insured within 
the basic pension programme.  Third, establishing a family old-age support policy 
and building the allowance or subsidizing benefits for the elderly who have one child 
or are childless.  
The second aspect of the plan is aimed at implementing the policy effectively. First, 
this plan includes the uncovered marginalized groups into the basic pension 
programme to expand the coverage. Second, it further promotes pension fund 
management at the provincial level, increasing the fund reserve function. Third, it 
implements the transfer and portability measures for the mobile labour force in a 
way which protects their accrued benefits in the basic pension programme. Finally, 
in terms of pension benefits, it aims to gradually increase the pension benefits level 
for enterprise workers, and raise the basic pension level of the urban residents' 
pension schemes.  
In summary, it can be seen that whether by institutional innovation or 
implementation, more effort is being put into improving equality by expanding the 
scheme or adding a new scheme for marginalized and vulnerable groups (such as 
migrant workers, the unemployed, the disabled, the childless elderly and surviving 
spouses), and it is focused on income redistribution, increasing the benefits level and 
gradually reducing the gap between the different groups. Finally, the various 
objectives to improve the implementation of the existing policy increase the 
integration and sustainability of the pension programme.  
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Chapter 7: Institutional analysis of pension reform 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter provided a detailed description of what happed over the past 
three decades by assessing the pension system in terms of policy design and 
performance. That overview and description dealt with the 'what' questions. What 
has happened in the historical and policy sense includes the detailed capture of 
critical or small policy changes from policy documents, and the description and 
evaluation of pension design and performance. All these empirical evidences and 
analyses have laid a foundation to explore the 'why' and 'how' questions by 
institutional analysis. The institutional analysis of each stage will present the 
empirical evidence about why and how the decisions were made and implemented 
under different leaderships. Finally, I shall give a conclusion about the dimensions of 
the dependent variables in China's case based on the conceptual framework (see 
Chapter 4), and how these explanatory variables (see Chapter 5) including context, 
institutional structure (political institutional structure) and pension institution 
constraints interact with actors to shape the development of the pension policy. 
7.2 Institutional analysis of pension reform in urban areas 
7.2.1 the dismantling of SOE welfare in the 1980s 
In 1979, China began to reform to a market economy. Within the reform package, 
reducing the burdens of welfare provision of SOEs was a crucial part of SOE reform. 
The government began a reform experiment by introducing social pooling and 
employee contributions to the pension scheme in some areas and this was 
implemented nationwide in 1986. The SOEs were required to contribute to local 
pension funds, and larger and older SOEs were enthusiastic about the cost sharing in 
the local pooling because they had a heavier burden with more workers close to or at 
retirement age, and the local fund could pay all the pension costs rather than their 
own budgets. However, the local pooling only covered the formal permanent 
workers in SOEs. With the introduction of a contract labour system,11 the 1986 
                                                
11 The labour market reform in 1986 terminated the lifelong employment policy in the planned economy and began the labour 
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regulations brought contract workers into the system and introduced individual 
contributions by requiring contract workers to pay 3% of their wages into the 
pension funds (Frazier, 2010c). These two important initiatives were mainly intended 
to alleviate the increasing burden on SOEs, especially the pooling fund, which could 
help to share the pension commitment burden between the prosperous SOEs and 
those making losses (Sander, 2010). The two measures aimed to reduce the financial 
pressure on SOEs and mitigate the economic transition crisis. The initial changes 
shifted the SOE welfare model into an insurance model in design. 
These policy innovations were the result of political elites learning from 
international ideas and models. The Ministry of Labour dominated the pension 
reform policies, and it had been closely connected with the ILO. The introduction 
and experiment of social pooling was influenced by the ILO's DB/PAYG social 
insurance model. The ILO held training sessions and seminars on social security for 
officials, sending experts to visit local labour insurance officials and providing 
technical assistance. In 1985, top political elites including premier Zhao Ziyang and 
the ESRC12 had exchanges with the WB mission of 1983-1985 regarding China's 
long-term market reform plan (Naughton, 1995). At this time, the WB recommended 
a fully funded social insurance model independent of enterprises (Lim et al., 1985). 
The concept of individual accounts was very attractive to the liberalist reformers, 
and was adopted for contract workers. However, the Ministry of Labour, as the 
dominant actor in social security reform, preferred the traditional social insurance 
model advocated by the ILO and promoted social pooling among different types of 
enterprise as a priority (Hu, 2012).  
The social pooling and employee contribution measures were responses to problems 
at the start of the transition process, and a policy paradigm of social security in the 
long run was not formed. All the change measures were aimed at integrating some 
problem solutions into the existing system without invalidating socialist ideology in 
policy discourse, distinguishing socialist social insurance from capitalist social 
insurance (Hu, 2012). The response to the financial problems in SOE management 
                                                                                                                                     
contract policy and the new labour force could become mobile in the labour market and lose the entire permanent employment 
guarantee and associated welfare benefits. 
12 The ESRC (national economic reform commission) was the precursor of the state council’s economic system reform office 
which was established in May 1980 with the purpose of making reform policies. ESRC, as an office above the ministries 
directed by premier Zhao, was the highest-level policy maker for national economic and social reform. 
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gradually dissolved the SOE welfare model and provided the original template of the 
social insurance model, but the comprehensive policy learning and paradigm 
building had not started. 
7.2.2 Formation of the social insurance model in the 1990s 
What changed?   
With the further restructuring of SOEs advocated by the central government in the 
1990s, the local governments were encouraged to shed all but the largest SOEs. On 
the one hand, this maintained the state's dominant control over key industries; on the 
other hand it attracted foreign investment through sales and mergers with foreign 
joint ventures (Gallagher, 2005). In addition, separating the welfare provision 
responsibilities from the enterprises was another crucial part of the reform. The local 
authorities replaced the SOEs as the bodies responsible for social development. In 
the context of SOE reform, local governments and SOEs cooperated to sell or merge 
the SOEs with private or foreign capital and unemployment and laid-off workers 
were the cost of this process. Pension benefits were the top priority of those 
enterprise workers, who carried a huge weight in passing the transition smoothly and 
maintaining social stability. The dominant SOEs' welfare system was dissolved with 
the shrinking of state enterprises. Meanwhile, the central government established the 
social insurance system to replace the previous welfare provision, and authorized 
social insurance agencies with local authorities to be responsible for collecting 
contributions, and administrating and managing the insurance funds. Since then, 
conflicts of interest started between SOEs and urban governments, central and local 
governments over pension policy implementation.  
How it was formed  
Pilot experiences: two models from different actors' advocacy 
The Ministry of Labour still dominated social security reform in the 1990s. The 1991 
regulation confirmed the idea of a social insurance model co-funded by employers 
and employees. However, this regulation was only targeting the SOE rather than 
other ownership types of enterprise. The ESRC (Economic and Social Research 
 171 
 
Council) as the upper-level social and economic development decision-maker 
appealed for fully funded individual accounts which was mostly copied from 
Singapore's central provident fund model (Nong, 1985). In early 1990, the ESRC 
held a conference inviting international experts from the ILO, the WB and ministry 
officials to evaluate the pilot experiences. As usual, the ILO and the Ministry of 
Labour still supported the 1991 regulation and confirmed their support for the social 
pooling practice and DB social insurance model (Gao, 1991). The ILO was worried 
about the individual account model, while the ESRC strongly supported the CPF and 
individual accounts. However, the WB experts did not recommend individual 
accounts because of the lack of aging risk pooling, and suggested that social pooling 
was the appropriate way to separate the social welfare administration from 
enterprises (WB, 1990). The disagreement between these two policy actors occurred 
not only because of their connection within international organizations and ideas but 
was also related to their functions and responsibilities. The purpose of the Ministry 
for Labour was to protect the benefits of labour, and it worried that the funds in 
individual accounts might be eroded in periods of high inflation (Lin, 2008), and the 
ESRC as the market economy reformer with a think-tank consisting of liberal 
economists preferred the individual account model because it conformed with the 
principle of efficiency and promoted the transition to a market economy. In other 
words, the individual account model as private property could motivate the 
formation of private interest, which was in line with the liberal reform idea (Hu, 
2012).  
The ESRC picked Hainan and Shenzhen as pilot regions to start social security 
reform and then extended it to other cities, including Xiamen, Guangdong province 
and Shanghai. The experience of Guangdong did not follow the fully DC model 
exactly because of pressure from local labour bureaus who were against it (Zhang, 
1991). However, the provincial ESRC policy makers preferred the individual 
account model learned from Singapore through research trips and the support of CPF 
experts from Singapore (Hu, 2012). Therefore, the final policy plan considered the 
ideas of both sides and came up with a combined model with smaller individual 
accounts and bigger social pooling (Hu, 2012). The Shanghai model was another 
variant, with bigger individual accounts and smaller social pooling (Shanghai 
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Municipal Government, 1994). The pilot experiences in these two models provided 
the foundation for the 1995 regulation which aimed to deepen the pension reform 
and promote the formation of a pension insurance model. The differences between 
the two models were never resolved, and the pension regulations in 1995 allowed the 
local authorities to choose one of the two models in local policy design. This resulted 
in more than two thousand different systems in China, which was highly criticized 
later by the World Bank (WB, 1996). 
National system design option 
The publication of the WB’s seminal ‘Averting the old age crisis’ in 1994 initiated 
its global campaign for pension privatization. In August 1995, the WB sent a mission 
to China with the cooperation of the State Planning Commission, and its research 
activities promoted the consolidation of a uniform public pension scheme for 
enterprise workers and stopping the local-level pilots (WB, 1996). The fully-funded 
DC or pension privatization advocacy also determined the formation of the 1997 
national regulation.  However, as for the manner of diffusing the WB plan, unlike 
what happened in other transitional or developing countries highly dependent on 
financial loans and compliance conditions, China did not receive massive loan 
assistance as other countries had done. For instance, Kazakhstan received $324 
million from the WB for pension reform while China, despite its much bigger 
economy, only got $20 million (WB, 2006, p.11). As for how the WB template 
impacted and shaped Chinese policy makers, according to Frazier (Frazier, 2010b), 
several steps were taken to disseminate the WB idea in the Chinese case. First, the 
WB’s famous publication of 'Averting the Old Age Crisis' (WB, 1994b) set off a 
debate about shifting the conventional PAYG DB system to a funded DC model, 
calling for governments to consider the existing fiscal burdens and the further severe 
crisis created by demographic aging. In that publication, the multi-pillar model and 
the partial privatization of the public pension system was proposed as an option to 
solve the budgetary crisis. Thus, the responsibility was shifted from public finance to 
individual contributions, employment history and capital market performance 
(Williamson and Deitelbaum, 2005). Many transition economies adopted this 
template and revised it according to their own conditions. For instance, privatization 
reform in Latin America countries attracted a lot of attention across the world (Huber 
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and Stephens, 2000). Chinese policy makers were also inspired by Latin American 
models and considered the policies learned from their experiences (Calvo and 
Williamson, 2008). Second, Estelle James, the leading expert of the WB’s pension 
reform plans, arrived in China and disseminated the book’s findings and discussed 
with high officials the possible reform options for China and how the WB could 
assist China’s institutional transition (Pordes, 1994). The discussions mainly 
included the WB's actuarial predictions of future pension costs under the existing 
model, and the various outcomes of different reform strategies, such as making 
changes to the retirement age, contribution rate and so on (James, 2002). 
The research team also drew from the data collected on local pension administration 
to conduct a survey about China’s pension status quo, and then provided their report 
to State Council ministers. The report was published in the following year as 
Old-Age Security: Pension Reform in China (Agarwala, 1997). It criticised China's 
pension measures and warned of a possible crisis. In particular, it criticized the 
fragmented pension design and administrative system in terms of contribution rates, 
benefit calculations and the low level of social pooling. It pointed out that the crucial 
origin of the fragmentation was the 1995 regulation that allowed local authorities to 
choose between different reform templates according to local conditions (WB, 1997). 
In fact, the report was widely circulated at the highest levels of the Chinese 
communist party, and exerted an impact on Chinese policy makers and reform 
options (Wang, 1998).  
In addition, even though pension privatization was a global trend, the Chinese policy 
makers were constrained by the institutional legacies. On the other hand, the 
fully-funded individual account was attractive for policy makers in terms of reducing 
pension debt and facilitating economic efficiency and growth (James, 1998). Given 
the less-developed capital market, fully-funded options would be risky to the minds 
of China's policy makers. Therefore, the partially-funded model proposed in the 
1997 regulation was consistent with pension privatization on a smaller scale, but also 
considered the huge transition costs and maintaining the DB social pooling element 
(Hu, 2012). 
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The impact of the WB can be identified by comparing the 1997 State Council 
regulations and the 1996 Report. The motivation for the 1997 regulations was to deal 
with the local fragmented pension schemes and attempts to unify the national urban 
pension system by establishing a uniform set of rules on contribution rates, benefit 
calculations, fund management. For instance, the 1997 regulation was supposed to 
promulgate a national uniform scheme and terminate local experiments, and to call 
for higher local-level social pooling, which were highly in line with the 
recommendations in the WB 1996 report. However, the 1997 regulation also fell 
short of the suggestion proposed by the WB on the measures for dealing with a 
possible further crisis, such as increasing the retirement age, decreasing the 
replacement rate, and the passage of social security legislation, which were not 
touched in the 1997 regulation. Again, the regulation consolidated the 
partially-funded pension system combined with PAYG DB social pooling and 
funded DC individual accounts, which was different from the WB template that 
advocated separating them into two independent pillars. China followed the WB's 
advice to create individual accounts and refused to separate it as an independent 
pillar but adopted partial privatization, because the Chinese policy-makers were 
concerned about the capital market, and it seemed to them that an unsound capital 
market might diminish the individual account fund, and that having it at a smaller 
size might be an optimal option (Hu, 2012). In summary, from the comparison 
between the 1997 regulations and the 1996 WB report, it is possible to conclude that 
the WB was highly influential on Chinese pension design in terms of basic direction 
and principles. In the specific parameter design, the Chinese government adopted the 
international pension models, and WB expert assistance was used selectively to 
finally come up with the partially-funded public pension. China's convergence and 
divergence reflects the fact that the impact power of international idea in China, but 
it is constrained by domestic institutional and policy legacies. 
How it was implemented   
Local authorities and general local SOEs 
In practice, integrating SOE restructuring into the social insurance establishment was 
a tough task for Chinese local authorities. During the 1990s, SOE bankruptcies and 
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mergers were the main strategy in the restructuring, and these resulted in mass 
unemployment and associated worker protest and social discontent (Cai, 2002). In 
order to cope with the social pressure induced by the reform of the SOEs, local 
governments found that the pension scheme could be an appealing measure to 
alleviate the transition pains. Local governments which had enough revenues in 1990 
offered an early retirement package for workers near retirement age and facilitated 
the SOE restructuring by reducing the numbers of redundant personnel and 
increasing competitiveness in the market. If the local governments did not have 
enough revenues to rescue the indebted and overstaffed SOEs, they could collaborate 
with SOE managements to lay off some workers and give one-off payments as 
compensation. The laid-off were not offered early retirement pensions, but at least 
they retained their social insurance record in the enterprises (Frazier, 2010b).In sum, 
in the more prosperous areas the local authorities tended to adopt pensions as a 
measure of SOE restructuring and a means of maintaining social stability. While in 
the less prosperous regions, the shortage of financial resources to tackle the 
transition pains, the small lump-sum compensations as a pension or laid-off measure 
for maintaining the future pension commitment were adopted to mitigate the impact 
(Hurst and O'Brien, 2012). During this process, local authorities gained the upper 
hand by cooperating with SOE managers, and also owned the credit and the blame 
for the results which the measures achieved (Frazier, 2010b). 
Local authorities and central privileged SOEs (integrating industrial pooling 
funds into the urban enterprise system) 
The 1997 regulation addressed the main objective of unifying the pension system 
nationwide and integrating the fragmented pension scheme. Apart from improving 
the administration by shifting it to the provincial level, another issue that needed to 
be solved was to merge the central ministry-managed pension funds13 into the 
provincial pension funds. In 1998, the State Council issued a policy to urge the 
transfer of the central sector pension scheme to provincial agencies, and to set up 
working groups which would collaborate with the Ministry of Finance to supervise 
                                                
13 Pension funds managed by central ministries, such as transportation, railroad, petroleum, banking, insurance, etc., had been 
established in 1951 and had evolved into a combination of basic state pension and occupation pension. These pension schemes 
provided more pension benefits than other general SOEs because of their good performance in their privileged status. While the 
locally-managed pension scheme was mixture of a social pooling basic pension as well as individual accounts. 
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the administration (State Council, 1997). However, the transfer process was 
extremely difficult given the resistance of the privileged sector SOEs. First, the 
funds of these SOEs administered by the central ministry tended to provide a higher 
replacement rate with lower contributions. For instance, the industrial sector 
enterprises were required to remit from 4% to 5% of their pay-roll as social 
insurance contributions while other enterprises had to contribute 20% or higher; in 
terms of payment, pensioners covered by sector pooling fund were entitled to 
benefits which were higher than the average pension enjoyed by local SOEs; the rate 
could range from 30% to 100% (depending on the sector). 
The vested interest accumulated in privileged sector made them reluctant to turn over 
the fund to provincial governments. Second, the provincial authorities encountered a 
bureaucratic obstacle when they tried to claim the central sector fund management. 
In Chinese bureaucratic protocol, the enterprise managers in sector SOEs usually had 
the rank of vice-minister, which meant in effect that these enterprises were 
supervised directly by the Ministry or bureau in Beijing, rather than the local 
authority. These enterprises tended to neglect or even obstruct the local authority 
implementation. Therefore, the integration process was very difficult at the local 
level. On the one hand, the central government provided one-off fiscal subsidies to 
provincial funds to compensate for the potential loss of benefits which might occur 
in sector pension funds (Frazier, 2004a). On the other hand, the bargaining between 
these privileged enterprises and local authorities was often resolved by central 
government official intervention. For instance, two steel central SOEs in Panzhihua 
and Shanghai were reluctant to transfer their contributions to local funds, and the 
situation was finally resolved after Premier Zhu Rongji met leaders of the Shanghai 
municipal party committee (Frazier, 2010c). The sector fund integration process 
illustrated that the urban governments, with lower bureaucratic rank than the 
privileged SOEs, seemed to have no power to conflict with the vested interest groups 
unless the central power and resources stepped in. 
Local authorities and private sector enterprises  
As for the non-state sector enterprises, local authorities encountered different 
obstacles and confrontations. The non-state sector enterprises included collectives, 
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private firms, and foreign investment firms. According to several reports, the private 
or foreign investment enterprises did not participate in the pension insurance 
schemes or evaded their contribution duty by falsely reporting the wage bill or the 
number of employees, in this way reducing their contribution burden (McGillivray, 
2001). Private firms bargained with local officials over reduced contribution fees and 
reduced workforce coverage, not only because this saved labour costs, but also 
because they were reluctant to pool the risk with other mature SOEs with a higher 
proportion of retirees. The relatively prosperous foreign-investment firms avoided 
the contribution by exempting temporary workers from coverage (Frazier, 2010c). 
Second, employees’ preference in the enterprise also encouraged the non-compliant 
behaviour of employers. For instance, employees preferred payment other than social 
insurance benefits, or were reluctant to report any irregular operation in the 
enterprise. In terms of the Chinese case, workers in smaller private firms were very 
reluctant to deduct a specific percentage of their wages to pay contributions because 
they were likely to be employed on a short-term or seasonal basis, and the relatively 
high labour mobility in this sector undermined the workers’ confidence in joining 
and maintaining their pension insurance records. In this sense, the employers seem to 
gladly collude with their employees to avoid participating in pension insurance 
schemes (Frazier, 2010c). However, local authorities’ perceptions on this issue were 
paradoxical. On the one hand, local governments needed to expand the coverage to 
the non-state sector to collect funds to cover the current deficits. On the other hand, 
however, local officials were also reluctant to undertake vigorous monitoring of the 
compliance issue because of the fear that it might crowd out the private capital to 
other regions and thus reduce the fiscal revenues (Chen, 2002). Therefore, the 
bargaining and balance between non-state sector enterprises and local authorities 
were the main hindrances to extending coverage, and drawing more enterprises into 
schemes and collecting funds from them was and still remains a primary concern for 
the local authorities (Nyland et al., 2006, 2011).  
Local authorities and pensioners (laid-off off workers, current active workers, 
transition groups between the old and new systems) 
In early 1990, many pensioners engaged in protest over unpaid benefits and unfair 
compensation from bankrupt firms (Hurst and O'Brien, 2002). Chinese pensioners, 
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including those laid-off from SOEs, were not organized or mobilized on the  legal 
and quasi-legal means in the system (Lee, 1998; Thireau and Linshan, 2003; Cai, 
2002), but they held the perception that a pension was state compensation for their 
long-term service and should be delivered as promised. In other words, the social 
attitude favouring a stronger state role in pension provision encouraged the 
pensioners to fight for their benefits (Chŏng and Chung, 2000). In this sense, the 
protest over pension issues carried a greater degree of state legitimacy. Therefore, 
the local authorities also sought to calm down the local pensioners with increased 
benefits from pension funds or central subsidies, especially in the rust belt provinces 
with more retirees. Indeed, these provinces, Liaoning, Heilongjiang and Jilin, 
received respectively 14%, 11.9% and 5.9% of the national share of social security 
subsidies from central funds, while their national proportion of SOE retirees were 
8.3%, 3.0% and 5.2% respectively (Whiteford, 2003, p.57). The disproportionate 
sharing of subsidies may not be sufficient to conclude that the central transfer went 
to the provinces where pensioner unrest was most severe, but the protests in these 
provinces were especially prominent (Frazier, 2004c). Unlike their counterparts in 
democratic pluralist systems, Chinese pensioners and their movement did not rewrite 
the social compact between themselves and the state legally, at least, as the transition 
eras put pressure on the local authorities, and even on the central government, to 
provide fairer compensation for their benefit loss. 
Local authority and central government 
The central government is in command of drafting basic pension regulations, leaving 
leeway for local authorities to interpret them and produce the final results. Local 
governments often modify central plans according to local conditions and economic 
interests and they sometimes do not comply with central directives, or sometimes 
even act in contrast with them (Chan et al., 2008). When central and local 
regulations conflict in this way, unless the central government has the strength of 
power to prohibit non-compliance, the local rules or regulations in practice 
determine the final outcomes (Wang, 1995). Local authorities can introduce a new 
policy geared to local central funds demands, and they also have the opportunity to 
obstruct and misinterpret central policy according to local interests (Holzmann, 
2000). In terms of 'empty individual accounts', in the pension reform review, it was 
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shown in the previous chapter that China started off from an established pension 
insurance system, combined it with social pooling and individual accounts in 1995, 
and consolidated the rules on how to integrate the two parts by establishing various 
system parameters in the 1997 regulation. In the 1997 regulations, the social pooling 
element is jointly funded by contributions from employees and employers, and the 
individual accounts are funded by employees' contributions and assumed to be 
private property. However, in reality, local governments have usually used the 
accumulated reserve in the individual accounts to pay current pension claims, 
leaving the individual accounts empty or simply notional (Li, 2005). This is because 
the central policy did not completely address the huge transition costs occurring from 
moving from PAYG to the partially-funded system, because the limited central 
subsidies could not cover the deficits in the transition period, and then because the 
local authority took money from the individual accounts intended for future retirees 
(Haico Ebbers, 2009). The reasons why this policy failed can be concluded as 
follows: the ambiguous central policy did not address clearly how to solve the 
implicit pension deficit occurring in the transition period and how to share the 
transition cost among the different levels of governments, which left space for local 
authorities to reinterpret policy according to their own interests and perceptions.  
7.2.3 Reform of the social insurance model in the 2000s  
This stage of the reform was targeted at solving the problems which emerged in the 
previous period. If the previous stage had dealt with the socialist legacies in the 
institutional transition, this stage of the reform was aimed at solving the problems 
which had been raised through paradigmatic adjustment and re-constructing the 
measures to improve the whole pension system design. The parameter adjustments 
were achieved by adding new policies in the public pension pillar to solve the 
unintended consequences in the previous stage, and the restructuring measure of 
adding a new pillar was to improve the pension system as a whole in the new 
context.  
Parameter design change 
The first change was establishing a social security reserve fund (the National Social 
Security Fund, or NSSF) to deal with the future payment challenges. The NSSF was 
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an innovative strategy intended to unify pension funding and enable the regions with 
deficits to deliver the payment commitment, and it can be regarded as the crucial 
effort to counterattack the fragmentized pooling funds at the local level (Leckie and 
Ning, 2007). The second was the pilot schemes for re-financing individual accounts 
which started in Liaoning Province and then was extended to Hei, Longjiang, Jilin 
and other provinces (State Council, 2005). The measures included separating the 
administration of social pooling and individual accounts, increasing central and local 
financial transfer to cover the payment deficits, increasing the employers' 
contribution to 20% and so on. In this case, the central government has a strong 
determination to solve the pension deficits through direct public transfer as well as 
by coordinating and bargaining with local authorities regarding the share of costs. 
For instance, in Liaoning province, central finance subsidies were 75% of the 'empty 
accounts' and the local authority took on the 25% remaining deficits (State Council, 
2005). In 2005, beyond the initial pilot projects in the North-eastern provinces, the 
government issued a new notice to expand the recapitalization pilot to more 
provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities (State Council, 2005). The third 
change was in the urban pension reform domain, where there were also some 
measures to extend the system coverage, not only to non-state sector enterprises, but 
also to the self-employed and the flexible workforce in the 2005 regulation. In other 
words, expanding the urban pension coverage was the main objective in the 2000s 
after completing the overall system design and principal integrations. The fourth 
change was advancing the social pooling from county level to national level in order 
to facilitate labour mobility.  
Architecture change (pillar and tier change) 
First, adding the second pillar. From 2004, a series of trial policy documents to 
develop the corporate pension on top of the public pension came out, and they not 
only provided the institutional framework for this second pillar pension programme, 
but also formulated the practice of procurement regarding the establishing, 
administration, fund management and risk control (IRC, 2004; MOLSS, 2004; 
MOHRSS, 2011c). Second, a social pension pillar for the elderly as a zero pillar was 
added to provide the minimum life guarantee for senior citizens (aged 80 and above). 
Finally, adding more schemes into the first pillar. The pension reform for the public 
 181 
 
sector workers was aimed at integrating this group into the established urban pension 
system. The newly established urban residents' pension scheme was intended to 
extend institutional access to the previously uncovered population (such as the 
unemployed).  
How it was changed 
With the idea of change in the CCP and a new leadership generation lead by Hu 
Jintao, building a harmonious society, tackling social inequality and expanding 
social welfare become obvious main strategies in the 2000s. The political rationale 
and strategy of the pension expansion in the 2000s reform process can be 
summarized as follows: first, the academic and social partners’ involvement in the 
strategic plans and reform. When experts from international organizations such as 
the ILO and the International Social Security Association presented lectures in 
Beijing in the mid-1980s, the social security professionals had to struggle to follow 
their research work, but since then research centres in related disciplines have 
mushroomed in China, and this academic development as well as political concerns 
about social welfare facilitated the academic researchers and experts joining in the 
social policy-making at the top level by delivering lectures on social security (Zhu, 
2009). Research projects and academic consultants updated the knowledge of the top 
leaders and policy makers on recent international trends and developments in the 
social policy domain, which considerably benefited central policy making (Zhu, 
2009). In addition, consultation about the social insurance legislation with academic 
researchers and the general public to draw opinions from various circles before it 
finally came out and was enacted in 2010 (NPC, 2008). In sum, more involvement of 
social groups (academic, general public)in policy planning brought new and 
scientific perspectives to the policy initiatives, and the interest groups could not only 
shape policy formation but could also reduce the hindrance to future 
implementations. Furthermore, academic surveys and reports on the policy demands 
and policy implementation outcomes provided valuable references for the policy 
makers to avoid faulty policy design and failed enforcement, and their intellectual 
knowledge could provide policy recommendations and alternatives for 
policy-makers to choose from. 
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Second, Chinese policy makers demonstrated enormous political will in extending 
social security coverage, not only recognising the significance of maintaining social 
stability, but also intending to employ it as a powerful tool to cope with poverty and 
social inequality (Zhu, 2009). The strategy they adopted was to put the social 
security objective into national socio-economic development plans, and the idea 
change could be presented in the policy discourse. For instance, the government first 
put the objective of extending the urban pension insurance coverage into the 
2006-2010 Five-year National Economic and Social Development plan (CCP, 2006). 
Meanwhile, the relevant ministries also worked out annual and five-year objectives 
and supervised their implementation nationwide (Zhu, 2009). The idea and policy 
change discourse also demonstrated the central willpower to redirect the 
development strategy away from marketization and privatization at the cost of social 
equality and justice, shifting to a more sustainable and equitable development path. 
In summary, the limited involvement of policy stakeholders through academic 
think-tanks, general public consultancy and idea shifts shaped the pension insurance 
model development at this stage. The expansion of coverage, the central financial 
subsidies for the implicit deficit, and the addition of new schemes in the first pillar 
and the other pillars gradually sketched a multi-pillar system in China. However, it 
cannot be denied that new problems keep emerging in practice. The sharing of the 
financial burden between different levels of governments for the new scheme has not 
been explicit, and in particular the subsidies for the low-income groups have not 
been clarified. The policy communication to newly-covered groups, dealing with 
vested interest groups in the reform package, as well as balancing the development 
and redistribution effect of the supplementary pillar, are still headaches to be sorted 
out in the future.  
How it was implemented  
The re-centralization of pension management (fund and administration) and closing 
the coverage gap are the main reform efforts in this stage. The pilot project of 
funding individual accounts as one of the central measures reverses the empty 
individual account, and redirects the pension reform back to its original path. 
Redirecting the pension reform away from the PAYG system and partially 
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privatizing the pension system is the main objective of central policies (Zheng, 
2006a). However, apart from the thirteen pilot provinces with public finance support, 
there are other provinces which are running the 'empty individual account' model. At 
the end of 2011, there were thirteen provinces with the re-funded pilot project which 
had accumulated 270.3 billion Yuan in their individual accounts funds. However, the 
size of the empty individual accounts is around 2200 billion Yuan (MOHRSS, 
2011c). 
Advancing the pension insurance management level is also encountering huge 
pressure in the implementation because of conflicts of interest. Up to the present, 
there are 31 provinces which have issued related regulations on provincial pooling, 
achieving the target in the policy paper. In practice, the implementation process has 
varied among different provinces. There are two types of provincial pooling in 
practice (Guo, 2009). One is the provincial pension reserve model in which all the 
cities and prefectures within the province turn in their pension fund surplus to the 
reserve fund, which is intended to pay the deficits of particular regions in the pay-out 
stage. This model is seen in Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Shanxin province. The 
other model is the budgetary management model in which pension insurance 
contributions at the sub-province level have to be submitted to the province treasury 
and then transferred to a social insurance specific account. All the pay-outs have to 
be approved by the provincial finance department and then distributed through the 
specific account. All levels of social insurance agencies take charge of collecting 
contributions, keeping administrative records and paying benefits. All the revenues 
and expenditure are controlled by the province (Chen and Li, 2011). This model is 
observed in Qinghai, Xinjiang. All the remaining provinces have only realized the 
uniform institution design regarding the contribution rate, benefit formula and 
parameter design; there is no unified pension insurance administration or fund 
management at province level (Chen and Li, 2011; Lei and Hao, 2009). These 
difficulties could be explained through the interest and competition within the 
institutional structure and design openings. On the one hand, worry about benefit 
level decrease is the crucial reason. Some cities and industrial areas have more 
retirees while others have a relatively young workforce (Bai and Tong, 2011). The 
cities with a pension fund surplus do want to turn over their funds to the higher level 
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and see them redistributed to aid other areas’ fund deficits. For example, the 
Shenzhen municipal government in 1998 had 2 billion Yuan of social insurance 
collection to support only 23,400 retirees and was strongly reluctant to turn over the 
pension fund to the government of Guangdong province which would definitely use 
the surplus to subsidize the 360,000 retirees in Guangzhou city (MOLSS, 2000). On 
the other hand, the spreading of responsibilities also brings about unintended 
consequences. The sub-provincial level authorities free from social insurance 
funding and pay-out responsibilities could intensify their development-oriented 
strategy and motivation of attracting capital (Zhang, 2009; Zhao, 2009; Xu, 2010). 
The richer areas are reluctant to turn over funds, or some areas have no incentive to 
collect contributions, and all these factors will pose continual challenges for 
provincial level pooling and administration. 
Fourth, the further extension of coverage also faces barriers. The atypical labour 
force includes flexible workers and the self-employed. These labourers can be 
divided into three categories: the emerging interest groups in the private sector 
(self-employment), the flexible workers in the formal sector (on seasonal, 
project-based contracts) and the marginalized groups (unemployed, laid-off during 
the economic restructuring). Based on the empirical evidence presented in Chapter 6, 
the current social insurance agencies in local areas aimed to manage and supervise 
the social insurance for typical labour in the former sector. At the same time, the lack 
of specific policies and administrative measures supervise the development of the 
scheme for the self-employed (He and Zheng, 2002). For the second category group, 
a short-term contract or irregular contract could not guarantee the contribution and 
record maintenance in the long run. The flexibility of their employment determines 
that efforts to expand cannot be dependent on the employer. For the third group, the 
marginalized groups in transition are usually low-income groups which cannot afford 
the pension insurance contribution. The evidence suggests that it is the interest 
groups in the private sector who usually make fewer demands on social insurance 
while the marginalized groups which had SOE welfare benefits before prefer to be 
transferred to new social insurance schemes (Nyland et al., 2011). In addition, for all 
of these groups, the relatively high contribution threshold in the design is another 
reason why their participation is impeded, particularly for the marginalized group 
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(Dong and Luo, 2010; Zeng, 2008; He and Zheng, 2002; Sun, 2006). Therefore, the 
flexible and self-employed workers in private sectors were an emerging interest 
group after liberalisation; they do not have a vested interest in the previous welfare 
system and they have less rights-based concern about welfare institution access. In 
addition, the lack of policy communication also determines their opinion as to 
whether they should participate or not. For the marginalized group, the vested 
interest accumulated in the previous system caused them to demand renewed access 
to pension insurance, but their employment status as well as their income level could 
not enable them to join it. 
Fifth, the development of the second pillar did not proceed as well as expected. From 
the empirical evidence discussed in the previous chapter, it can be concluded that the 
coverage rate of the second pillar is small, with low coverage, and with about 5% of 
the basic pension insured eligible to have the supplementary pension scheme. From 
the pension fund comparison data, the low coverage rate with relatively high 
proportion of fund accumulation reflects the generosity level of this pillar fund in 
terms of contribution accumulation and benefit payments. This contradiction also 
reflects that the supplementary pillar not only provides additional pensions for the 
insured but also increases the income inequality among the elderly. Expanding the 
second pillar pension coverage and promoting its development are the main solutions 
to mitigate further elderly income inequality in retirement. In practice, there are 
some constraints and difficulties which affect the development of a second pillar 
pension. First, the basic pension pillar crowded out corporate pension development 
(Dong, 2010). Currently, the contribution rate of the basic pension is set at 20% of 
payroll, and if added up with other public insurance schemes it could reach 30%. 
This high contribution rate crowded out the space to develop the supplementary 
scheme, particularly for the relatively low-income workers, mostly in small to 
medium enterprises. In this sense, establishing the supplementary pension plan will 
increase the burdens on enterprises and workers (Liu, 2007). In addition, the lack of 
policy incentive is another reason. The preferential tax policy for this pillar scheme 
only existed in the accumulation stage, in which 5% of total payroll for the 
supplementary pension scheme could enjoy income tax exemption (MOLSS, 2004). 
However, tax incentive measures in the pay-out stage or tax preferential measures 
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for the individual are still missing (Pu, 2005). Furthermore, the particular incentives 
or subsidy measures for the small-medium enterprise and relative low-income 
workers are absent too. Therefore, the current tax exemption measures for the 
capable enterprises and their high-income workers, the policy design for the 
conditionality of the second pillar, and the high burden from the basic pillar all 
constrain the expansion of the second pillar pension and may result in further 
inequality of income distribution in the future.   
Sixth, as for the introduction and development of the social pension, institutional 
coverage is limited in some provinces. The pillar development is in the initial stage, 
and the current institutional extension is constrained by other factors (Jia, 2012). 
First, the lack of a compulsory national design cannot push the local authorities to 
develop this scheme. Second, currently the funding of the scheme is from local 
public spending, but most of the regions (except Ningxia and Tianjing) do not 
include the spending in the local budget management, which might create spaces for 
the unstable development of the scheme. In sum, the policy and financial resource 
provision of the social pension pillar are limited, and it has not reached the 
multi-pillar pension design (Yang, 2012b).  
Finally, the integration of the public sector workers' scheme and the urban residents' 
scheme encountered difficulties in practice. For the public sector pension scheme, 
the reform was difficult because of the vested interest in the previous system (Lu, 
2011a). The public-spending based and higher benefits level in the old system 
created vested interests for the current workers. The shift to the social insurance 
model and the possibilities of a decrease in benefits are the crucial challenges for the 
pilot project and for future reform (Han, 2010). In addition, public sector workers 
have more bargaining power over the policy change compared with private-sector 
workers (Bai and Jiang, 2013). Unlike the enterprise workers' scheme were 
associated with SOE restructuring, the public sector scheme reform was not from the 
economic pressure. In addition, rather like the marginalized groups(including early 
retirees and laid-off) during economic transition, public sector workers have more 
privileged status to protect interests. Therefore, the less stressful macro context and 
the more vested interests in the micro actors determined the pension institution 
reform for this group is difficult, even more difficult than in the enterprise sector. As 
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for the urban residents' pension scheme, it is designed to cover a larger population 
which was previously excluded from the formal institution, and the policy and 
financial input are supposed to be welcome to the general public. However, 
according to the survey evidences on this scheme (Lu, 2011b; Yang, 2012a), there 
are some barriers which affect further extension. On the one hand, the new scheme is 
not well-known among urban residents. Policy communication is limited at the 
grass-roots level (Lv, 2011). The communication of policy to this less-regulated 
population (no employer, no workplace) demands more effort from the community 
service which is responsible for public service delivery. On the other hand, some 
groups are reluctant to join this scheme because of worries about policy stability, the 
maintenance of asset value, and the possible loss of contribution (Jia, 2013). In 
general, they have little trust in the new policy provision. The new initiative is easy 
to create by the strong executive but the implementation process will encounter 
unexpected consequences because of the limited administrative capacities in the 
grass roots, as well as the lack of welfare right perception and policy 
communication.  
7.2.4 the institutionalized social insurance model 
The enactment of the social insurance law was the first legislation to consolidate the 
national pension schemes for different groups. It was the first legislation to put 
forward the institutional coverage of social insurance nationwide. In addition, it 
clarified the central government's responsibilities as the final resort of the payment 
crisis. However, the standardized basic pension insurance system is the main content 
of the legislation. As for the development of a multi-pillar pension system there are 
no clauses to deal with this issue. Furthermore, there are many clauses regarding the 
later improvement of the on-going pilot scheme (public sector, urban residents) and 
leave leeway for the local authorities to develop their own institutional designs, 
which might require adjustments of interest later if the national institutionalization is 
still desired.   
Apart from the social insurance legislation unifying the national pension system, the 
twelfth five-year plan is a development outlook for the CCP in the next five years 
and this also brings into focus the objectives of equality and integration in the social 
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insurance system. Therefore, the social insurance legislation summarizes the past 
decades' experience of welfare reform and realises the need for universal access to 
public pension, and the next five-year plan is aimed at achieving more equal 
redistribution of the. It can be concluded that the period of the formation and 
development of national pension insurance in the past decades has now drawn to a 
close; equal access to pension insurance nationwide has been consolidated in the 
legislation. The equality of pension insurance across different population groups 
(urban versus rural, private sector workers versus public sector workers; employed 
versus unemployed; regular labour versus atypical labour) will become the trend of 
the next stage of development.  
7.3 Conclusion  
7.3.1 the dependent variable: the direction and extent of change 
Based on the conceptual framework of dependent variables which we generated in 
Chapter 4, we have followed similar conceptual tools, coding framework and 
measurements to investigate pension reform in China. The sections above have listed 
the policy changes at the top level and revealed what the implementation looks like 
mainly based on the qualitative evidences. In this concluding section, we shall 
combine the qualitative and quantitative evidences together to analyse the reform 
direction and measure the degree of reform as well as dynamics.  
Qualitative change based on qualitative evidence  
From the historical review of policy documents (see Table 7.3.1) since the 
mid-1980s, we have found that China has concentrated on building and reforming its 
pension insurance model in the past decades. To distinguish the direction of the 
reform and the extent of change between structural and parametric change, we shall 
use the coding framework to analyse the pension institutional reform direction and 
scope (see Table 7.3.2). 
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Table 7.3.1 The characteristics of reform from the mid-1980s to the 2000s 
Time Reform Direction Reform Extent 
Mid 1980s Retrenchment Programmatic 
1990s Retrenchment Systemic 
First half of 2000s Retrenchment Programmatic 
Second half of 2000s Expansion Systemic 
The pension reform started in 1986 with two crucial initiatives: introducing social 
pooling and individual contributions for new contract workers. The pooling fund can 
help to share the pension commitment burden among prosperous SOEs and those 
making losses (Sander, 2010). The introduction of employee contributions combined 
with reform of the labour market represented the initial shift away from the SOE 
welfare system. The two measures aimed to reduce the financial pressure on SOEs 
and harmonise with the labour market change. There was no crucial shift in the SOE 
welfare paradigm but new policy instruments based on existing policy were brought 
out, which could be classified as a second-order change. The measure of increasing 
individual responsibility for pension entitlements was also one of the crucial 
measures identified in the retrenchment reform, and China's parameter change in this 
period led towards this direction. Therefore, I would argue that the dominant SOE 
welfare system was not challenged in the 1980s and that minor adjustment measures 
were the first attempts to reform public pensions in the direction of retrenchment. 
The extensive reform efforts in the 1990s were aimed at building partially-funded 
public pension insurance to replace the previous SOE welfare system. Most of the 
reforms started with pilot projects at the sub-national level until 1997 when the 
pension programme was made mandatory nationwide. The crucial measures in this 
decade included creating the DC/NDC tier and transferring the financial mechanism 
from PAYG to pre-funded (partially). The integration of privileged industry SOEs' 
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pension programmes into the newly-established partially-funded model were 
intended to reduce the state budget's involvement in the benefits pay-out and achieve 
greater risk-sharing among both privileged SOEs and general SOEs. According to 
our coding framework, these efforts match the systemic change in this period with 
the mandating of the national pension insurance model, which was a shift from the 
previous welfare model. The introduction of a public pension insurance scheme and 
of a pre-funded financial mechanism indicated that China was moving towards a 
social insurance welfare model. The overall objective or reform direction went in the 
direction of further retrenchment. For instance, harmonising the privileged sector 
schemes into the national programme and mandating individual contributions and 
the pre-funded mechanism were the focus in this decade. 
The reform initiatives in the 2000s are a little more difficult to code. The measures 
included establishing the NSSF as a reserve fund, adjusting existing parameters to 
facilitate portability, mandating a fully-funded second pillar to create corporate 
pensions, and integrating public sector worker pension reform can all be classified as 
retrenchment efforts. However, reform efforts such as introducing a new 
non-contributory pension for senior citizens, extending the coverage to more groups 
including the atypical labour force and private sector workers, increasing the benefits 
promise, and adding a new mandatory scheme for urban residents, are all examples 
of systemic expansion in our framework. It seems that there is no doubt that China 
went through systemic change in this decade. To define the exact direction of the 
development, we have to examine and classify these measures in chronological order. 
Then we can roughly reach the conclusion that the feature of the first half of this 
decade was parametric retrenchment reform and that since 2005 the reform efforts 
moved more towards public pension expansion. To further test our conclusion, we 
can turn to the quantitative evidence in the next section and check whether the 
quantitative changes match this or not.  
Quantitative change 
Public pension generosity  
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Figure 7.3.1 Public pension expenditure per retiree (1990-2010) 
 
Source: Human resources and social security statistic yearbook 2011 (calculated by author) 
Figure 7.3.1 shows the development of public spending per retiree from 1990 to 
2010. As the figure suggests, the public pension spending increased over time, 
particularly after 1995. Given the lack of public expenditure data on public pensions, 
the indicator adopted here is the public pension fund expenditure, which constitutes 
both employer and employee contributions, public transfer and other sources. The 
only indicator of expanding spending cannot explain that the public pension is more 
generous, but it does indicate that the public pension insurance fund expanded with 
the development of the national public pension programme after 1997. 
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Figure 7.3.2: Public pension generosity index (1997-2010) 
 
Source: China human resources and social security statistic yearbook 2011(it is calculated by author, based on the data of public pension 
fund expenditure and number of retirees) 
Figure 7.3.2 shows the trends in public pension generosity based on the empirical 
data. The coverage data is calculated by the number of retirees and population above 
the retirement age (65+), the empirical replacement rate of urban worker scheme is 
adopted here ( see table 6.2.5). It can be seen that from 1997 to 2005, the generosity 
of public pensions followed a declining trend in general but that after 2005 it 
gradually increased and went back to the same level as in 1997. The sharp fall in the 
generosity level since 1997 came from the decrease of empirical replacement rate. 
Going back to the original data, it is found that the pension benefits level did not 
decrease during this period, while the individual income increased more quickly than 
the pension, which made the whole replacement rate lower than before. And the 
growing generosity level after 2005 mainly came from the gradual expanding of 
coverage, more urban workers from different types of enterprises contributed to the 
urban scheme. Because the data issued in the previous decade is incomplete, we 
cannot generate the index from the start of the reform (1986) to the present, but the 
available data confirm what we concluded in the qualitative change in the whole 
2000s, that the first half of the decade was largely in the direction of retrenchment 
with a declining generosity level, while the second half of the 2000s witnessed more 
generous public pension provision which indicates an expanding direction.  
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Pension privatization  
In order to create a pension privatisation index, we standardized each of the four 
indicators (see chapter 4.2.3) on a scale from 0 to 10 in order to maintain the relative 
distances between each year. We calculated the mean of these four scores into one 
score as the index.  Table 7.3.2 gives an overview of the raw data of the four 
components of index indicators and the component index. It shows that China 
followed a process of increasing privatisation from 2007 until the present; the 
complexity of the reform direction in the 2000s can be summed up as follows: in the 
first half of the 2000s the retrenchment reform efforts and quantitative data all 
confirm this direction, and the second half of this decade showed the public pension 
expanding and the development of private pensions as well. The index also shows 
that the degree of privatisation has been growing year by year (see Table 7.3.2). 
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Table 7.3.2 Privatization index (2007-2012) 
 
Year Replacement 
rate of public 
pension 
Assets of 
funded 
pension as % 
of GDP 
Private 
expenditure 
as % of public 
expenditure 
Contribution 
rate multiplied 
by coverage of 
private 
pension 
Compound 
index of 
pension 
privatization 
 Replacement Funding Expenditure Contricov  
2007 58% 0.32% 11.10% 18.75% 0.82 
2008 58% 0.37% 12.67% 19.57% 0.87 
2009 58% 0.47% 15.62% 20.30% 0.98 
2010 58% 0.51% 15.76% 21.175 1.02 
2011 58% 0.57% 18.31% 23.10% 1.11 
2012 58% 0.65% 20.14% 24.81% 1.20 
Sources: The bulletin of human resources and social security (2008-2012); The bulletin of labour and social security development, 2007 
 
7.3.2 Independent variables and causal effects 
Impact of the political institution  
According to the hypothesis which we formed in Chapter 5, in China's political 
system the strong executive and less powerful veto players and veto points (or say de 
facto veto players and veto points) provide greater possibility to change the status 
quo.  However, the empirical evidence suggested that any reform initiatives (big or 
small) are easy to introduce at the central level, but the effective implementation at 
the ground level is diminished. This is because of the presence of de facto veto 
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players (sub-national governments) as well as de facto veto points (policy space and 
institutional openings) to allow the veto powers to have an effect. For instance, at the 
top level, replacing the SOE welfare system with the social insurance model in 1990s 
was structural retrenchment reform, but the subsequent parameter changes in the first 
half of the 2000s were aimed at consolidating this model and fixing the practical 
issues emerging from the implementation, such as transition cost problems and 
administrative issues. It could be argued that the top-level policy shift would not be 
as difficult as in the democracies, but the real change did not take place as easily as 
we had assumed. In other words, the continuous confirmation and consolidation of 
the newly-established model in a decentralised and fragmented China were not as 
painless as expected.  
At ground level, local governments took advantage of the decentralised 
administrative and fiscal system and had more leeway to redirect and reshape the 
policy outcomes. The problems of empty individual accounts, the difficulties of 
nationalizing public schemes and the extension of coverage were constrained by 
local government interests. The pro-economy development strategy and the 
decentralised system gave the local governments motivation to develop economies in 
the cost of social protection, to maintain local funds and less likely to engage in 
social pooling with other regions for fear of benefit decreases. The expansion of 
public pensions to non-state sector workers, part-time and flexible workers was also 
restrained because of the local governments' concerns about their own interests. 
Their concerns about the loss of private capital within their own jurisdiction 
determined their limited attitude to compliance, and their capacity to monitor the 
atypical labour force joining the pension insurance needs to be improved. 
Impact of the pension institution and legacies 
If we follow the propositions generated from other countries' reform experiences and 
the hypotheses for China, these suggest that the maturity of the PAYG system in 
China as well as the absence of a funded scheme might render large-scale reform 
impossible. But the empirical evidence shows the contradictory results: China had 
been through systemic reform in 1990s and the adoption of PDC (partially defined 
contribution) model replaced the PAYG. The hypothesis of the possibility of radical 
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reform in China is not true even though this case also have mature PAYG System. 
However, fixing measures in the following decade addressed the legacy problems 
and implement issues dominated in 1990s. In addition, in China's case, not only does 
the starting point of the pension system matter, the policy legacies in the reform 
process also affect the outcomes. For instance, the pilot experiences and 
trial-and-error policy practices have formed transition legacies (system 
fragmentation) and created a challenge for pension scheme nationalisation. The 
unclear financial burden-sharing within different levels of governments and the lack 
of policy intervention for the marginalized groups all resulted in the delay of public 
pension expansion and development in the latter half of the 2000s. 
Impact of idea and macro context 
In the previous chapter, we hypothesized that China might not turn to structural 
reform in the short term given the relatively positive data from the 1980s to the 
2030s, and that the subsequent projected radical aging would cause China to 
consider deeper reform in the medium or long term. In addition, we hypothesized 
that capital dependence on the WB would determine the scope of reform, and the 
relatively smaller loans received from the WB might not bring radical reform in 
China. The empirical evidence shows that China went through structural change in 
the 1990s, shifting the pension provision model from SOE provision to a social 
insurance model, and also adopting the pre-funding mechanism that the WB had 
advocated.  It seems that China went through fundamental change even in its 
relatively positive demographic situation and smaller loan dependence on the WB. 
However, if we bring the macro social economic context into consideration, we find 
that the structural reforms of the 1990s were intended to cope with the market 
economy reform and the SOE reform. The shift from a planned economy to a market 
economy rendered the critical change in pension provision, even in the favourable 
demographic situation.  In addition, the formation of a partially-funded pension 
insurance model in China was also the result of a compromise between domestic 
design and international ideas; China's case reflects the fact that idea diffusion 
matters more than loan conditionality, which also brings about critical new features 
in policy design, not only in the short term, but also in the long term. For instance, 
 197 
 
from PAYG to partially-funded in the 1990s, and in another structural shift in the 
second half of the 2000s, we find also conformity with the WB's multi-pillar model.   
Impact of interest groups 
Based on the hypothesis about interest groups (business interests and unions) formed 
in Chapter 5, we found that China's case does conform to our hypothesis. First, the 
absence of any union participation in the decision making and pension 
administration made the retrenchment reform easier at the top level and the ground 
level, and the retrenchment systemic reform from the 1990s to the early 2000s did 
not encounter the opposition of the unions in either decision making or 
implementation. In addition, as for the hypothesis about privileged business interest 
groups, China's case also saw that the privileged SOEs opposed the retrenchment 
integration through social movement and non-compliance, and the final solutions all 
involved compensation from public finance or the involvement of the top political 
elite. As for the general business interest, this also conformed to our hypothesis that 
private interests would oppose the introduction and expansion of a public pension 
programme by evading the insurance participation. Their perception of labour cost 
control and the local governments relaxing their supervision all contributed to the 
problem.  
7.3.3 Change pattern  
Identifying the causal factors of pension institution evolution, how it is taking place 
and what the interactive causal mechanisms are another set of our research questions. 
Adopting the historical institutionalist and incrementalist explanatory framework 
(Mahoney and Thelen, 2010) to identify the causal mechanisms behind the trajectory, 
the explanatory account explored the interactions between institution and actors, 
which conditions allow or obstruct changes, and the different actors' strategies of 
approving or blocking change. 
Reviewing the evolution of pension provision in China since the mid-1980s, we can 
summarize the general strategies that the political actors adopted to change the 
pension institution through policy layering (see Table 7.3.3). At the same time, using 
the empirical evidences on ground level implementation (Whiteford, 2003; Béland 
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and Yu, 2004; Chen, 2004; Frazier, 2004b; Frazier, 2004c; Frazier, 2006b; Salditt et 
al.; 2007, Yu 2007; Sin and Worldwide, 2008; Guo, 2009; Frazier, 2010b; Shi, 2011; 
Chen, 2012; Hu, 2012; Nyland et al., 2011; Nyland et al., 2006; James, 2003), we 
also found that the interest groups and other actors managed to redirect top level 
policies through the drift and conversion (see Table 7.3.3). Layering refers to the 
introduction of new rules on top of or alongside the existing ones; as already 
explained, layering does not introduce new institutions altogether, but provides 
amendments, revisions or additions to existing ones (Thelen, 2003). Drift denotes 
changes of existing rules due to environment change; it is understood as a process in 
which new environments alter the demands on existing institutions while the old 
rules remain the same, and drift may occur in order to accommodate shifts in 
external conditions (Hacker, 2004). Conversion occurs when the rules remain 
formally the same but are interpreted and enacted in new ways (Thelen, 2003). 
However, the misinterpretation is not driven by the changed setting; instead, the 
actors actively pursue and explore the inherent ambiguities of institutions. Through 
redeployment, they convert the institution to new goals, functions or purposes to 
serve their own favourable interests.  
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Table 7.3.3 Development path and patterns 
 
Top level (central policy) Ground level change 
1980s: De-constructing socialist welfare and 
social insurance welfare development (State 
retreat) 
The social insurance model is diffused into 
the SOE welfare model 
1990s: The retrenchment of pension insurance 
through layering 
 
Local governments redirect the PDC model 
into the NDC in practice (conversion) 
Private interest groups avoid compliance 
(drift) 
Early 2000s: Top level layering to retrenchment 
through more state intervention and regulation 
Second half of the 2000s: Top-level layering to 
expansion in the public pillar 
Curb the problems from the previous stage 
 
Institution layering in the top level will bring 
new actors and dynamics for further 
development (future plan) 
In particular, the old-age insurance model replaced the socialist pension based on the 
state budget from the 1980s to the 1990s. This was the initial process of pension 
insurance development with the direction of retrenchment. The retreat of state 
financing for pension provision for the SOE workers on the one hand represented 
retrenchment while on the other hand the introduction of individual contributions 
implied the formation of a new pension insurance model in the market economy (see 
above).  
The making of the pension insurance model underwent continuous policy layering 
from the 1990s. The incremental reforms included mandating the system design and 
setting unified parameters, and improvement of the practical procedure shifted the 
existing SOE pension institution to a social insurance pension in 1997. The policy 
layering in the 1990s gradually brought about systemic change. The institutional 
outcomes indicate that the pension institution has dramatically shifted from the 
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previous model, but the manner of the change was through incremental layering. In 
the first half of the 2000s, the reform efforts were policy layering by parameter 
adjustment in order to consolidate the newly-established partially-funded public 
pension nationwide. The advancing of pooling administration level and the 
mandating of funded individual accounts were all attempts to confirm the 
retrenchment reform.  However, the systemic change in the 1990s seen as 
institutional characteristics only demonstrates the top-level policy change, and if we 
bring compliance and ambiguity into consideration, the dynamics and difficulties of 
systemic retrenchment become more apparent.  Again, based on the empirical 
evidence in the literature (Gu, 2001; Chen, 2004; Smyth, 2000; Ma and Zhai, 2001; 
James, 2002; Sun and Maxwell, 2002; Whiteford, 2003; Béland and Yu, 2004; Jin, 
2004; Frazier, 2010b), the central policy encountered a reverse impact from ground 
level through drift and conversion, and these impacts impelled the central 
government to look for programmatic change in the first half of the 2000s in order to 
confirm the newly-established system.      
First, during the retrenchment reform in the 1990s, the challenge was the conversion 
of local governments. The decentralization and privatization process empowered the 
local governments and inspired their motivation to redirect the central policy (Zhang, 
2006; Landry, 2008). Local authorities had more discretion over their own specific 
design and fund administration. The openings in the political institution and the 
targeted welfare institution (pensions) created spaces and opportunities for 
reinterpreting the central policy and even re-shaping the original objective. For 
instance, the challenges of pre-funded individual accounts, advancing the social 
pooling level and integrating the public pension scheme at provincial level all 
encountered sub-national opponents to various degrees. The notional individual 
account practice and the provincial reserve funds were innovations at the local level 
with their own interpretations (Sun and Maxwell, 2002).  
The decentralization combined with pension retrenchment facilitated the state retreat 
and maintained the state legitimacy to a large degree. The local governments were 
authorized to develop economic and social programmes. The decentralized fiscal 
system and GDP-oriented development strategies motivated the local governments to 
proceed with the retrenchment through cooperation with local SOEs and reducing 
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the possible opposition through early retirement, lump-sum compensation, laid-off 
measures and so on (Frazier, 2010b). In addition, the pension reform measures which 
facilitated local economic development were adopted and implemented, but the 
initiatives which might erode local financial resources or local benefits levels were 
re-directed by the authorities through conversion or non-compliance. The call for the 
pre-funding of individual accounts from central funds was directed to notional 
individual accounts at the local level. Until the central injection of funds to support 
the change, only some provinces could achieve the goals set by the central 
government.  In addition, the decentralized structure also constrained the pension 
nationalisation. The up-scaling of fund management and risk pooling encountered 
extreme difficulties in practice because of the local worry of losing control of the 
fund or suffering possible benefit cutbacks (Lei and Hao, 2009). Therefore, the 
state's re-intervention in the 2000s with the good intention of perfecting and 
improving pension provision did not proceed as smoothly as was assumed.  
The policy feedbacks over the retrenchment and decentralization also constrained the 
realization of these good intentions. The privatization process in the 1980s changed 
the structure of risk groups. The decline of state sector workers and the increase of 
the private sector demanded a greater pension system response to the new risk group. 
The retrenchment and development in the 1980s and 1990s were targeted at the 
crucial constituency, urban SOE workers. The reform initiatives in the 1990s were 
aimed at achieving equal access and distribution of the pension system. However, the 
effects of equal access and equal redistribution through new rounds of policy 
layering also faced challenges in implementation. On the one hand, the extension of 
the basic pension to the private sector encountered private interest drift. The reform 
packages centred on SOE workers neglected the emerging and vested private 
interests with the development of private economy. The changing context was not 
reflected well in policy design in terms of incentive for private enterprise 
participation, the supervision and regulation. The evasion of private enterprises 
resulted from the their neglect of the existing rule, and the reform efforts did not 
target on the supervision of private sector employers. The central policy failure to 
curb the non-compliance of private enterprises, and late response to changed demand 
in the pension expansion process all provided the space for the policy drift in the 
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implement process. Therefore, the private interest drift in the current existing policy 
pose further extension challenge. Non-compliance and high salaries as an alternative 
to replacing pension insurance contributions were the main strategies that the private 
employers adopted to evade participation in the public pension scheme (Nyland et al., 
2006, 2011; Maitra et al., 2006). The economic privatization process fostered vested 
private interest in the process, and non-compliant behaviour came from reluctance to 
share the risks with SOE enterprises, as well as the labour cost consideration. 
In order to solve the problems in the implementation process and reverse the change 
at ground level, the central government proposed new regulations to intervene in the 
implementation and ensure the consolidation of partially funded public pensions. In 
other words, the reform was centred on pre-funding individual accounts, advancing 
the administration and pooling level, and integrating the schemes across regions. In 
the latter half of the 2000s, the policy layering at top level not only dealt with the 
problem which occurred in the previous stage, but also moved towards building a 
multi-pillar system and expanding the public pension coverage. These new initiatives 
with expanding intentions also produced positive outcomes since the public 
generosity level has increased since 2005 and pension privatization has gradually 
developed. Given this study mostly focus on public pension pillar, the zero pillar 
(social pension) and secondary pillar (EA) implementation practices are not touched 
on, what happened in ground level after mid-2000s shift towards the interaction 
between public private provision mix and the adding of social pension, which worth 
studying in the future. 
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Chapter 8: The rural case 
8.1 Introduction  
In the pre-reform era, China's rural social services were mainly provided by family, 
kin communities and income from farming (Joseph and Phillips, 1999). Collective 
committees or local governments provided a unique social safety net for the 
vulnerable groups, such as the 'five guarantees'14 system. Apart from the limited 
social protection for the marginalized groups who had no family support, no 
comprehensive, universal social service was established in the past decades. 
However, with the collapse of the rural collective economy, the undermining of 
family protection due to the one-child policy, and massive migration to urban areas, 
the central government began to consider the aging challenge in the rural population 
and started a public rural pension programme in 1986. This chapter will review the 
process of rural pension scheme development and assess the current system 
performance. The institutional analysis will present how and why the policy change 
was formed and implemented.  Finally, it concludes with the examination of the 
reform direction and scope, as well as the explanatory variable and dynamic effects 
on development process. 
8.2 Historical development overview 
 8.2.1 Initiation stage (1986-1992) 
The initial attempt to build a public rural pension system was proposed in the 1986 
Seventh Five-Year Plan (CCP, 1986), which was the first political discourse to 
propose rural social security. The subsequent Eighth Five-Year Plan went further by 
emphasizing the significance of the social security system in improving economic 
development and social stability (CCP, 1991). After almost a decade of economic 
reform and restructuring, the state began to promulgate social welfare provision for 
the rural population. 
                                                
14 The rural communes were required to provide “five guarantees" including food, clothing, fuel, education and burial 
expenses to the rural residents in extreme need, without kin to care for them. It is from the directive “Exemplary charter for 
advanced rural cooperatives” (1956).  
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In 1986, the State Council authorized the Ministry of Civil Affairs to be responsible 
for several pilot projects in rural areas (MOLSS, 2006). This was the first initiative 
to launch a social welfare scheme in rural China. Since there was no template to be 
copied, the uncertainties regarding how to form the scheme design and which model 
would be appropriate for the rural sector dominated the thinking among 
policy-makers (Wang, 2005; Yang and Luo, 2003). Given some local experiences in 
the developed areas, as well as the inequality across the country, the ministry 
adopted an incremental and conservative strategy and proposed a voluntary, DC 
fully-funded individual savings accounts model. In other words, a model was 
preferred in which the central government was responsible for the regulation and 
supervision of the scheme, but held back from final administrative responsibility 
(MOCA, 1986). This idea of limited state intervention was dominant in the 1990s. 
Afterwards, local experience was gained from various pension schemes carried out 
under the supervision of MOCA. At the beginning of 1991, MOCA launched a 
preliminary plan in five counties in Shandong province (Mouping, Longkou, 
Zhaoyun, Rongcheng and Rushan) as the first pilot group(Labournet, 1997). The 
basic features of the system design were individual contributions as the principal 
source, collective subsidies as supplementary sources, and the need for family 
support to combine with the social insurance system (Peng and Song, 2002).  
In 1991, a national rural pension insurance conference was held by MOCA in Yantai; 
this conference drew conclusions from the pilot experiences, confirmed the specific 
implementation procedures and formed the local regulations (Lin, 2007). The 
conference achieved some consensus regarding the development of rural pension 
insurance: first, with the economic development and consequential income increases 
in rural areas, it had the financial source to develop the rural pension scheme. Second, 
the pilot should start in developed regions, that is, regions with annual per capita 
income exceeding 700-800 Yuan were allowed to launch the programme. Third, 
given the uncertainties of the social insurance design for the rural population, and 
limited knowledge about the social insurance and commercial insurance there, in 
some areas the commercial insurance companies replaced the civil affairs bureaus to 
handle pension provision, which impeded the development of public pension 
insurance. The local work was expected to target building the public programme in 
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the rural areas. Finally, establishing specific agencies and having trained personnel 
administrating the programme was another task (MOCA, 1992c). This conference 
settled the principles and measures for the development of the pilot project. The pilot 
projects then expanded to 29 provinces with 5.3 million participants. In particular, 
Wuhan was distinguished from the others because the pilot scheme there covered all 
the counties and prefectures within the jurisdiction (Labournet, 1997). In 1992 a 
'national rural social insurance pilot experience exchange conference' was held by 
MOCA in Wuhan, and it was proposed to follow the Wuhan and Shandong 
experiences and push the project further forward nationwide (MOCA, 1992b). The 
Jiangsu province experience was an another pilot model praised by MOCA; another 
conference held in Zhang jia gang in Jiangsu province at the end of 1992 further 
advertised and promoted the expansion of the scheme (Labournet, 1997).    
8.2.2 The expansion phase (1992-1998) 
A clear central policy was launched in 1992, 'The trial measure of county level rural 
pension insurance programme' by MOCA (MOCA, 1992a); rural pension insurance 
was to be based on the local economic development level and combined with family 
support, land protection and social assistance. The basic principle was to maximize 
the family support function while the public was meant to provide merely limited 
supplementary support. Within the system design, individual responsibility was the 
principle which emphasized the close link between contributions and benefit levels. 
The collective subsidies as supplementary assistance could be used in the developed 
regions (MOCA, 1992a). In 1995, the State Council issued document No.51 to 
further clarify the advice on launching rural pension programmes based on the 
previous five years of pilot experiences (State Council, 1995b). On the one hand, it 
emphasized the institution extension; on the other hand, it heightened the 
administration issue, including information system construction and personnel 
training. In addition, fund management and supervision were another task alongside 
expansion. The fund supervision committee and accounting system had to be built up 
at the local level. Finally, advertising was another aspect to achieve the expansion, 
because with a new institution, public education and communication through media 
propaganda and mobilization could encourage participation (State Council, 1995b).  
 206 
 
In 1997, MOCA adjusted the fund management measures and investigated the 
financial performance of rural pension funds. In addition, MOCA issued a notice 
about promoting institutional coverage to the rural collective enterprise workers and 
gradually expanded the coverage (MOCA, 1997). The ministry issued rural social 
insurance administration procedures to solve the technical issues in administration, 
and the rural social insurance computed individual account administration system 
(second version) was adopted. Finally, service delivery was improved by training 
service personnel. The expansion stages saw the publication of several policy 
documents and regulations to clarify the national system design and implementation 
procedures (MOCA, 1997).   
8.2.3 The stagnation phase (1998-2002) 
In 1998, the government's institution restructuring impacted the development of the 
rural scheme. The newly-established Ministry of Labour and Social Security 
(MOLSS) replaced MOCA and became responsible for the rural scheme. In 1999, 
with the rectification and reform of the insurance industry, the State Council changed 
its plan. Document No.14 (1999) clearly stated that China was not ready for a public 
rural pension programme (State Council, 1999). The central government instructed 
local authorities to stop the pilot expansion, and began a process of appraisal and 
rectification and transferred the existing programme into commercial insurances if 
possible. However, the specific rectification measures were not defined. This policy 
shift resulted in a sharp decline in the coverage: by 2001, the number of participants 
was under 60 million and it gradually decreased over time, to around 55 million in 
2007 (State Council, 1999).  
8.2.4 the renewal of local piloting (2003-2008) 
In 2002, the 16th CPC National Congress report stated that “when the economic 
conditions permit, local governments should explore building a rural welfare system 
including pensions, health care and minimum life guarantee” (CPC, 2002), which 
clearly showed that establishing the social security system in the rural sector should 
be done according to the local development level. This new statement represented 
another policy shift in developing rural welfare programmes (Xinhua News, 2002). 
In 2003, the CPC Third Plenum conference issued a decision to improve the socialist 
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market economy system and emphasized the principle of the rural pension insurance 
programme: that the family support dominated model would be the guideline for the 
foreseeable future (CCP, 2003). Renewed efforts to introduce rural pension schemes 
started in 2003. The MOLSS issued a new guideline for the development of rural 
pension schemes. The second round of pilot projects started in 2008. In general, 
there were three types of pilot project formed at the local level (Cai 2012): first, 
social pooling plus individual accounts; second, flat-rate universal pensions 
combined with individual accounts; and third, individual accounts only. In addition, 
the scheme differed in the financing role of the government at the accumulation and 
pay-out stages. Therefore, there were five sub-national models with specific 
parameter variances based on the local pilot experiences. The first type was the 
flat-rate pension plus individual accounts with the government financing the pay-out 
stages. The government paid the flat-rate benefits from general revenues. This was 
represented as the Beijing model. The second type was a flat-rate pension plus a 
matching DC individual-account model, which meant that the government not only 
made a matching contribution to individual accounts but also financed the flat-rate 
pension. This model was seen in Baoji in 2007 and in Qian’an in Hebei province 
(Qin, 2009). The third model was individual accounts with social pooling, which was 
financed by the government. This type was implemented in Suzhou in Jiangsu 
province and Qingdao in Shandong province (Qu, 2012). The fourth model was the 
individual account plus social pooling and government finance meeting both the 
accumulation and pay-out stages; ZhongShan and Dong Guan implemented this 
measure (Huang, 2009). The fifth model was individual accounts only with the 
government matching contributions to individual accounts. This was observed in 
Yantai in Shandong province in 2005 and in Hangzhou in Zhejiang province (Huang, 
2008). All of these sub-national pilot experiences provided lessons and suggestions 
for the design of a national pilot project.  
8.2.5 the new rural pension scheme (2009) 
A number of new trial schemes for the rural pension scheme were introduced at the 
local level in 2003, with local governments being responsible for the system design 
and for financial support, and the central government did not arrange special funding 
for the new experiment (Cai, 2012). It was not until 2008 that the Ministry of Labour 
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and Social Security issued a document entitled 'The Opinions of the State Council on 
Launching the New Rural Pension Insurance Pilot Programme' which promoted rural 
old-age support officially and introduced the attempt to form standard pilot projects 
nationwide in 2009 (MOLSS, 2008). 
This new scheme was also a voluntary programme. All rural residents over the age 
of sixteen were eligible to participate and were entitled to benefits at age 60 with at 
least fifteen years of contribution history. The scheme provided a basic flat-rate 
pension and the individual account investment return. The flat-rate benefit was set at 
55 Yuan per month initially. The individual account accumulation would have a rate 
of return of one year's deposit interest rate of the People’s Bank of China and 
benefits were calculated by dividing by 139 in the claim period (MOLSS, 2008). 
Those aged 60 and above could receive the basic rate benefit if their children were 
contributing to the scheme. Those with an incomplete contribution record (less than 
fifteen years) before they retired could make a lump sum contribution for the 
short-fall in their record. The financing of the new scheme came from three sources: 
the government provided the basic flat-rate benefits, individual contributions ranged 
from 100- 500 Yuan per year based on personal choice, and matching contribution 
subsidies from local governments at a minimum of 30 Yuan per year; the collective 
subsidy was encouraged but not mandatory and no specific level was defined. The 
fund management was delegated to the local office of the MOHRSS at county level, 
and was intended eventually to advance to provincial level (MOLSS, 2008). 
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Table 8.2.1 Historical development (1986-2011) 
 
1986: 7th CCP Five-Year plan 
 
1986: MOCA's proposal on Exploring the 
Establishment of a Rural Social Security 
System  
• Proposes rural social security  
 
• MOCA responsible for the rural programme 
development  
 
1991: National rural pension insurance 
conference  
 
1992: MOCA's trial measure of county-level 
rural pension insurance programme  
 
 
1995: SC's views on the improvement of rural 
pension insurance  
 
1997: MOCA's trial procedures of county-level 
rural pension insurance management 
 
 
1999: SC issues notice of rectifying the 
insurance industry 
• Reflection on pilot experiences and 
confirmation of practical procedures and 
regulations  
• Voluntary contributory individual accounts, 
managed by the county-level government, with 
state regulation. In developed regions, a 
collective subsidy is provided.  
• The expansion of the programme by solving 
the administrative issues: information tracing 
system, personnel training, fund management 
and participation promotion. 
• Unifying the policy, procedures, parameters 
and practical issues, including: administrative 
body and scheme administration, financial 
management, fund management, audit, record 
management, etc.   
• Ending the rural pension insurance 
development and beginning appraisal and 
rectification 
2002: 16th CPC National Congress 
 
2003: CPC's Third Plenum conference  
 
2008: MOLSS publishes the Opinions of the 
State Council on Launching New Rural 
Pension Insurance Pilot Programme  
 
2009: SC issues guidance on carrying out the 
new rural social pension insurance pilot  
 
2011: Social insurance legislation 
• Another round of proposals for the 
development of rural social security 
programmes 
• Another round of initiatives for rural pension 
schemes   
• Promotion of the rural pension scheme pilots at 
local level   
 
 
• Forming the pilot project at national level  
 
• Mandating the rural pension scheme  
Note: made by author 
8.3 Old and new comparison 
Drawing on the experiences and lessons learned from the old rural pension system, 
the new scheme had distinct features. The most evident was the greater role of 
government financial support. In the past decades, the government had not provided 
funds for the scheme except the means-tested security-net programmes. Also, the 
1992 old rural pension scheme did not involve the financial responsibilities of the 
government, but the political will and policy regulations promoted the development 
of the scheme. This new pension scheme was a two-tier system in which the basic 
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pension benefits were provided by the government (central and local governments 
share the funding responsibility), and the second tier personal accounts funded by 
individual contributions, collective economic organization's contributions, and local 
government subsidies (Shen and Williamson, 2010). The contribution-sharing in the 
personal account could be different in local schemes, but the basic pension tier was 
standardized nationally. The central government provided the basic pension benefits 
of 55 Yuan per month. The central government promised to provide the full basic 
benefits for the less-developed inner and Western regions, paying half for the 
Eastern regions while the local governments bore the other half (MOLSS, 2008). 
Apart from the public financial expansion in the rural pension scheme, the new rural 
system was aimed at achieving universal coverage by 2020 (State Council, 2009a). 
Contrary to the old scheme which had voluntary participation without the intention 
to build an institutionalized old-age welfare system, the new scheme was intended to 
build up a comprehensive rural sector pension scheme as a crucial part of the 
national welfare system (Shen and Williamson, 2010). In addition, the previous rural 
elderly welfare provision was basically means-tested and provided a security net 
only for the vulnerable groups. The ‘five guarantees’ and rural minimum income 
support were funded by public money and provide the basic living requirements 
(Hong et al., 2004). These selective rural welfare institutions provided safety-net 
protection rather than universal coverage. However, the new rural pension scheme 
could be seen as a first attempt to build a welfare system institutionally in China's 
rural sector, which can be assumed to be a crucial policy shift in rural welfare system 
building. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 211 
 
Table 8.3.1 A comparison of the old and new rural pension schemes in China 
 
Sources: The trial measure of county level rural pension insurance programme (MOCA, 1992a); Calculation measure of rural pension 
insurance (Trial)(MOCA, 1994); Guidance for carrying out the new rural social pension insurance pilot (State Council, 2009a) 
8.4 Performance evaluation  
8.4.1 Coverage 
The rural pension scheme pilots started in 1986, and the first national design was 
issued in 1992. This programme underwent gradual development with increasing 
numbers of participants until 1998. It can be observed that the number of 
contributors increased from 1994 and reached a peak in 1998, after which it 
                                                
15 Older contributors close to retirement but with a record of less that fifteen years of contributions were eligible for basic 
pension benefits if they, their spouses or their adult children were contributing to the new scheme  
Category Qualify conditions Benefits  Financing  Management 
Old  
scheme 
Those aged 20 are eligible 
to participate.  
 
Those aged 60 for both 
males and females are 
eligible for a pension 
 
The pension is calculated on 
contribution standard, 
contribution history, and the 
calculation parameter: 
Benefits= 0.008631526 × total 
individual account 
accumulation 
Financed from individual 
contributions ranging from 2 to 
20 Yuan monthly with a 
matching 2 Yuan contributed by 
the collective. 
Investment in bank deposit 
and national bonds. 
Committed to guaranteed rate 
of return. The local bureau of 
civil affairs administers the 
scheme and is subject to the 
internal control of the Ministry 
of Finance and to auditing 
New 
scheme  
Those aged 16 are eligible 
to participate  
Those age 60 for both 
males and females are 
eligible for pension  
 
At least fifteen years of 
contributions to be entitled 
to the basic flat-rate 
pension (55 Yuan); those 
with less that fifteen years 
are subject to family 
binding15 
The pension includes the 
basic flat-rate pension of 55 
Yuan, plus individual account 
accumulation which is 
calculated on the balance of 
the insured's contributions 
plus interest rate returns, and 
divided by 139 (139 in 2012). 
Financed from central subsidies 
to support the flat-rate benefit 
(100% for central and western 
regions and 50% for eastern 
regions). Individual contributions 
range from 100 to 500 Yuan 
annually as personal choice; 
matching contribution for the 
individual account from local 
governments of at least 30 Yuan 
per year; collective subsidies are 
encouraged but not mandatory.  
Investment in bank deposit. 
Fund management begins at 
the county level, with the aim 
of shifting to provincial level. 
Local office of the Ministry of 
Human Resources and Social 
Security will supervise funds.  
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decreased rapidly. From the period of stagnation to the renewal of the pilot phases, 
the number remained at a stable level. During the stagnation period, the withdrawal 
or closure of the programme caused the number of participants to plummet in 1999 
and it remained at 50 million (see Figure 8.4.1). The initiation of the new pension 
scheme in 2009 brought more participants and the number increased rapidly, 
reaching 102,768 million, accounting for 24.81% of the rural active population in 
2010 (see Figure 8.4.1). The number is higher than the peak number of old scheme 
and would increase further with the expansion of the new programme. The central 
government set the geographic coverage target; by the end of 2010 it would cover 24% 
of rural counties, by the end of 2011, the target was set at 60%, and universal 
coverage will be achieved by 2020 (State Council, 2009a). However, institutional 
coverage in the geographic sense does not mean that the rural eligible population 
will be able to access the new scheme; the coverage rate as a percentage of the active 
rural population was 24.81% in 2010, which demonstrates that there is a long way to 
go from geographic universal coverage to citizenship universal coverage (Dorfman 
et al., 2012b).  
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Figure 8.4.1: The coverage of the rural pension scheme (1994 – 2010) 
 
Sources: The bulletin of civil affair development (MOCA, 1994-1997); The bulletin of labour and social security development (MOLSS, 
1998-2007); The bulletin of human resources and social security (MOHRSS, 2008-2010).	  
8.4.2 Adequacy 
There are no national pension benefit data available. The benefit level is calculated 
from the rural pension funds' expenditure and the number of benefit claimants in the 
same year. It could roughly reflect the general benefits level across the country. The 
replacement rate is calculated based on the rural per capita income, which also 
represents the general level of pension benefits.  For the years for which data are 
available (1999-2004), the pension benefits level was around 50-70 Yuan per month 
in most of the years. The replacement rate was around 20% in the old scheme, and in 
the new national scheme it was around 10% (see Table 8.4.1).  
As for the adequacy level, will the benefit of 60 Yuan per month be adequate to 
protect the rural elderly from poverty? From the survey data from the China old-age 
research centre, the elderly incomes and expenditures both increased in the past 
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decade, particular in the last five years. However, the average pension benefits did 
not increase very much, and it is obvious that the pension benefits continued to fall 
short of the elderly average expenditure (see Figure 8.4.2).  The low benefits level 
could not cover living expenses, which is also a reason why the programme is not 
attractive. In addition, the adequacy level is low by most measurements. The pension 
benefits account for 9.89% of rural per capita income in 2011 terms, 23.73% of 
$1.25 per day, or 81.43% of the rural poverty line/minimum living guarantee 
threshold (MOHRSS, 2011b). 
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Table 8.4.1: The replacement rate of the rural pension schemes (1995-2011) 
 
Year  Pension benefits 
(yearly) 
Pension benefits 
(monthly) 
Rural per capita 
income (yearly ) 
Replacement rate 
1995 367.63 30.64 1578 23.30% 
1996 575.86 47.99 1926 29.90% 
1997 543.45 45.29 2090 26% 
1998 903.01 75.25 2162 41.77% 
1999 n.a n.a 2210 n.a 
2000 n.a n.a 2253 n.a 
2005 695.36 57.95 3255 21.36% 
2006 845.07 70.42 3587 23.56% 
2007 1020.41 85.03 4140 24.65% 
2008 1109.38 92.45 4761 23.30% 
2009 488.43 40.70 5153 9.48% 
2010 698.57 58.21 5919 11.80% 
2011 689.74 57.48 6977 9.89% 
 
Sources: The author's own calculations; The bulletin of civil affair development (MOCA, 1994-1997); The bulletin of labour and social security 
development (MOLSS, 1998-2007); The bulletin of human resources and social security (MoHRSS, 2008-2010); China human resources and 
social security yearbook (MHRSS, 2011b); The Bulletin of the National Economic and Social Development (National Bureau of Statistics of 
China, 1994-1996) 
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Figure 8.4.2: The redistribution effect of the rural pension scheme 
 
Sources: The elderly population survey in urban/rural areas 2000, 2006, 2010 (China Research Center on Aging, 2000, China Research 
Center on Aging, 2006, China Research Center on Aging, 2010) 
 
8.4.3 Financial sustainability  
It can be summarised that the fiscal costs come from the following sources: the 
central government subsidies for the basic benefits, at 55 yuan a month per person; 
the local government providing matching subsidies of at least 30 yuan per 
contributor; the local government providing the subsidies for the low-income groups 
(dibao recipients or others entitled to contribution subsidy); the local government 
providing the subsidy to finance the difference between the annuitized benefit and 
the more appropriate and actuarially fair annuity factor; the local government 
providing the payment to surviving spouses of any remaining balance (Hinz, 2012). 
The central government commitment to providing basic pension benefits was 
calculated from the lowest affordable level at the price of inadequacy of benefits, and 
some simulations using different system parameters have found that the central 
government spending on this pension scheme take up to 1.0-2.5 per cent of central 
general revenues (Cheng, 2011). The costs are projected to grow with demographic 
aging and increases in the numbers of recipients. However, if the benefits level 
increases with GDP growth, an estimate of the cost would still be less than 0.75 per 
cent of GDP in 2050 (Hinz, 2012). Financial sustainability at the local level (county, 
municipal) is more uncertain, because the matching contribution or subsidies for the 
contributor and beneficiary vary across localities. The cost to local governments of 
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providing minimum matching subsidies for the benefits are very low relative to GDP, 
and the likelihood of this being realized or not also depends on the local fiscal 
capacity. Finally, apart from the financing sources, the system design parameter also 
affects the future fiscal sustainability. The annuity factor used to calculate the 
benefits for the individual account was set as 139 months. It  is based on the life 
expectancy calculation at age 60 and a 4 per cent expected rate of return on funds 
during retirement. The World Health Organization has published life expectancy 
figures for China and these indicate that the life expectancy at age 60 in 2009 was 
15.6 years (187 months)(WHO, 2011). This suggest that the annuity factor of 139 is 
too low, and that the substantial subsidy embedded in the annuity factor for the 
individual account pension is about 65 per cent of the benefit amount (Wang et al., 
2012), which means that it may endanger the financial sustainability if this parameter 
is not changed according to life expectancy. Also, this subsidy has to be borne by the 
administering bodies, or the local governments in fact, the less developed regions 
with less fiscal capacities have more possibility to fall into the payment crisis. 
8.4.4 Merits and problems  
Merits  
In terms of institution design, there has been major progress. First, the design of the 
parameters and rules has made the programme affordable for most rural citizens. 
Overall, fifteen years of contributions at 8.33 Yuan per month yields a benefit of 73 
Yuan per month for 19.2 years (Dorfman et al., 2011, p.100). This seems like a good 
deal for those who can afford it. Second, the incentive measures and financial 
subsidies reflect the government’s willingness to develop the rural pension 
programme. The matching individual account contribution subsidized by the local 
government provides the incentive for farmers to participate in the scheme (Zhang 
and Zhang, 2012). In addition, the flat-rate pension benefits jointly financed by 
central and local governments are the new feature of the pension template for the 
rural areas (State Council, 2009a). Finally, the preferential financial support for 
less-developed regions reflects the equity objective in the institution design (Yibo et 
al., 2011). In terms of institutional implementation, the universal access to pension 
provision for the rural population is the primary task (State Council, 2009a). Until 
 218 
 
2011, the geographic coverage was 60%, and around 358 million farmers were 
included in the system. The incentive measures and political mobilization of 
institutional extension help to achieve the objective.  
Problems   
First, the flat-rate benefit is very low and has failed to fulfil the objective of poverty 
reduction. As the data discussed above show, the average pension benefits (flat 
benefits and individual accounts) could not reach the dibao threshold. Therefore, 
achieving universal poverty protection for the elderly will require additional 
minimum benefit guarantees under the current design, or establishing a 
non-contributory social pension targeting the vulnerable groups. Second, the 
incentive measure only works for those aged 45 and above. The empirical evidence 
shows that those aged 45 and above believe that the benefits are substantial, but the 
incentive is not strong for other age groups, particular those aged below 45. The 
younger groups contribute to the scheme on behalf of their parents because of family 
binding policies (Gao, 2012). Third, the financial support for the vulnerable groups 
is limited. The contribution subsidies mainly come from local revenues. The local 
financial subsidies of 30% of the flat-rate benefits and support for the dibao 
recipients are implemented variously across different regions. The less-developed 
regions with limited financial capacities cannot fulfil their responsibilities in practice 
(Zhang and Zhang, 2012).  
8.4.5 Outlook 
The bigger picture of the development of the rural pension scheme in the 12th 
Five-Year plan comprises two aspects. The first is to realize the universal coverage 
of the new rural pension scheme. Although the new rural pension design has some 
incentive features (matching contribution subsidies, government financing and so 
on), there is still some scope for improvement. Whether China will be able to 
achieve universal pension coverage will depend on sustained participation, the 
problems are particularly in less-developed regions with limited fiscal capacities and 
low-income group with limited contribution ability. The second objective in the 12th 
Five-Year plan is to consider the integration of the urban and rural pension systems, 
realizing the full equalization of benefits between rural and urban residents. In order 
 219 
 
to achieve this, a common design framework will be needed to facilitate portability 
between schemes. However, the plan only addresses the general direction of 
development for the policy framework and a more operational policy design will be 
needed in the future. 
8.5 Institutional analysis of the development of the rural pension 
programme  
8.5.1 how it formed and reformed 
The role of ideas and historical context  
The role of ideas in the new institutionalist account is used to explain the source of 
institutional change. On the other hand, the idea of who should provide the old age 
support for the rural residents has a powerful influence on directing the perception 
and diagnosis of problems. The interplay between idea and institutional structure 
determines the policy design. According to Béland (2005), ideas not only determine 
the problem analysis and solution menu, but are also used in a narrative articulation 
for policy legitimacy. Ideas as cognitive maps define the interest of policy actors and 
shape the political conflicts in the policy process. Regarding China’s rural pension 
case, the idea about whether the rural pension should be provided by public or 
private funds determines the development path (Shi, 2006). The fluctuating 
development path of the rural pension schemes is because the idea about the policy 
paradigm has changed over time. 
In particular, in the development period of the old scheme, there was a retirement 
savings plan, and the state was responsible for institutional design and supervision 
and for providing limited finance subsidies through tax concessions (Wang, 2006a). 
During that phase, MOCA, as the main policy entrepreneur, supported the idea of 
more state responsibilities, and this was presented by an official speech of 
vice-minister Chen at a national conference on the rural pension scheme (Shi, 2006). 
Chen stated that the rural pension scheme was an important component of the 
economic strategy and a path-breaking initiative in the rural welfare system. In 
general, MOCA was convinced that the state should play a more active role in 
supporting the rural elderly by both policy initiatives and financial support (Chen, 
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1992). The Ministry of Finance and the People’s Bank of China, however, 
questioned the viability of a rural scheme and doubted the necessity of a public rural 
pension scheme (Shi, 2006). They argued that the conventional support for the 
elderly based on land and on family should be the model in rural China. The state 
could encourage a multi-pillar approach based on family support, commercial 
insurance and community care. In short, they proposed a limited state role in rural 
pension provision (Lieberman, 2002). It can be seen that there were conflicting ideas 
among the de facto veto players: the principal policy maker, that is, the State Council, 
was drawn to the MOCA idea initially and promoted the development at the local 
level. 
 The wider East Asia  crisis in 1997 altered the perceptions of the problem and 
policy orientation among central policy makers. For fear of a similar crisis in China, 
the central government began to regulate the insurance market to control possible 
risks. The State Council issued document No.14 in 1999 to regulate the insurance 
and financial markets, and the rural pension scheme was also included in the 
rectification plan (State Council, 1999). Premier Zhu Rongji, as one of the famous 
liberal reformers in China, repeatedly criticized the disorder of MOCA's pension 
schemes and the possible financial risks that they might bring, and he argued that the 
time for establishing a rural pension scheme was not yet ripe (Tencent, 2013). The 
premier's view determined the policy direction and the State Council set up an 
internal commission in 1998 to review the development of commercial insurance and 
other similar schemes, including the rural pension scheme. The group’s members 
included the major actors involved in rural pension reform: the State Planning 
Commission, the MOF, the MOL and MOLA (Shi, 2008). This special committee 
was committed to investigating the possible problems and potential risks involved in 
the rural scheme. In 1998, the group presented a report claiming that there were 
several risks inherent in the current rural pension scheme, particularly in aspects of 
pension fund management and the policy distortion in the implementation. The 
report further entrenched the debate among the ministries on the future direction of 
rural pensions (Leisering et al., 2002a). The MOCA still supported state involvement 
in the financial and administrative sphere because of the imperfect private insurance 
market, while the scheme's opponents partly advocated the state providing 
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supervision and regulation, and preferential tax treatment for the private insurance 
development (Shi, 2006). The SC made the final decision about rectifying the public 
rural pension situation in 1999, and premier Zhu also consolidated this policy shift in 
a speech which emphasized that rural old-age security should rely on family support 
and community care, and that the wealthy regions could adopt commercial insurance 
to supplement traditional family support (Leisering et al., 2002). In addition, there 
were no specific measures for putting the rectification into practice. The shift from 
public provision to private provision brought the scheme into a period of stagnation. 
Therefore, after 1999, the coverage of the rural pension scheme slumped. The 
delayed decisions of the central policy-makers put the benefits of participants and 
local administrative staff in danger (Leisering et al., 2002).  
Apart from idea change among the top policymakers, the failure of the old scheme 
was also the victim of a reconstruction of various ministries in 1998. The 
responsibility for rural pension management was transferred from MOCA to 
MOLSS, and the related local bureaus and offices were forced to transfer the 
administration work from civil affairs to social security agents. The government 
administration system reform thus had an impact on the development of the old rural 
scheme. In some developed regions, the local government has stronger financial 
capacity to support massive organization and workload change (Zheng, 2007b). The 
overall transfer worked smoothly and the subsequent operations went well. Even so, 
in some inner and western regions, rural pension schemes in most localities have 
been more or less at a standstill. With little fiscal input, many local executive 
agencies had to use accumulated pension funds to maintain the internal 
administration. In some less-developed regions, they refunded all the money in the 
individual accounts to farmers and cancelled the rural pension scheme (Zheng, 
2007b). The closure of a pension scheme unilaterally ruined trust in the government 
at the local level (Zheng, 2007b; Li and Zhu, 2012). By the end of 2005, the number 
of participants in rural pension schemes had dropped to 54.42 million, accounting for 
only 5.8% of the rural population. The accumulated fund reached 31 billion Yuan. 
Compared with the number of participants in the peak year of 1997 of 80 million, 
over 20 million farmers had withdrawn from the rural pension scheme (Chang and 
He, 2006). 
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In 2003, under the new leadership of Hu-Wen, the administration changed its idea 
about development strategy. The shift from efficiency-oriented economic 
development to harmonious society-building signified a paradigm shift in the Hu 
administration (Yu, 2009). Setting up a new rural pension scheme became a specific 
policy initiative under the new policy rationale. This idea change also could be as a 
demonstration of the political will to promote social development in rural areas. The 
Chinese government issued a series of documents concerning the establishment of 
the rural pension insurance system: 'The Opinions of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China and the State Council on Building a New Socialist 
Country' (State Council, 2006) and the National Eleventh Five-Year Plan (CCP, 
2006). These policy documents were aimed at establishing appropriate rural pension 
insurance according to local economic and social conditions.  
In 2007, the Seventeenth National Congress of the CPC report expressed the will to 
explore the new rural pension scheme and encouraged local rural pension pilots 
(CPC, 2007). In 2008, the third session of the Seventeenth CPC issued the 'Circular 
of the CPC on several major issues in further improving rural pensions and 
development', which also mentioned establishing universal, multi-level and 
sustainable rural social security protection (CPC, 2008). In March 2009, premier 
Wen Jiabao stated in the Government Work Report that rural pension insurance 
pilots should be launched from 2009 and should cover 10% of counties (Liu and Han, 
2010). In addition, the financial crisis of 2008 was a stimulus which promoted the 
national new rural scheme which then rapidly proceeded (De Haan, 2010). Increased 
public spending as a crucial change in the new design was consolidated in the policy 
document. Beijing Normal University's Professor Zhang Xiulan argued in 2009 that 
the financial crisis had accelerated comprehensive social protection in China (World 
Economic Forum, 2012). The swift launch of the new rural pension scheme in the 
middle of 2009 was a sign that the crisis had accelerated the initiative based on the 
previous political preparations under the idea of a 'harmonious society' (Haan, 2010). 
8.5.2 Why  
The institutional opportunities for the unintended consequences  
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In the old scheme development process, we find that the investigation and 
assessment of the old scheme conducted by the special committee in 1997 identified 
several problems in the implementation process: the overestimation of future benefits, 
the management risk of pension funds, misleading information given to farmers, and 
abuse of power over compulsory participation (Lieberman, 2002). The report 
presented the problems occurring in the implementation and proposed 
recommendations for policy change or transition. However, the report did not 
explore how and why the problem had taken place at the local level.  
We will use the empirical evidence collected to analyse the determinant factors of 
these problems. First, the original institution design problem created possibilities for 
policy failure. The parameter set was not based on actuarial calculation results, 
which resulted in payment risk. It was a personal savings plan launched and 
administrated by the government, but the benefits level depended on individuals' 
contribution records without government financial support (MOCA, 1992a). Within 
the scheme design, the assured retirement benefit was calculated based on an annual 
interest rate of 8.8%. However, China’s economy was at a high inflation stage when 
the policy came out. The accrued benefits would exceed the predicted level when the 
interest rate came down after the high inflation period. Actually, when the central 
bank repeatedly cut interest rates from 8.8% in 1997 to 6.8% in 1998 and then to 2.5% 
in 1999, the fund accumulation shrank with the decrease in the deposit interest rate 
(Leisering et al., 2002, p.125). The future payment risk would be mounting while the 
benefits level remained unchanged. The imbalance between accumulation and 
pay-out posed financial risks for the old scheme. In addition, with regard to pension 
fund management, the policy regulated that the fund could only purchase 
government bonds and be deposited in the bank for investment. No department was 
allowed to divert the fund or use it for direct investment (MOCA, 1992a). Under this 
fund operation regulation, the fund's investment returns could not meet the benefits 
claim level when the interest rate continued to fall without violating the regulations 
and exploring ways to increase the fund returns. Therefore, the central government 
on the one hand had restricted fund operations, but on the other hand it steered away 
from providing financial support for the potential payment crisis. The absence of 
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fund investment plans and central financial support led to the ensuing payment crisis 
(Chang and He, 2006). 
In the phase of stagnation, the lack of proper rectification measures eroded the old 
scheme and hastened its inevitable failure. Following the investigation by the special 
commission, the responsibility for rural pensions from MOCA to the 
newly-established Ministry of Labour and Social Security (MOLSS), which 
primarily took charge of the urban social insurance issue (Gov.cn, 2012). This 
adjustment represented the downgraded status of rural pensions. The so-called 
'rectifications' only existed in the policy orientation, and there were no consolidated 
measures or guidelines for the local governments to follow except for halting further 
expansion (State Council, 1999). The MOLSS was supposed to introduce detailed 
regulations to enforce the State Council's decisions about rectification; however, the 
two proposals which the MOLSS put forward were not finally approved because of 
conflict between the related ministries. The first plan was intended to commercialize 
the existing pension schemes in poor regions and maintain the current scheme in 
well-off regions. This partially commercialized plan did not conform to the ideas of 
the Ministry of Finance, which claimed that the state had withdrawn from the rural 
social security system. In the other plan, the MOLSS made more concessions and 
agreed to follow the commercial insurance principle. It proposed setting up a special 
branch under China Life Insurance, which would take charge of the old scheme and 
administrative work. This meant that the special agency should operate under 
government regulations and supervision, and the state regulations involving the rural 
special commercial insurance. Although the basic principle was agreed among the 
associated ministries, insurance regulators did not agree to set up such an agency 
closely linked with government; MOF did not want to have any involvement in the 
policy framework design and was reluctant to propose other alternatives. Therefore, 
after 1999, the local pension schemes were again in a state of stagnation (Leisering 
et al., 2002).  
In the new scheme development process, the institutional design problem also 
affected the achievement of the policy objective. According to the evidence from a 
survey in the model provinces (Hubei, Chengdu, Hebei, Jiangsu), the incentive 
measures only played a partial role in practice (Zhang and Ma, 2012; Gao, 2012; 
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Yang and Zhang, 2012; Zhang and Jin, 2012). The universal flat-rate pension benefit 
design attracted farmers aged 45 and above. The threshold of fifteen years 
contributions for entitlement encouraged the age group who was relatively close to 
retirement. In comparison, the younger population did not have any incentives to 
join the new scheme (Zhang and Zhang, 2012). It was set that an individual could 
choose from five contribution benchmarks: 100, 200, 300, 400 or 500 RMB annually, 
and the benefits level was linked to the accumulated funds (State Council, 2009a). 
The more each person contributes, the more he/she will receive on retirement. It 
seemed likely that the policy design would generate incentives to attract rural 
residents to contribute more to their funds, but the empirical and anecdotal evidence 
shows that young farmers were reluctant to participate, and that the participants 
preferred the lowest contribution standard. In addition, the young age group (below 
45) was worried about the long-term certainty and stability of the pension scheme, 
and this concern resulted in less enthusiasm for participation (Zhang and Jin, 2012). 
Some studies have found that the low participation rate among younger people 
resulted from the low return rate of individual accounts which was at the deposit 
interest rate of that year. Also, younger individuals would like to invest their money 
in other ways to generate greater returns. The overall low benefits level of this 
scheme might not attract the younger generation that thinks less about old age life 
and prefers to invest its savings in other ways (such as housing, stocks and shares) 
than in the pension scheme (Shen and Williamson, 2010); the designed benefits level 
was relatively low, and survey participants responded that the benefits could not 
cover their basic living expenses. Finally, the local financial subsidies as an incentive 
and compensation for the low-income groups were not implemented very well, 
which means that this incentive measure has not been realised in some poor localities 
(Yang and Zhang, 2012). Therefore, the new scheme design (benefits level, incentive 
measures) shaped the interest and perception of farmers over whether they should 
join or not. Also, the dependence on local financial resources in the design did not 
consider the various development levels across localities, and the conflict between 
the objective of expansion and the limited capacities is a dilemma for further 
development (Zhang and Zhang, 2012; Yang and Zhang, 2012; Zhang and Jin, 2012; 
Zhang 2009c).    
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Apart from institutional design, the decentralized administrative system generates 
possibilities for the localities to pursue their own interests and this might redirect the 
realisation of the policy objective. In the old scheme's development stage, the 
mismanagement problem in implementing it further deteriorated the scheme and 
undermined its sustainability. The old rural pension scheme and the civil affairs 
bureaucrats as the agent in charge of the administration had to draw money from the 
pension fund for their administration fees, at the rate of 3% of the fund, to support 
the day-to-day operation (MOCA, 1992a). In order to collect enough administration 
fees, the local bureaucracies were motivated to recruit more farmers into the scheme 
and expand the contribution base. With this administrative intervention, the 
originally designed voluntary scheme became compulsory in some areas (Wan, 
2002). For instance, in some less-developed regions in Hunan province, the rural 
pension scheme implementation became a social movement: the government 
promulgated and allocated the task of fund collection to lower-level governments, 
and the grassroots officers also invented many measures to attract farmers to 
participate in the system (Chang and He, 2006). For example, in their promotional 
campaigns, many localities claimed that the scheme would secure the basic living 
standards even though there was no commitment to this from central policy. Some 
local civil affairs authorities even tried to link participation in the pension scheme 
with their marriage registration. In this sense, the implementation of the rural 
pension scheme at the level of grassroots government changed to competing for 
farmers’ capital (Chang and He, 2006). The absence of public financial support for 
the system administration therefore resulted in mismanagement. In addition, the 
1998 government administrative reform changed the management body of the rural 
scheme, and the social insurance agencies at the local level were reluctant to deal 
with the legacies from the civil affair bureaus. In some developed regions, the local 
government has stronger financial capacity to support overall transfer worked 
smoothly and the subsequent operation went well. In some inner and western regions, 
rural pension schemes in most localities have been more or less at a standstill. With 
little fiscal input, many local executive agencies have to use some of the 
accumulated pension funds to maintain their internal administration. In some 
less-developed regions, they have refunded all the money in the individual accounts 
to farmers and cancelled the rural pension scheme.  
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In the development of new scheme, a similar problem also exists. The policy design 
required the local governments to make matching contributions to subsidize the 
individual accounts. On the one hand, this was an incentive measure to attract 
farmers; on the other hand, the contribution subsidies for the vulnerable groups 
(dibao recipients) could reduce their burdens and improve equal access to the new 
scheme (State Council, 2009a). The local governments' public subsidy, or public 
spending in essence, could stimulate the farmers to participate in the new rural 
pension scheme and boost their confidence in the new policy (Tian and Ding, 2011). 
However, given the condition of unbalanced social-economic development in 
different regions, the inner and west regions have limited financial capacity to 
support the new rural pension scheme. The provinces with bigger rural populations 
are less-developed regions too, so the demands for huge financial subsidies and their 
limited capacities create a dilemma in implementation. Therefore, in order to 
maintain the expansion of the new rural system to less-developed regions, it is 
essential to reconstruct the financial responsibility between central and local 
governments, not only for providing more central support for the flat-rate pension 
benefits, but also for providing matching contributions in the individual accounts. 
The institutional constraints for the unintended consequence  
In the development of the old scheme, the limited administrative capacities and 
mismanagement problems not only derived from the opening of the institutional 
structure, but also from the institutional constraints. The political institution did not 
empower the farmers to mobilise their welfare demands and the top-down social 
mobilisation measures for the new institution building provided limited possibilities 
for the rural residents to affect the formation and implementation of the pension 
insurance model. In addition, unlike the long-term exploration of and 
experimentation with welfare reform in the urban sector, the rural reform was not 
urged by the vested welfare interest. In the SOE welfare system, the urban workers 
had an impact on the model design and adjustment; while in the rural sector pension 
programme as an innovative institutional design; there were no welfare legacies or 
vested interests among farmers. In comparison with their urban counterparts who had 
been entitled to welfare benefits before transition and had a vested interest in the old 
system and greater lobbying power to press both the central and the local 
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governments to provide and deliver new welfare provision, the rural populations 
have less lobbying power to affect decision-making. Similarly, rural populations 
have less weight to press the local governments to follow the central policy 
objectives or to provide an increased welfare service. Therefore, when the local 
authorities redirect policy implementation or distort the original objective (from a 
voluntary to a mandatory scheme, by mismanagement of the pension fund, or by 
closing the programme unilaterally, for example), the rural residents have fewer 
opportunities or rights to resist the failure of old scheme. The political institution and 
welfare institution constraints determined that the farmers as the crucial actors could 
not impact or reverse the mismanagement of the old scheme.  
The legacies from the old scheme affected the expansion of the new scheme. 
According to various research surveys and reports (Feng, 2010; Feng Tieying, 2010; 
Zhang, 2010a; Zhang, 2010b), those approaching the age of 60 were most likely to 
enrol in the scheme because they could receive the basic public pension benefits 
when they reach 60 regardless of their contribution record; and those near the age of 
45 have tended to have had a ‘wait and see’ attitude toward the new policy. They are 
doubtful about the long-term development of the new rural pension scheme. The lack 
of public confidence and trust over the new policy is another reason which prevents 
residents from joining it. Reviewing the rural pension reform process, especially the 
old scheme and its failure, it is easy to tell that rural policy has fluctuated according 
to changes in bureaucratic ideas and political will. The rural scheme has jumped on 
and off the policy agenda over the past decades. This unstable process has highly 
damaged public trust and confidence in this policy (Chang and He, 2006; Tian and 
Ding, 2011). In addition, the idea of family and land supporting life for the elderly as 
traditional value legacies still has a vast impact on the old conservative generations. 
The perception of welfare and social insurance is not taken for granted among rural 
populations as it is by their urban counterparts, and the lack of awareness of social 
rights and a lesser desire for a public service make the rural pension policy not easily 
acceptable for some rural residents. There is a concept that family and children 
caring for the elderly should be the right way and that the government has no 
obligation to provide a service except for caring for those who do not have family 
members (Daily, 2008). Also, the absence of easily understood and transparent 
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communication of policy to the general public is another reason affecting rural 
public opinion. The use of a top-down political campaign to add a new institution 
constrains the implementation of it as well. There were no education programmes or 
promotional campaigns when the new scheme was introduced at the local level, so 
the general public could not be actively mobilized to follow the policy (Zhong and Li, 
2012). The institutional legacies and constraints combined together led to 
implementation problems.  
Therefore, compared with the urban reform which was actively demanded by the 
urban workers in the transitional social economic context, the rural scheme 
initiatives and reform mainly derived from an active political intention, promoted by 
the central leadership and implemented by local authorities, which left limited space 
for rural residents to have any impact on the policy formation. These top-down 
active policy changes without any policy pressure from farmers may be subjected to 
the passive attitudes of the policy recipients at local levels, and the legacies of failure 
of past policies, as well as traditional idea legacies combined with the institutional 
structural constraints, affect public opinion and participation behaviour. 
8.6 Conclusions  
Following the conceptualization of dependent variables and independent variable 
effect hypothesis which we generated in Chapter 4 and 5, we provide here an 
institutional analysis of the rural case to reveal the development path and its 
dynamics. Again, we used the combined qualitative and quantitative evidences to 
analyse the direction and scope of change as well as the impact of change drivers. 
8.6.1 Dependent variables: direction and extent  
Based on the qualitative evidence (mainly policy documents) and the coding 
framework, we argue that the reform effort since the 1980s represents a systemic 
welfare expansion. The rural pension scheme was first proposed by the government. 
The rural welfare protection in the PRC was provided by the family and kinship with 
minimal collective subsidies for the vulnerable groups (the 'five guarantees' system). 
The old rural pension scheme proposed by the government reflected the state's will 
to build institutional welfare protection for rural residents for the first time.The 
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policy proposals were discussed among bureaucratic actors and piloted at the local 
level. Sets of formal regulations which were issued in the 1990s in order to 
administer and develop the rural pension scheme reflect the commitment to 
expanding the welfare system essentially by drawing in more people. However, the 
scheme was based on voluntary participation without state funding support, the 
coverage was selective based on the farmers’ contribution capacities. In this regard, 
we argue that the old rural scheme development as the selective expansion from 
1980s to 1998. 
Accordingly, the quantitative evidence including coverage rate and replacement rate 
(see figure 8.4.1 and table 8.4.1) also shows that the generosity index increased from 
1994 and reached a peak in 1998 (see Figure 8.6.1 below). Indeed, the direction of 
expansion was very explicit after the formal policy regulation was issued. However, 
the old rural scheme was suspended in 1998 and the quantitative evidence also 
shows a dramatic slump in numbers of participants accordingly. Starting 1998, the 
qualitative and quantitative evidence combined clearly suggest that the rural pension 
scheme moved in the direction of programmatic retrenchment. This retrenchment 
halted following another round of pilots for a rural pension scheme in 2003, which 
stabilised the generosity. During this period, the scheme was carried out on the pilot 
basis, and the local experiences provided the lessons for the mandating of new 
schemes, and we suggest the rural scheme underwent experimental period. Finally, 
the new rural pension scheme was proposed in 2009 with the introduction of basic 
pension subsidies from government (central and local), which reflected the 
fundamental change compared with the previous one. This again reflects a systemic 
shift from the old system, while it also indicates a more generous welfare provision 
for rural residents. 
 In sum, we can conclude the development path and direction as follows: the old 
rural scheme's introduction and in middle 1980s suggested a selective welfare 
expansion compared with the traditional family support for old age, and the 
development in most of the 1990s underwent rapid expansion with increasing 
generosity levels. The stagnation period (1998-2002) retrenched the old scheme 
seriously with a rapid decline of institutional generosity, although there was no 
change in programme parameters or profiles in this stage. The formation of the new 
 231 
 
rural scheme since 2003 was in a experimental period and the local pilot projects 
provided the policy-making sources for the forming of new scheme. These new pilot 
projects carried out in local level to different degree brought in the government fund 
support, and in this sense, the reform direction went towards expansion with more 
generous design comparing with the old scheme. The final mandating in 2009 
replaced the old scheme, and the programme's features also show that the new 
scheme is a systematic shift from the old one with more generous provision. 
 
Table 8.6.1 The characteristics of reform from mid-1986 to 2009 
 
Time Reform Direction Reform Extent 
Mid 1980s-1998 Expansion  Selective 
1998-2002 Retrenchment Programmatic  
 2003-2009 Expansion Experimental 
2009-now Expansion Systemic 
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Figure 8.6.1: Generosity index from (1994- 2010) 
 
Source: The bulletin of civil affair development (MOCA, 1994-1997); The bulletin of labour and social security development (MOLSS, 
1998-2007); The bulletin of human resources and social security (MOHRSS, 2008-2010); China human resources and social security 
yearbook (MHRSS, 2011b); The Bulletin of the National Economic and Social Development (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 
1994-1996) 
8.6.2 Independent variables and causal effects  
Impact of political institution  
Just as in the urban sector, the Chinese political system with its strong executive and 
less powerful veto players and veto points provided the possibility for generating far 
reaching change in the rural sector. What is more, the empirical evidence also shows 
that the policy change process was unstable and without a clear blueprint before the 
new scheme initiatives in 2000s were introduced. The dismantling of the old rural 
scheme and its replacement by the new one in the past three decades suggests a 
fluctuating development path. Just as it happened in the urban sector, the top-level 
policy change was easy to initiate because of the absence of powerful veto players 
and veto points. Yet, what is different from the urban case is what happened at the 
ground level. Rather than acting de facto veto players, the local governments used 
the opportunities offered by decentralization to obstruct the development of the rural 
scheme, promoting it as a campaign by different measures. This brought about an 
expansion of the old rural scheme alongside some unintended consequences, such as 
the blind determination to expand coverage and impeding the fiscal sustainability of 
the old scheme. In addition, in the development period of the new scheme in 2000s, 
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the local governments were more cautious about the pace of development. With the 
more generous new scheme, it was supposed to be easy to reach universal coverage, 
but the empirical evidence does not confirm this and the generosity index remained 
at the same level from 2003 to 2009. Since the political institutions alone cannot 
explain this contradictory performance, we shall turn to the pension institution 
design for an explanation.  
Impact of the pension institution  
The absence of an institutionalised public pension for rural residents meant that the 
old scheme could be established and developed easily. The rapid expansion from 
1992 to 1998 on the one hand can be explained by the absence of any impact from 
legacies, while on the other hand it also conforms with the welfare expansion 
proposition that it is easier than retrenchment – i.e. the politics of blame avoidance. 
In addition, the old scheme was a voluntary funded individual account, which was 
financed mainly by the contributors while the local management authority received 
the administration fees from the fund. This provided the local authorities with the 
incentive to promote the expansion of the old scheme. Thus, the absence of financial 
responsibilities and the possibility of gaining increased fees by expanding the 
contribution base were the crucial incentives for the local governments to develop 
the old scheme. However, the replacement of the old rural scheme with the new one 
was neither quick nor easy. On the one hand, we argue that the new design involved 
local financing for the programme, which affected the extension of the programme in 
less-developed areas with limited fiscal capacities. The higher the number of 
participants, the greater the financial burden for the local government, and the 
decentralized administration also allowed sub-national implementation at its own 
pace, which consequentially impeded the universal coverage. In addition, we argue 
that the legacies from the old scheme, such as the lack of belief in the public 
provision, also affected attitudes to participation, particularly for the middle-aged 
generation, as the evidence shows ( see above: Change and He, 2006, Tian and Ding, 
2011). Finally, the process of policy reform in China has followed a gradual 
paradigm, starting from sub-national piloting and accumulating experiences and 
lessons, and then forming the policy design at the national level. The local 
experiments were useful for accommodating the diversity of conditions at the 
 234 
 
sub-national level; however, it also brought a challenge for the further 
nationalization programme and the nationwide integration of the scheme as the 
future project proposed. 
Impact of idea and context 
Contrary to the urban sector reform that more impacted by the ideas and paradigm 
promoted by the WB, the change in the rural pension schemes more involved more 
conflict of ideas between bureaucratic actors. This idea conflict between state 
provisions, commercial insurance or family support for the elderly in the rural sector 
was the crucial factors impacting the development path.  The initiation and 
development of the old rural scheme were more dependent on promotion by the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs as the old programme only involved state regulation rather 
than state financing. The idea of commercial insurance and family support 
arrangements for retired rural residents took the upper hand during the stagnation 
stage since 1997, which was also caused by the macro context during this point in 
time. The insurance industry crisis brought about by the East Asian financial crisis 
and the low financial sustainability of the old scheme resulted in the stagnation of 
old scheme as well as the retrenchment in the following years with falling 
participation. The Hu-Wen administration with its development strategy emphasised 
the balanced development between the urban and rural sectors, and social security 
for the rural sector was put on the government agenda. The local pilot experiences in 
2003 and the nationalized policy design in 2009 mandating the new rural pension 
scheme followed the idea of more state intervention for the support of retired rural 
residents. Not only the policy regulation but also the input of financial resources 
from the government demonstrated its strong political will to build institutionalised 
welfare provision in the rural sector. Therefore, the idea conflicts between the 
political actors and their bargaining determined the unstable development of the old 
scheme. The Hu-Wen administration's idea shift from efficiency to equity 
consolidated the new rural pension development in recent decades.   
Impact of interest groups 
Similar to the urban sector, the absence of organized interest groups (pensioners, 
rural residents) involved in the pension policy-making facilitated the policy change 
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easier. In addition, in the old scheme development stage, the relative lack of unity of 
rural residents determined their reduced power for affecting policy change or 
stagnation. When the reform turned towards retrenchment, the rural residents and the 
pensioners had no channel to oppose the change. In the new programme, there is 
some evidence for the generational conflicts over whether or not to join the new 
scheme were seen in the empirical evidences. The family-bond design of the new 
programme connects the young generation with the middle-aged generation who is 
closer to retirement, which incentivised the promotion of the extension of coverage. 
In practice, however, the young generation had less incentive to take up the scheme 
because of the low benefit level and low investment returns, while the middle-aged 
generation was more concerned about the feasibility of payments and more inclined 
to join the scheme. These conflicting attitudes towards the new programme also 
caused problems in implementation. 
8.6.3 Change pattern 
Adopting the historical institutionalist and gradual change theory, we can delineate 
the model type of institutional change in the rural sector. We argue that the rural 
pension institution underwent a displacement pattern. To remind ourselves 
displacement represents the removal of existing rules and the introduction of new 
rules, and this kind of change can happen abruptly or slowly (Streeck and Thelen, 
2005). More gradual replacement occurs when a new institution competes with an 
older one rather than supplementing it (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). The new 
institution in this case was introduced by the actors who were the losers in the old 
institution, and the old supporters could not prevent the new rule from coming in, so 
the gradual replacement happened. More precisely, the new administration Hu-Wen 
administration as the new actors brought in the new design for the rural sector, and 
the supporters or the vested interests in the old scheme (the previous participants) 
had no capacity to block the new rules. In addition, the retrenchment and the 
dismantling of the old programme under the previous government administration 
further de-powered the supporters of the old system. In addition, the new rule in the 
direction of welfare expansion was more welcome and more acceptable than the old 
ones. The gradual replacement pattern in rural pension development took place with 
no explicit opposition. 
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Chapter 9: Discussion 
9.1 Research questions and findings  
9.1.1 Question 1:what pension policy change has happened from 1980s to 2010s?  
Pension policy change in China represents vigorous efforts to shift from the state 
financed SOE welfare system to the social insurance pension model in the urban 
areas and to create a state-regulated individual account pension scheme in the rural 
areas in the 1980s. The 1980s witnessed the dismantlement of the socialist welfare 
system as part of the de-regulation of the Chinese economy and society. Both in the 
urban and the rural sectors, the debates and experiments regarding which pension 
provision model would be most appropriate for China in the market economy 
context were going on over the course of the entire 1990s. Policy learning from other 
countries (such as Singapore and Latin American countries), the diffusion of 
international ideas, and the various local pilot projects firstly started from different 
models (DB social insurance model, funded individual accounts, and so on) and was 
finally consolidated as the partial DC (PDC) social insurance model in 1997 under 
the support and advice of the World Bank. In the rural sector, a voluntary personal 
savings account model regulated by the government was piloted and quickly 
expanded during the 1990s and then halted in 1998. 
 In the 2000s, the partial DC pension insurance was improved by issuing more 
regulations to address the implementation issue and investing more central financial 
resources for the transition costs. In addition, the previous state sector 
worker-targeted system was gradually extended to other labour groups, including 
workers in the private sector, the self-employed, flexible workers and other atypical 
workers. Finally, apart from the basic pension pillar development, efforts to set up a 
multi-pillar pension system were also observed: establishing the corporate pension 
scheme and social pension scheme pilots at the local level.  Unlike perfecting the 
established system in urban areas, the rural sector underwent another round of new 
rural pension pilots and experiments to replace the old system.  In 2009, the State 
Council consolidated the new rural pension model and the new scheme differed from 
the old by the substantial public financial support from both central and local 
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government.  This injection of public spending was an innovation and reversed the 
urban-biased trend in welfare service provision. Comparing the size of the benefits, 
and the development level of the new pension scheme with its urban counterpart, the 
standard for the rural population was substantively low; however, the objective of 
building an institutionalized pension scheme for the rural population, the principle of 
universal coverage, and the provision of support from public finances all represent a 
dramatic policy shift in the development of a rural welfare system. Therefore, if we 
observe the pension policy change in this decade, the greater coverage, increased 
support from public finances, and the strong political will to achieve institutionalized 
pension provision for both rural and urban populations indicate a considerable 
welfare expansion. 
Universal coverage of the pension system was being formed, and different segments 
of the population were covered by different schemes in the basic pension pillar. 
However, as for the integrated national pension scheme, it still has a long way to go 
to achieve universality. Currently, the segmentation of the urban and rural systems is 
striking. The policy designs, parameters, principles and objectives are quite different 
and it is hard to expect a harmonisation of the urban and rural pension systems in the 
near future. In addition, even within the separate urban and rural sectors, the 
divisions of the basic pension are also obvious. The schemes for urban formal 
workers, informal workers and urban residents, as well as workers in the public 
sector, are quite diverse in terms of system design, benefits level and so on. Apart 
from the formal policy with its specific target, there are some omissions in the 
universal coverage; the groups who are not capable of contributing to the scheme are 
excluded from the basic pension system. Within the rural sector, the national rural 
scheme as a unified design for the rural population is clearer than its urban 
counterpart in terms of system design; however, its voluntary nature also brings 
about a difference between insiders and outsiders – contributors and non-contributors. 
The empirical evidence shows that the outsiders are usually the vulnerable groups 
who are in need of a pension but cannot afford the contributions. Therefore, even 
though the basic pension schemes provide universal coverage for the urban and rural 
citizens based on their status, the empirical universal coverage, particularly including 
the low-income vulnerable groups, is a crucial issue to be sorted in the future. In 
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addition, universal coverage does not mean that a national basic pension system is 
forming. The objectives of integration and harmonization of the rural and urban 
schemes, as well as the segmented systems within the urban sector as the reform 
direction proposed by government, are difficult to achieve in the short term. The 
integration and harmonization measures, procedures and parameter adjustments will 
be the questions to be answered in the future. 
9.1.2 Question 2: has the pension institution undergo change or not, to what extent 
and in which way? 
After reviewing the pension policy change over the past decades, the second set of 
questions seeks to trace the pension reform trajectory at the institutional level. In 
general, pension reform started from the dismantlement of the old system and its 
replacement with a new one. The pension insurance system which replaced the old 
scheme was featured by the retrenchment from the 1980s to the 1990s. In the 
advanced economies in the West, welfare retrenchment usually generated a reduction 
in the generosity of benefits, the coverage or the quality of social programmes since 
the 1970s (Bonoli, 2000a). In China’s case, from the 1980s to the 1990s, pension 
reform also suggests a degree of retrenchment.  During this time period, the state 
retreated from previous welfare commitments by establishing new scheme while 
passing responsibilities to the individual and society as a whole.  
First, the reform during this time was aimed at reducing the number of beneficiaries 
by unemployment and lay-off measures. The SOE workers who were entitled to 
pension benefits under the old system were dropped from the system during the 
social transition (Cai, 2002). The decreasing numbers of SOE workers meant a 
decreasing welfare burden for the state. Lay-offs, with or without compensation, and 
early retirement packages were adopted to reduce the SOE welfare burden and the 
number of potential beneficiaries. Second, the formation of a new pension insurance 
model changed the financial mechanism with the state retreating from the principal 
financial responsibilities. The employer and employee joint contribution method 
replacing state financing represents another aspect of retrenchment. The introduction 
of individual contributions and pooling at the local level gradually shifted the 
responsibility for pension provision from the state to the employer and the individual, 
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and the government was responsible for regulation and administration. The 
formation of the pension insurance model out of the SOE welfare model on the one 
hand replaced the welfare legacies, but on the other hand it coincided with the 
demographic aging and PAYG crisis in the global context. Third, consolidating the 
urban worker pension scheme in 1997 also unified the system parameters and design. 
The individual contribution rate was increased from 4% of payroll gradually to 8% 
and the employer contribution rate was capped at 20% of payroll. Compared with the 
previous parameters, the contribution rates for employers and employees were raised. 
This constituted a direct retrenchment strategy with the aim of containing 
expenditure. Another measure in this regulation was that the benefit level was 
decreased, with the replacement rate falling from 80% to 60%. Forth, entering the 
first half of 2000s, there was continual adjustment of the basic pension benefits for 
urban workers according to economic growth and wage levels, pre-funding of the 
individual accounts with central and local financial subsidies, and the setting up of a 
social security reserve fund as the last resort for a payment crisis, as well as specific 
measures issued to deal with implementation problem in scaling-up the pooling level 
and improving the portability of pension benefits. All these parametric adjustments 
were intended to solve the problems which had occurred in the previous stage and 
improve and confirm the PDC design.  Finally, in the second half of 2000s, the 
expanding of coverage and adoption of the new pension scheme for urban residents 
incurred considerable amounts of additional central public spending. The multi-pillar 
pension model was being formed in this period – albeit with coverage of only a small 
fraction of the population. The supplementary pillar was set up as a voluntary 
scheme on top of the basic pillar targeting the insured already in the basic pension 
pillar. In addition, the non-contributory senior citizen's allowance as a miniature 
social pension was developed at the sub-national level from local public funds. The 
multi-pillar pension model was introduced at the top level, but its development (in an 
empirical sense) still has a long way to go. In sum, the reform efforts and direction 
during this time period were a reversal of the retrenchment by expanding access to 
the pension scheme and increasing public financial inputs. 
In rural areas, the old pension scheme for the rural population was regulated by the 
state without providing further financial support. As the first formal welfare 
 241 
 
provision for the rural residents, it indicates a systemic shift towards more 
institutionalized pension provision.  With the development of old rural scheme and 
more insured were covered from 1992 to 1998. Our institutional analysis concluded 
that the rural areas underwent pension expansion from in the 1990s until 1998. The 
stagnation since 1998 not only reflect the retreat of state in provision but also the 
declines of generosity level, both the qualitative and quantitative evidences 
demonstrated the rural pension welfare retrenchment from 1998.  The new pilots 
projects started from 2003 resumed the institutional provision for rural elderly, the 
quantitative data also shows the halt of generosity level decline and gradually 
increased since the new rural pension scheme confirmed in 2009. Given the design 
features and the more coverage witnessed, we concluded that the rural sector 
underwent a gradual expansion since 2003.    
Therefore, from an overview of pension development in both the urban and rural 
sectors, we find that the retrenchment was evident from 1980s to 1990s in urban 
sectors while the rural experienced expansion with increasing number of participants. 
Even though within the same context of liberalized China, the arguments of the 
different development paths are not odd.  Because we do the analysis within the 
separate sectors, and comparison over the crucial time points are still within the same 
sectors. The different starting point of pension provision will lead us into different 
judgments of change directions and feature.  However, if we putting these two 
sectors together, and overviewing the rationale of reform initiatives behind them, the 
state retreatment from financing was evident in both sectors. The PDC model in 
urban and voluntary individual accounts in rural both demonstrate the constrained 
state involvement of financial support. The scenario after the mid-2000s were 
different from the previous and we witnessed the pension expanding trend in both 
sectors comparing with their last stage. More state financial input, policy regulation 
increasing generosity was observed in qualitative and quantitative evidences in the 
latter half of 2000s. The only difference resides that urban sector was more 
complicated with public provision expanding and greater privatization at the same 
time.  
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9.1.3 Question 3: what factors bring about the change in policy and institutional 
level? 
Liberal ideas, economic openness, demographic aging  
The second leadership generation of the PRC under Deng Xiaoping began the liberal 
reform of the economic sector and the third generation lead by Jiang Zemin further 
developed the liberal reform by privatising the economy and welfare provision. The 
conservative idea holders in the political elites initiated economic openness through 
privatisation, marketization and trade openness. This openness on the one hand 
brought market competition from the private sector and the dismantling of 
communal economies, while on the other hand it exposed the state-owned economy 
to foreign capital and integration with the global market. The emerging private sector 
and the growth of foreign capital flowing into China greatly reduced the competitive 
and financial capacities of SOEs. Risk pooling was introduced to share the pension 
payment burdens of different-sized SOEs in order to force the SOEs with a young 
age structure to subsidise those with older employees.  
Labour market reform was another aspect of the new economic openness, with the 
introduction of contract workers and the gradually replacement of the 
life-employment guarantee in the socialist system. As a response to these new 
welfare needs, the individual account funded by individual contributions was 
introduced and this would be used to pay future benefits rather than state budgets 
continuing to pay them. These two measures were adopted in the 1980s as problem 
responses to the initial economic openness but did not change the socialist welfare 
system in essence. In the 1990s, with the assistance of international organizations, 
the consideration of demographic aging, and the development of urbanisation under 
the liberal economy process, pension reform was aimed at creating basic pension 
systems in the market economy context and replacing the old systems. 
In the urban sector, by separating pension provision from the SOE corporate system 
and introducing employer/employee contributions for the pension funding with the 
state as the last resort, the state gradually retreated from pension provision 
responsibilities. The administration and financial responsibilities were delegated to 
employers, employees and sub-national governments. In rural areas, the collapse of 
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the collective economy, and the undermining of family support for the elderly in the 
urbanization process pushed the development of rural pension pilots. However, the 
individual account design without state or collective economy support could not 
mitigate the effect of dismantling collective and family support.  
Idea change, new social risks, and policy legacies  
First, the fourth leadership generation under Hu-Wen directed China’s development 
in the 2000s (2003-2011); this generation was distinguished from its predecessors by 
adopting the scientific development concept16 and emphasizing the coordination of 
social and economic development in order to reverse the pro-economy, 
pro-efficiency trend of the previous decades and solve the problems which had 
occurred in the previous stage. The ideas of ‘building a harmonious society’, 
alleviating social inequality, and increasing the protection of vulnerable groups were 
the crucial welfare development efforts at this stage. In addition, the problems which 
had occurred in the previous stage of China's economic transition also urged the 
policy makers to design an appropriate response. This new social and economic 
context provided an enabling environment for reform.  
Second, the economic reforms of the recent decades on the hand increased household 
incomes and decreased the proportion of the population living in poverty; on the 
other hand they increased the income gap between urban and rural dwellers across 
different regions and sectors. The unequal access to welfare provision because of the 
constraints of institutional design aggravated social inequality. Even for the 
population entitled to welfare benefits including pensions, the benefits inequality 
among workers in different sectors was obvious. The decreasing replacement rate of 
the basic pension in 1990s also raised concerns about the adequacy of benefits. 
Overall, the inequality and inadequacy were other drivers of reform in this period. 
Increasing the urban workers' pensions in line with wage increases, building the 
second pension pillar and a series of social pension experiments were all initiatives 
responding to these issues.  In addition, with the liberalisation and deregulation of 
                                                
16 It is one of the guiding social economic principle of CPC. It incorporates scientific socialism, sustainable 
development, social welfare, a humanistic society increased democracy and ultimately building the harmonious 
society  
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the labour market, various types of employment began to emerge: migrant workers, 
flexible workers, part-time workers, self-employment and so on. The emergence of 
new risk groups in the labour market also called for the introduction of risk 
prevention (including pensions) for them. How to reform the welfare system to adapt 
to these social and economic changes and to include the new groups into the pension 
system required crucial initiatives in this stage. Extending coverage to private sector 
and atypical workers was the major reform effort accordingly. Finally, the economic 
crisis which started in 2008 resulted in GDP falling below the pre-crisis, so how to 
achieve recovery and make appropriate responses to mitigate the impact of the crisis 
were also immediate drivers to the issuing of pension reform regulations. The 
continuing economic growth seen in this decade provided sound financial support for 
pension reform through publicly-financed subsidies for matched contribution scheme 
for the new rural scheme with that for urban residents. The resume of rural pension 
scheme and more state finance and subsidizes and institutionalized pension design as 
the whole represent the welfare expanding package within the future development 
strategy in post crisis. 
Third, the policy legacies and effects in the transition time, such as fragmentation 
occurred from the trial process and pilot projects urged the reform efforts in early 
2000s to solve the implement issue.  Because this fragmentation delivered little risk 
pooling and had limited redistributive effect. The fragmentation also impeded labour 
mobility across different geographic areas of pooling.  In addition, the 
mismanagement of pension insurance at the local level (the withdrawal of individual 
account funds) engendered the future pay crisis. All these constraints on the pension 
reform legacies were another trigger for new rounds of reform such as re-centralizing 
the pre-funding of individual accounts and pension pooling levels, providing social 
security reserve funds, and regulating the transfer and portability of pensions.  
9.1.4 Question 4: how the casual factors interact with each other and push the 
pension institution evolve over the last decades? 
Beyond identifying the macro-level causal factors or drivers of pension institution 
evolution in China, how it took place and the interactive manner at the institutional 
(meso) level was another set of research questions. To this end, this study adopted a 
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historical institutionalist and incrementalist conceptual framework to identify the 
causal mechanisms behind the pension policy change trajectory in China, in 
particular, the interactions of context, institution, and actors which allowed or 
obstructed changes and the various actors' strategies for approving or blocking 
change. 
Reviewing the evolution of pension provision in China, we found that the general 
strategies which the actors adopted were replacement, layering, drift and conversion, 
strategies which have been described in detail elsewhere in this thesis. 'Replacement' 
means the removal of existing rules and the introduction of new ones; 'layering' 
refers to the introduction of new rules on top of or alongside the existing ones, 'drift' 
denotes the changed impact of existing rules due to change(s) in the environment, 
and 'conversion' represents the changed enactment of existing rules because of 
strategic redeployment (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). In particular, we argue that the 
rural sector is examined as the gradual institutional replacement, and the new scheme 
completely replaced the old one. It happened on the one hand because of local 
government conversion and erodes the old scheme in the end; on the other hand the 
top level actors adopted the replacement strategy to start the new scheme.  The 
urban sector scenario is more complex.  The forming of this basic pension 
insurance model underwent a continuous policy revision, adjustment and policy 
layering process. The parametric reforms regarding the system design and parameter 
set after 1997, and the improvement in practical procedures did not change the 
existing institution but added more policy regulation to address the problems in 
implementation. The systemic reforms which included adding more pillars on top of 
the basic pillar, as well as more schemes for the new risk groups, are usually 
assumed to be typical institutional layering. Here it is argued that the top policy 
actors, the bureaucratic actors and CCP elites, directed the pension institution 
transformation through policy layering strategies which included adding new 
schemes but also adding more rules to the existing scheme and revise and adjust 
the design of policy parameter. And the implementation problems in 1990s and 
early 2000s emerged because of local authority conversion and private interest 
drift.  
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To be specific, the reform in urban sector was initiated and deliberated on by these 
top-level actors with limited consultation with other stakeholders such as social 
partners and local authorities. As a consequence, the implementation suffered the 
risk of non-compliance or reinterpretation. In this case, sub-national interests and 
private interests presented the main barriers to implementation. First, during the 
retrenchment stage, the challenge was the local government conversion. The 
decentralization and privatization process empowered local governments and 
inspired their motivation to redirect the central policy. Local authorities had more 
discretion over specific design and fund administration. The openings in the political 
institution and the newly-targeted welfare institution (pensions) created spaces and 
opportunities for reinterpreting the central policy and possibly re-shaping the original 
objective. For instance, the challenges of pre-funding individual accounts, advancing 
the social pooling level, and integrating the public pension scheme into the 
provincial level all encountered sub-national opposition to various degrees. The 
notional individual account practice and provincial reserve funds were innovations 
added at the local levels according to their own local interpretation. Those pension 
reform measures which facilitated local economic development were adopted and 
implemented, but initiatives which might erode local financial resources or local 
benefit levels were re-directed by the local authorities through conversion or 
non-compliance. In the first half of 2000s the call for the pre-funding of individual 
accounts from central funds was directed to notional individual accounts at the local 
level. Before the central injection of funds to support the change, some provinces 
could not achieve the goals set by the central government. In addition, the 
decentralized structure also constrained the nationalisation of pensions. Up-scaling 
fund management and risk pooling encountered extreme difficulties because the 
local authorities were worried about losing control of their funds or the possible 
cutback of benefits. In this sense, the policy layering in the early 2000s with the 
good intention of perfecting and improving pension provision did not proceed as 
smoothly as had been assumed. The policy feedback on retrenchment and 
decentralization also restrained the realization of the good intentions. 
 Second, the privatisation process in the 1980s changed the structure of risk groups. 
The decline in the numbers of state sector workers and the increase of the private 
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sector demanded a greater pension system response to the new risk groups. The 
retrenchment and development in the 1980s and 1990s were targeted at a crucial 
constituency, urban SOE workers. The reform initiatives in the 1990s were aimed at 
achieving equal access to and distribution of the pension system. However, the 
effects of equal access and equal redistribution by new rounds of policy layering also 
faced challenges of implementation. On the one hand, extending the basic pension to 
the private sector encountered private interest drift. Non-compliant behaviour and 
the high salary alternative replacing pension insurance contributions were the main 
strategies that private employers adopted to evade participation in public pension 
provision. The economic privatization process in 1990s fostered the vested private 
interest in the process, and the non-compliant behaviour of private sector, were the 
results of the reluctance to undertake risk sharing with SOEs as well as the 
consideration of labour costs. The pension reform in 1990s were targeted on the SOE 
workers and failed to response to the demand of private sector enterprise. The 
pension policy design neither resolved the incentive issue to motivate the private 
sector nor their reluctance of sharing pension deficit with SOE. On the one hand, the 
contradiction between the segregated economic structure and generalized pension 
design generated the non-compliance of private sector. The non response to the 
changed economic situation and new demand of emerging private sector caused the 
policy drift in the implement. On the other hand, the reform efforts failure to curb the 
non-compliance behaviour are another reason bring about the policy drift.  In 
addition, the extension of coverage to atypical workers in the private sectors also 
encountered difficulties. The non-compliant behaviour towards these groups on the 
one hand occurred because of limited administrative capacities to supervise, while on 
the other hand these new risk groups usually had limited financial capacities to 
contribute to the scheme. Therefore, the neglect of the private interest groups 
emerging in the post transition China as well as neglect of new risk groups feature 
resulted in the private interest drift in the pension expansion process. In addition, the 
private sector enterprises could not set up supplementary pension schemes if they did 
not participate in the basic pension, and this regulation also obstructed private 
business interests from joining the second pillar and constrained the development of 
private pensions. To summarise, the objective of equal access to public pensions and 
adequate benefits still encountered difficulties in practical terms. 
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9.1.5 Question 5: has the pension reform achieve the original objectives and what 
challenges are ahead in the future development?  
The contradiction between the dynamic labour market and pension 
fragmentation  
The rapid demographic and economic transformation, including aging, family 
structure change, urbanization, labour mobility and the formalization of the labour 
force, demanded that pension reform should respond to the pace of change. However, 
currently, the fragmented pension provision in both the horizontal and vertical levels 
has created a barrier to labour mobility across sectors and regions. The separate 
schemes for waged residents (urban enterprise workers) and non-waged residents 
(urban and rural resident schemes), the different schemes for workers in different 
sectors (enterprise, public sector, self-employed), and the fragmented financing and 
administration at city level rather than provincial and national level, are all impeding 
labour mobility across different sectors and provinces. A national pension 
framework which includes the portability of pension rights is needed to cope with 
the dynamic labour market. The portability of urban and rural rights will be essential 
in the context of increasing urbanization because it would strengthen the pension 
security of the growing migrant population. The portability of pension rights across 
regions would assure that individuals could make labour market decisions without 
worrying about the loss of benefits because of a change in location.  
The contradiction between fiscal capacities and participation  
First, from the state perspective, high transition costs need a high contribution rate to 
fund them. In China's urban scheme, the contribution rate of 28 per cent of coverage 
is relatively high compared with OECD countries. The high fiscal burden for 
employers is a disincentive to their take-up rate, and the regional differences in the 
fiscal burdens affect the economic competitiveness between regions, which further 
increases the inequality of development. Second, from the individual perspective, 
individuals' personal capacities do not allow them to contribute to scheme. For 
instance, the empirical evidence shows that the low-income groups or non-waged 
residents cannot afford the contributions and they also tend to need pension 
protection the most. The vulnerable groups such as low-income and marginalized 
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people cannot afford the contributions and are not eligible for the entitlements, 
which is the crucial obstacle to empirical universal coverage. Measures including 
subsidies and deductions for these groups are needed in future reforms. The 
contribution-based scheme excludes the most-needy element of the population with 
limited fiscal resources, and this further increases income inequality among the 
retired population. Therefore, to date, the pension system design has in some ways 
contributed to the divergence. 
The contradiction between the declining public pension and the less-developed 
supplementary scheme  
As we found in a previous chapter, the decline in public pension generosity in the 
urban sector required the provision of a supplementary pension. The promotion of 
occupational and personal pension schemes could improve old-age income 
protection. However, as the data show, the coverage of the enterprise annuity was 
quite low, and the institutional framework was only for enterprise workers. The 
second pillar was less developed in both policy design and the extent of coverage.  
The contradiction between good design and reverse choice in implementation  
First, governments and social insurance agencies attempted to expand pension 
coverage through the traditional social insurance model which relied on the 
imposition of mandating participation and payroll tax collection (Hinz, 2012). In 
China's case, legally mandating the coverage has only applied to formal sector 
workers in urban areas, while participation is not mandatory for the schemes for 
informal sector workers, residents without work, and rural residents. In addition, the 
scope of coverage largely relies on the legacy of the old system in which the state as 
the employer was responsible for pension provision, and the state retreat and labour 
market re-regulation caused an increase in the numbers of informal workers as well 
as a fall in the coverage rate. With a strong state will to promote pension 
development, closing the coverage gap has been the principal objective of pension 
reform in recent decades, and China has witnessed the development of institutions 
which formally provide a pension insurance scheme for different segments of the 
population. The addition of new schemes for the previously uncovered population 
has closed the institutional and coverage gap, and this has achieved universal access 
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to public pension provision in both the rural and the urban sectors. However, the 
newly-established schemes for urban residents and rural residents and the integration 
measures for atypical workers in urban areas are based on voluntary participation, 
which reduces the implementation effect.  
Third, the integration of various schemes in the public pension pillar is another 
challenge for China. The fragmentation of the public pension scheme based on 
urban/rural registration, occupation and employment status is the current scenario. 
The creation of a national public pension system is the long-term objective of 
pension reform (State Council, 2012). However, the segregation between public and 
private sector workers, formal and informal labour, and urban and rural populations 
cannot be solved in the short term (Wang, 2012). The mature schemes such as the 
public sector and urban workers’ pension systems, and the new scheme for the urban 
residents and rural residents are very different in terms of parameter design and 
system rules. The integration and harmonisation of these separate programmes poses 
a huge challenge for reform design and implementation, which suggests another 
round of interest and resource reconstruction. In addition, the full portability of 
acquired pension rights across professions, sectors and geographical areas for an 
increasingly mobile labour market is another concern in the integration reform. 
Currently, the portability of pension rights, measures and procedures for urban 
formal workers has been confirmed in State Council documents, and more measures 
will have to be issued after the design of pension integration has been settled.  
The non-compliant behaviour among employers and local governments is a 
significant challenge for the next step of the reform. Keeping records, supervision of 
employers, communicating policy to the public and introducing explicit evaluation 
and incentive measures for local implementers could enhance compliance with the 
implementation process. In addition, the adjustment of policy design to reshape the 
actors’ preferences and perceptions is another way of facilitating the achievement of 
the objective. 
The contradiction between pre-funding reform and the distributive 
consequence 
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Equal institutional access is one part of the story, but equality in the redistribution 
effect is another purpose for the future development of pension provision. For a long 
time there has been an unsolved income gap between the urban and rural sectors, and 
across professions, sectors and regions. This income disparity in distribution is not 
mitigated by plans for the redistribution of the public pension programme. The 
empirical evidence demonstrates that the preferential benefits for public sector 
workers, the urban population, and formal workers further strengthen the disparity in 
the outcomes. In addition, the benefit adequacy for disadvantaged groups is another 
issue, and the low benefits for atypical workers, unemployed residents and rural 
residents cannot cover old-age expenditure and just in fact increase the inequality. 
The next five-year blueprint proposes redistribution equality as the purpose for the 
next reform, and reversing the income inequality through a redistribution programme 
including public pensions is another challenge ahead (State Council, 2012).  
The contradiction between fiscal resource demand and bad performance  
The financial sustainability of pension funds is another issue to be fully addressed. 
Currently, the management of social insurance funds is undertaken at local level and 
these funds are only deposited in state-owned banks or used to purchase domestic 
state bonds, which puts pressure on the fund values declining in real terms. The 
diversification of investment profiles for the pension fund and maintaining or 
increasing the fund values for future payment are crucial for financial sustainability. 
Diversifying the investment portfolio and increasing investment returns at a rate 
higher than inflation are necessary to maintain the fund value. Currently, the State 
Council has approved Guangdong's proposal for diversifying the investment 
portfolios managed by NSSF, and more local funds or national measures should be 
adopted for other provinces. 
9.2 Research aim: bringing China into comparative welfare studies 
9.2.1 A comparison between the Chinese system and mature systems  
Dependent variable:  the change direction and extent 
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The pension systems of many western countries have been under budget pressure 
because of globalisation, aging populations, in the short term and financial 
sustainability in the long term. These pressures have stimulated many governments 
to put reform on the agenda. Pension retrenchment initiatives not only include 
cutting spending but also structural reforms which move a welfare state towards a 
more residual model or adopting a funded pillar to replace a PAYG system. 
Compared with the pension reform experiences in West and globally under these 
various pressures, there are two main differences in China’s case.  
Over viewing the pension development path from the quantitative and qualitative 
evidence suggests that China underwent retrenchment in the 1980s and entered a 
period of expansion in the early 2000s. Unlike Western countries undergoing welfare 
expansion first and then retrenchment, China's case is the reverse: retrenchment with 
state retreat in the 1980 and 1990s was followed by a shift to expansion with 
increased state intervention since mid- 2000s. Therefore, under the same global 
context, the different starting points and sequences of development map out different 
reform trajectories between China and the west. In addition, China's pension 
retrenchment was initially triggered by economic reform. The retrenchment in the 
1980s was a state retreat from public financing as well as decreasing the size of 
SOEs in the economy, which indirectly reduced public spending burdens. The 
dismantlement of the socialist pension system and the building of a new pension 
insurance model coincided with a global diffusion of neo-liberalism, which led to the 
formation of a partial DC model in China. It has been argued that China has 
undergone a systemic shift from socialist pension provision to social insurance 
pensions. The path departure development was seen explicitly in China's case in the 
initial decades of reform, which was also different from the path-dependent 
arguments observed in mature welfare states. The Western retrenchment has been a 
rewriting of the embedded social pact between state and society, while China's 
retrenchment was more a means of building new social pact in a market economy. 
Therefore, it seems like China has been through more radical shift from the starting 
point since late 1980s and through out 1990s and 2000s.  Not only the development 
trajectory is different with west counterparts, but also the reform process  and 
manner are different. For instance, from overviewing of policy profile and pension 
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programme, China case had been through radical reform in 1990s and witnessed less 
opposition compared with West counterparts.  However, if we bring the compliance 
and implementation process into observation as we propose in chapter 5, it is found 
that the path dependent effects and opposition exerts more impact in the implement 
process in China case.  The systemic path departure in the policy document did not 
realized in the real practice. The pension institution evolution in China is not that 
radical path departure as it appeared. The comparison with west case helps us to find 
that radical path shift through top policy change is mitigated by the path dependence 
effects. How to explain the different development trajectories (sequence of 
expansion and retrenchment); how to explain the different extent and dynamic of 
pension reform between China and West (difficulty of rewriting social pact and 
difficulty of implementing it); as well as how to explain the different response to the 
same international idea (privatization).  In order to answer these questions, we 
would turn to our explanatory variables to get more comparative analysis findings. 
The independent variables 
First, the roles of context and idea 
Pension reform stems from the projected changes in demographic ageing which 
require a policy response to maintain the long-term sustainability of a pension 
system (Pordes, 1994). Much pension reform has been driven by the budgetary crisis 
that is accelerated by population aging. In addition, low economic growth, 
de-industrialization and other external factors such as globalization and financial 
crises all contribute to an environment of general austerity leading to welfare state 
retrenchment (Pierson, 2002). Observing similar factors in China’s context, 
demographic aging is a serious issue in terms of size and speed. It took around 40 to 
50 years for the population aged 60 to increase from 5% to 10% in many western 
countries, while it took China only eighteen years to increase from 4.9% in 1982 to 
10% in 1999. The contributing factors were not only longevity but also the one-child 
policy in China. In addition, unlike the demographic aging which followed 
industrialization in the West, China has been characterised as “getting old before 
getting rich” (Zhu, 2002, p.2). The aging pressure is the crucial reasons for China's 
shift to a DC-funded mechanism as well as the justification for unpopular reform. 
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However, if we go back to the hypotheses formed before (Chapter 5) in which 
putting China into international comparative landscape (demographic projection and 
size of IPD), we hypothesized that China may not adopt radical reform straight away. 
And this PDC model adoption and confirmation in 1990s and 2000s witnessed in 
China confirm this hypothesises. Rather than locking in path dependent PAYG 
model nor the fully privatization like Latin America, China came to the comprise 
template with partially funded public pension reform, and the size of DC funded part 
(8% of payroll contribution with 24.5% target replacement rate) is relatively small 
compared to DB component (20% of payroll contribution with 35% target 
replacement rate). 
In contrast, the low economic growth and de-industrialisation which can be 
witnessed in the welfare state retrenchment literature are not factors contributing to 
the pension reform in China. The average growth of 8% of GDP and the rapid 
industrialisation and urbanisation in the liberal reform process gradually decreased 
the number of state-owned enterprises and opened the space for private capital to 
emerge and develop. The initial reform was the policy response to the economic 
reform and an adjustment measure to initiate the reform of the pension system for 
SOE workers. With the emergence of a private sector and urbanization, the reform 
efforts turned to expansion, catering for the private sector workers and the rural 
population. Therefore, the retrenchment in China was not a policy response to a time 
of austerity as it was in the Western counterparts, but the restructuring of the 
economic system and the dismantling of SOEs brought about the retrenchment in the 
end. In addition, just as economic growth and industrialisation have promoted 
welfare development in the West, these variables also contributed to China's pension 
reform which increased state subsidies and policy intervention since mid- 2000s. 
However, given the continuously GDP growth after the market economy throughout 
1990s and the absence of expansion in these decades, we will argue that the 
economic growth and industrialisation is the crucial determinants of welfare 
expanding, rather the leadership administration change and their idea shift as well as 
demands of social policy for the new risk in the post-transition time play more 
crucial role in shifting Chinese welfare reform direction.   
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The role of liberal ideas in social policy and welfare retrenchment are also seen in 
Western case literature. The implicit definition of ideas and the explanatory 
framework to explain the success or failure of retrenchment varies. However, the 
ideational approach as the source to explain policy change has been reaching 
consensus (Lieberman, 2002; Béland, 2005,2007,2009; Shi, 2006; Babich and 
Béland, 2009). Here, ideas are mostly treated as complementary variables within 
institutionalist studies. Welfare retrenchment is the result of the advancement of the 
liberal idea. In this, China shares a similarity with the Western case: the global 
diffusion of the liberal idea and the policy learning of political leaders in the 
post-Mao era initiated China's economic reform and the associated change to the 
social programme. In particular, the partially-funded DC model adopted in China 
was the consequence of compromise between privatization idea and domestic 
conditions. In the welfare extension stage, the debates and discussions about the zero 
pension pillar, or the social pension programme in China, was also the consequence 
of idea diffusion from the international organizations (UN, ISSA, WB). Compared 
with other developing countries, China's pension reform efforts were not primarily 
dependent on money from international organizations, but the power of ideas was 
nevertheless diffused in the Chinese context. Coming back to our hypothesis that 
China may not have reformed fundamentally given the less loan dependence on WB.  
But the analysis in the previous chapter (chapter 7) finds out that China has not 
carried out radical change through fully privatization, but the idea diffusion in 1990s 
did impact the final formation of partially fund model in China case.  In addition, 
the multi pillar model promoted by the WB, including supplementary pillar, social 
pension idea (from ILO) all contributed to the reform initiatives in 2000s. Therefore, 
China adopts the international idea diffusion as the policy learning process and 
combined certain advocated policy paradigm into the existing domestic design. The 
extent of dependence on the international organization and their ideas is modest 
compared with west democracy as well as capital dependent developing countries. 
The former more tends to use the international idea and template as the strategy to 
justify and legitimize the unpopular domestic reform and reduce the reform 
difficulties, while the later are highly connected with the capital conditions of IO and 
have less freedom in domestic adjustment. Rather than using the international idea to 
justify the domestic welfare cutback or fully accepting the privatization reform, 
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China’s reform experiences adopted the global trend from the idea diffusion, but also 
considered more the domestic background to recreate the scheme. 
Second, the possibilities of veto  
At the centre of the pension reform debate in the West, the pension systems with 
path dependence and veto points arguably constraining government ability to 
implement changes of the status quo (Pierson, 1994; Myles and Pierson, 2001; 
Immergut et al., 2007). The number of veto players and veto points combined 
constituted an important explanation of the differences in reform trajectories and 
options across countries. In the Western case literature, veto points and veto players 
are conceptualised on the basis of the extent of the involvement of social partners in 
the administration of a social insurance programme and the particular structure of 
constitutional constrains (i.e. a majoritarian system versus a proportional one, 
Lijphart, 1999). Furthermore, the number of political parties and their preferences 
and ideational distances determine the dynamics of the policy making process. In 
particular, the high involvement or embedment of social partners in the pension 
insurance programme constitutes the high possibility of veto and the greater 
difficulty to change the status quo.  Not least, changing a highly institutionalized 
retirement system proves difficult because the constituencies of a welfare state have 
an interest in maintaining the status quo (Pierson, 2001). Political institutions with 
numerous veto players and veto points provide opportunities for the related interest 
groups to influence the decision-making or impede legislative change. The political 
institutions in democracies allow the interest groups to represent their interest 
through political parties or mobilization, and to block any reform which might 
damage their own interests. In order to overcome the veto possibilities in pension 
reform, governments adopt different strategies including social consensus or 
consultation to make the reforms possible (Ebbinghaus, 2006).  
In contrast with the Western cases,  Chinese political system with its CCP 
authoritarian government suggests an absence of partisan and institutional veto 
players in the Chinese system. The SOE welfare system was actually administrated 
by the state with budget financing by the state as the last resort, which also indicates 
the absence of veto points for the social partners. However, it is possible to 
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conceptualize the possibilities of veto in China's case by looking for similar players 
or openings at other ‘points’ in the Chinese system. The bureaucratic actors holding 
different reform preferences and ideas within the top-level decision process 
determine the conflicts and competition in the policy deliberation process. The 
ideological distance and conflicts of interest between more liberal actors (such as the 
Ministry of Finance and the reform commission) as well as leftist idea holders (the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs, and the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security) 
ultimately confirm the compromise pension model of China's partial DC model. In 
addition, apart from the activities of these de facto veto players, the top political 
elites in the CCP had a significant impact on resolving the conflicts between these 
players and initiating a new round of reform. For instance, the idea changes of the 
CCP in different stages reflected in policy discourse determined the direction of 
pension development in their particular leadership term, whether retrenchment by 
state retreat or expansion by state re-intervention.  If we come back to our 
hypothesis about the veto players and veto points in China context, we find that the 
evidence confirmed with the hypothesis that China with fewer powerful veto player 
face less difficulties to change of the status quo. The top-level policy change and 
reform initiatives started from mid-1980s and continued to date. The policy 
amendment, revision, adjustments were always in the process, and the building and 
improving national pension system is still on the way. 
As to veto points, rather like the western counterparts with social partners playing 
veto roles in the decision-making or adopting demonstrations to press the 
government to make comprise options for administering pension programmes, 
China’s system usually lacks the involvement of similar social partners in 
decision-making, implementation and administration. However, there are 
nevertheless opportunities in the political institution and pension institution polices 
to block or redirect the reform direction. For instance, the decentralized system was 
shown to empower the local governments to administer the pension insurance system 
which led to local governments becoming directly involved in administration and 
fund control and thus having the power to delay or redirect particular reform 
initiatives. In addition, the policy practice of trial-and-error, central guidelines and 
the procedure for local innovation, as well as the ambiguity of policies, also 
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generated veto possibilities for the local actors by way of re-interpretation of the 
central policies. Therefore, the de facto veto points in the Chinese system challenged 
the achievement of the central policy objective. In this sense, our hypothesis about 
the less powerful veto points resulting fewer barriers is not true. Rather, the de facto 
veto points existing in the informal rule and practice posed a lot of implementation 
challenges, which is another dynamic reason why top level policy layering in early 
2000s was needed. The findings also provide certain implication, the 
institutionalisation of the local governments within the decision-making at the top 
level, and an explicit top policy design with a long-term view are seriously needed to 
address the current implementation challenges and future development. 
Third: welfare institution legacies and feedback effects  
In Western cases, welfare state retrenchment is seen as extremely unpopular and 
politically difficult to achieve. Cutbacks and any restructuring in the pension field 
are very difficult to carry out not only because of the double payment issue, which 
originates from the pension design, but also because of the enduring popular support 
for a mature and developed system (Pierson, 2000). The welfare expansion in the 
post-war period developed the welfare arrangements in the West, which generated 
profound social and economic underpinnings and made it politically difficult to alter. 
By contrast, China’s incomplete welfare system built at the beginning of the PRC is 
distinctive by its pro-urban and pro-state sector constituency features. The political 
movement and ideological education promoted by the communist party in the Mao 
era confirmed these features. The deprivation of the agricultural and rural population 
under the socialist industrialisation, and the preferential treatment for the working 
class and party members who were the backbone of socialist development were also 
justified before the reform. However, because of the low development level in terms 
of industrialisation and urbanisation, the size of welfare protection for the crucial 
socialist constituency was small compared with the western welfare states based on 
universal citizenship rights. But the maturity of the PAYG and the absence of funded 
scheme in China context still provide the difficulties of structural change, particular 
in the implement process.  Therefore, the retrenchment and state retreat from 
providing financial support at the very start of the social transition was more 
plausible compared with the west, even though the process still encountered social 
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discontent and incurred social issues.  One reason is that the size of pension 
institution is relatively small comparing with West case; another reason comes from 
the less powerful opposition of interest groups which will be analysed later. In 
addition, over viewing China’s case, another difference can be observed in the 
legacies of retrenchment in the privatisation process. The emerging private and local 
government interest as the legacies built up in the privatisation and decentralisation 
process in the 1980s had a significant impact on the extending pensions and 
centralizing reform efforts in the 2000s. The protection of private benefits and 
regional pension funds and benefit levels through non-compliant behaviour or local 
policy innovation highly impeded the top-down reform even though it was 
developed with good intentions and objectives.   
Fourth: the role of interest groups  
Labour unions and movements and the allied political parties affect social policy 
indirectly through their mobilization and electoral strength. Organized labour has 
played a crucial role in expanding welfare (Esping-Andersen, 1990a; Korpi, 2001). 
The strength of the unions and the electoral power of the left influence welfare state 
expansion (Huber and Stephens, 2001). In China, the CCP has the authoritarian 
power over general economic and social development. Unlike social partners such as 
unions, employer associations or pensioner associations which are involved in the 
management of pension programmes or have collective power to oppose reform, the 
Chinese unions were dependent on the Communist party and had to obey the strategy 
laid down by the party, so the organized labour movements or mobilizations were 
less influential than in western counterparts (Chan, 2000). Neither urban workers nor 
farmers have had any legal or formal channels to veto policies which damage their 
benefits. Therefore, the dismantlement of socialist welfare and the social insurance 
model which replaced it as efforts at retrenchment were implemented without serious 
opposition, although in some regions with a high incidence of social discontent, the 
compensation packages from central subsidies also played a role in maintaining both 
social stability and state legitimacy (Frazier, 2004c). Overall, the opposition from the 
generations who lost their entitlement or suffered most from the cutbacks was 
modest compared with the democracies, and the weak role of social partners in 
protecting their benefits was the crucial reason for this. In other words, the political 
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system constrained the social partners from performing their assumed role of 
defending the labour benefits. Therefore, the hypothesis that the absence of union 
involvement in pension reform provides fewer barriers to retrenchment reform is 
confirmed with the findings. However, the extension stages of pension reform in 
early 2000s witnessed more involvement of social partners and academic and 
intellectual groups. For instance, government think tanks are usually constituted by 
professors from universities, and academic publications on the strategies for social 
security development are funded and supported by the central government. In 
addition, the government has duly consulted with the social partners, including 
employers’ organizations and trade unions, in the process of drafting social insurance 
legislation, and the top-level legislature normally releases draft laws in order to seek 
suggestions and opinions before formally enacting them. Academic attention is being 
given to social inequality and unbalanced development, and the academic think-tank 
is playing a role in reversing the trend in economic efficiency and contributing to 
more social welfare reform efforts from the central government. Soliciting opinions 
from social partners on the one hand justifies the eventual enactment and on the 
other hand decreases the veto possibilities in the practical implementation. 
Another crucial interest group are  employers who were known to oppose the 
mandatory social insurance and welfare expansion. Employers and their association 
have offered the most forceful opposition to the introduction and expansion of public 
pension schemes, so policy makers have to take employers' interests into 
consideration when changing the policy (Mares, 2003; Swenson, 2002). The 
mandatory pension insurance forced the payment of contributions from wages and 
created the incentive for concern about competition. Alternatively, the national 
programme pooling the risk unevenly might favour the larger firms (Mares, 2003). 
China's case shares similarities with the west in this respect. The non-compliance of 
employers, particularly in the private sector, reflects their opposition to introducing 
and expanding the mandatory public pension programme. In addition, the national 
pension programme's initiatives for integrating the schemes for state sector and 
private sector enterprises; privileged SOEs and general SOEs also encountered 
opposition from different employers with different interests and perceptions. For 
instance, the privileged SOEs were reluctant to be integrated into the national 
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programme because of their concern about declining benefits, which confirmed with 
our previous hypothesis that the privileged sectors have more power to oppose 
reform. The private sector enterprises did not want to join the national risk sharing 
because they considered that it provides more advantages for the large state sector 
enterprises, which confirmed with our hypothesis that employers with their 
associated interest are highly possible to oppose the introducing and expanding the 
public pension scheme. 
9.2. 2 Comparison within China – urban vs. rural 
Development path 
If we look at the urban and rural sectors together, we find that the two sectors went 
through different development paths. Starting from the mid-1980s, the urban sector 
was in retrenchment reform with the state's gradual financial retreat from the SOE 
welfare programme, and further systemic change was completed in 1997 with the 
national regulation. The reform efforts in the first half of the 2000s focused on 
improving the partially-funded pension insurance scheme and this consolidated the 
retrenchment direction in more specific policy design. The quantitative data also 
confirm that this redirection produced a declining generosity level of public pensions. 
The increase in reform efforts toward expansion by addressing the coverage gap in 
institutional design reflects the expanding path with the generosity level beginning to 
rise. Overall, the development path underwent retrenchment first and then in the 
middle of 2005 shifted to more generous protection in policy design and outcomes. 
The overall development path in the rural sector started from welfare expansion 
compared with its previous status. The state-regulated pension programme was first 
introduced for rural residents in the mid-1980s and rapidly expanded in the 1990s. 
Even though the generosity level was limited given the voluntary nature of the 
scheme and the absence of state financial support, this institution protection was still 
expanding in 1998. From 1998 to the early 2000s, the old rural scheme was being 
dismantled with declining participation and development stagnation at the local level. 
The new scheme replaced the old one in 2003 with various local pilot projects, and 
most of these put more public financial resources into the scheme.  The mandating 
of the new rural pension scheme in 2009 confirmed the more generous protection for 
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rural citizens. Overall, the development trajectory started with expansion through 
institutional protection in the middle 1980s, underwent retrenchment from the late 
1990s to the early 2000s, and converged with the urban sector in the expansion 
period in the middle 2000s. The different trajectories of these two sectors can be 
explained by the variables, including interest groups and pension institutions 
(starting point and legacies).  
 Explanatory variables compared 
First, the political veto possibilities impact the difficulty of reform. Although the 
programmes in the two sectors were initiated and implemented under the same 
political system, the political veto power affected their development paths differently, 
particularly in the implementation. For instance, local governments in both sectors 
had discretionary powers in the implementation process, and the decentralized 
system empowered the local governments to follow or redirect the central policy 
according to local conditions. The difficulty of retrenchment in the urban sectors 
came from the veto power of the local governments in terms of advancing the 
pooling level and funding costs. While in rural sector, the first expansion be 
explained by the attractiveness of welfare expansion, and the mis-management in 
local blindly promoted the voluntary program and deteriorate the fiscal prospect and 
finally resulted in the stop of old scheme. in addition, the retrenchment in rural sector 
in the late 1990s was not hard as in the urban sector. It can be explained by the 
pension design: the old rural pension schemes did not involve local fiscal 
responsibilities, which reduced the conflicts between central and local governments. 
The voluntary individual savings scheme with limited government involvement 
made it easier to follow the central reform in the implementation process.  The less 
opposition from farmers also contributed to this, which will be analysed later. 
Second, how context and idea impact the reform in both sectors. The reforms of the 
two sectors were carried out in the context of social transition. The shift from 
socialist economy to market economy rendered the reforms different at the outset. 
The urban reform started with state welfare cutbacks and gradual retrenchment with 
the decline of the SOE economy and the emergence of a private economy. The rapid 
urbanization and declining family support initiated the institutional pension 
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protection for the rural sector.  However, both sectors entered an expansion stage in 
the mid-2000s, with the political will emphasizing more sustainable, scientific 
development. In this sense, the move towards national pension development can be 
seen to have started from then. As for the influence of idea, the formation of the 
urban insurance programme was more affected by the diffusion of the international 
idea (such as the WB), while the old rural scheme was more influenced by the 
domestic bureaucratic actors. However, the new rural pension schemes and the 
expansion in the urban sectors in recent years have both been affected by the pension 
re-framing and discussion among international organizations (WB and ILO). 
Third, the starting point of pension institution and associated vested interest groups 
determines the different reform paths in. The reform of the urban scheme started in 
the 1980s and underwent continuous reform in the following decades. In contrast, 
the rural pension scheme underwent a unstable process, initially developed in the 
mid-1980s, halted in the mid-1990s, resumed in the 2000s and finally confirmed in 
2009, and this fluctuating process was quite different from the continuous 
development path of the urban system. This difference can be explained as the effect 
of policy feedback and the associated vested interest groups' sizes and capacities. As 
Pierson (Pierson, 2000) has argued, historically enacted policies will generate 
considerable lock-in effects and foster the interest group constituencies to maintain 
the status quo and form the path-dependent logic. When the elected officials seek to 
dismantle, replace or reform such policies, they are likely to face not only the costs 
of path departure, but also resistance from interest groups and bureaucratic 
constituencies. Following this logic, on average, less-entrenched policies are easier 
to alter or more vulnerable to radical change than older, more established policies 
which have created profound social and economic underdogs (Pierson, 1994). In the 
Chinese case, the urban-rural dualism is a basic feature of China's society, and the 
pro-urban development strategies and urban-biased welfare provision was formed at 
the start of the PRC. The socialist welfare system was SOE welfare in essence, with 
the state financing the urban workers and their families in the state sector. Rural 
welfare was a residual system targeting the most vulnerable groups, and family and 
kin communities provided the old-age support in the socialist era until 1986 when 
the old rural pension scheme was piloted at local levels. Therefore, the urban 
 264 
 
population suffered from the state's financial retreat and welfare commitment 
cutback or loss in the social transition, which generated discontent among the vested 
interest groups who were in the SOE welfare protection scheme. The organized 
labour in the areas with high densities of SOEs received compensation out of central 
financial subsidies as a result of their demonstrations (as happened in the 
North-eastern provinces). The less-organized labour in the regions with a lower 
density of SOEs generally shouldered the transition costs on their own. Massive 
numbers of laid-off workers had to find employment opportunities in the labour 
market, with or without pension insurance records. These groups gradually became 
marginalized groups in unemployment or self-employment and have usually been 
excluded from the urban pension insurance system, which was also the reason for 
extending the coverage and adding the urban residents' scheme after the mid-2000s. 
The rural counterparts faced another scenario, and the establishment of a rural 
pension scheme for the first time in 1986 was the first initiative to provide an 
institutional pension programme for the rural population, even though the scheme 
was not mandatory. For the general public, it was welcomed and developed by the 
local authorities' campaigns and mobilization. The introduction of the new scheme 
for the rural population did not encounter any opposition from farmers or local 
authorities. However, the mis-management and development of the old scheme 
implied a budgetary crisis, and it was halted in 1998 and replaced by the new rural 
pension scheme finally in 2009. This halting and replacement occurred with fewer 
obstacles mainly because of the lower vested interest it created and the lower 
organizational capacities of farmers compared with their urban counterparts. The 
voluntary participation and low-level benefits together with the short-term 
development (1992-1998) determined the reduction in the difficulties when make the 
radical change in the rural sector. The rural population‘s awareness of their rights to 
public pension had not been formed because of the urban-biased legacies. In addition, 
the new rural pension scheme, with more support from public spending and 
increased incentives, was more acceptable or at least welcome for the famers. All 
these factors contributed to the relatively easy institutional replacement in the rural 
sector. However, the policy feedback effects also existed and the hesitant attitude 
towards the new pension scheme indicates the concern of rural dwellers about the 
stability of the public policy and the possible risks in the future.  
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In addition, not only did the starting points of the pension institutions and the 
associated interest groups affect the development trajectory and extent of change in 
both sectors, but also the policy feedback in the transition process (privatisation, 
urbanisation) also shaped the perception and demands of citizens in different ways. 
In the post-transition stage, the urbanization and declining family support in rural 
areas, as well as the stagnation of the old scheme, required comprehensive 
institutional pension provision for the rural elderly, and the demand for public 
pension provision was urgent. This is why the politicians re-emphasised the new 
rural pension institution. While for the urban counterparts, the post-transition 
featured the emergence of privatized interests and private sector employers who 
evaded the high cost of the public pension scheme and preferred the private pension 
alternatives. The opposition from private employer groups and their evasion 
behaviour were challenges to implementation after 1997. Therefore, the transition 
legacies also shaped the perception and demands of the citizens in different ways. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 266 
 
Chapter 10: Conclusion 
10.1 Implications  
10.1.1 Practical:  recent global trends towards a new paradigm of privatization  
In this section, we shall draw on the recent global pension reform trends and 
experiences to provide some policy lessons for China. The changes in objectives, 
reform needs and environment has pushed a new round of pension reforms across the 
globe in recent years. First, the reforms focus on basic income protection for the 
elderly, providing protection for the vulnerable elderly across countries. The reasons 
for developing this approach can be concluded as follows. When the coverage 
expansion in systemic reform is not realized as expected, an alternative approach 
should be adopted to force the coverage. The increase in the contributions/benefits 
link limited the redistribution to low-income groups within the system. The 
International Labour Organization also shifted from the multi-pillar, funded efforts 
to a 'social floor' campaign which emphasized access to essential health care and 
income protection for the elderly (ILO, 2011). Second, recent reforms have also 
addressed the challenge of projected demographic aging across the world. The 
measures include increasing contribution rates, decreasing benefits levels, setting a 
later retirement age and so on. A recent development is that politicians and policy 
makers are now aware that the future generation should not bear all the pains (more 
contributions, fewer benefits), so working longer or retiring later is the most natural 
way to achieve this. Mandating later retirement is not enough, introducing incentive 
policies to encourage people to want to work longer and retire later are more 
important (European Commission, 2012). Third, the post-crisis challenge also poses 
a new drive for pension reform. In particular, the fall in GDP and in pension assets 
caused by the crisis needs greater efforts to be undertaken to address population 
aging and public budgets in order to prevent the further meltdown of the pension 
system (Clements et al., 2013). The financial crisis has also rendered the 
newly-introduced funded pillar more difficult to sustain. Finally, the financial crisis 
has further increased uncertainty about pension funds. The expected high returns of 
the funded system in the 1990s were dampened by the early 2000s and the 
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fluctuation in asset prices further challenged confidence in the returns on funded 
assets.  
Accordingly, public pension reform over recent decades across the world has 
included introducing or strengthening the basic protection for the vulnerable elderly, 
the move towards funded schemes, and encouraging government efforts to expand 
coverage. The development of a pre-funded scheme might suffer in a financial crisis 
and the concern over deteriorating fund assets generates more reconsideration of this 
approach.  However, such reviews are unlikely to stop this scheme, and the 
providers have to work hard to deliver what they promised in the unfavourable 
capital situation (Holzmann, 2013). In particular, first, the zero pillar as the mean of 
poverty reduction has become the focus of reform over the past two decades. The 
modes of universal, means-tested or cash transfer provision have been the 
instruments in low- and middle-income countries over the last decade (Grosh, 2008). 
The key questions about the development of this pillar are fiscal affordability, 
disincentive effects and the administrative issues of universal benefits. The first 
pillar, a mandatory, unfunded DB public pillar, has undergone reform to various 
degrees, mostly aimed at fiscal sustainability by reducing generosity, increasing 
retirement age and so on. The recent reform discussion topic on this pillar is the 
adoption of the NDC which operates as a DC scheme in accumulation and annuity 
payments, but remains unfunded. This approach is under discussion in many EU 
countries as well as China.  Finally, the policy makers are more interested in 
providing coverage for the employed in the informal sector in low- and 
middle-income countries. In order to motivate participation, matching contribution 
subsidies has been adopted (Palacios and Robalino, 2009). The issues in this scheme 
include high administrative costs, lack of good annuity products, and the role and 
scope of the regulation. The final reform trend in public pension provision is to 
centralize public pre-funding, creating public pension reserve funds to support the 
unfunded pillar and offering a cushion against future crisis.  
New paradigm of pension privatization  
After reviewing the reform trends after the financial crisis, Orenstein found that the 
privatization trend after the 1980s had been scaled back by the international 
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organizations (WB and ILO) as well as model countries (Chile) for economic, 
ideational and institutional reasons (Orenstein, 2011). In particular, privatization 
might reduce the long-term fiscal burden but it increases government debt in the 
short and medium term because of the double payment issues occurring in the 
transition period. Therefore, governments with high transition cost may put off 
privatization reform (Brooks, 2005). The global financial crisis affected balance 
sheets further and is expected to produce a slowdown of privatization. In addition, 
the crisis also shifted the perception of the privatization approach and caused people 
to doubt the ability of free market capitalism to provide welfare. Rather than 
providing high productivity and efficiency, more problems and dis-functionality in 
free market capitalism are predicted (Birdsall and Fukuyama, 2011). In addition, the 
ideational shift has also changed debates about privatization among the very 
international institutions that used to advocate it. For instance, the World Bank 
shifted from a focus on free market liberal policies and began to focus on 
inclusiveness and sustainability in an environmental and social sense. The IMF also 
agreed to reduce the use of neoliberal policy conditionality and focused on fiscal and 
monetary management. The IMF responded to fiscal crises in several countries by 
not advising further privatization, but instead advised a scaling-back of it in 
countries such as Hungary and Latvia, which was different from the their previous 
advice (Orenstein, 2013).  
However, Orenstein (2013) argues that privatization has not come to an end but is 
evolving new paradigms and new features by reviewing the reform experiences 
across countries. Two trends can be seen in the empirical world. First, the scaling 
back of commitment to individual accounts rather than eliminating them. Second, the 
economic problems expected to be solved by privatization have become more 
serious because of the crisis (Orenstein, 2013, p.9). As for how to cope with the 
privatization trend in the new context, he argues that there is no death of 
privatization, but a rebirth instead. As the European Commission’s green paper 
suggests, pension privatisation must move towards adequate, sustainable and safe 
systems.  Two recent trends following this direction are renewed interest in the 
design and implementation of a minimum pension (Bonnet et al., 2010; ILO, 2008), 
and automatic enrolment in pension savings scheme rather than mandatory 
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participation. These two trends demonstrate a future direction which deals with the 
distributive consequence of privatization and new forms of individual choice. In 
detail, increasing interest in a minimum pension is being promoted by the ILO 
(Holzmann et al., 2009,p.11), and even though ILO had little impact on pension 
reform compared with the WB from 1994 to 2006, it has achieved greater success in 
the design and implementation of social pensions (McCord, 2010), which converged 
with the policy priority of the WB after the crisis. However, the emphasis on 
minimum pension protection does not exclude the development of privatization, and 
the reframing of reform only addresses the consequences of privatization and ensures 
a transition with more protection for the poor (Orenstein, 2011). The second trend 
mostly witnessed in English-speaking countries was the 'nudge' measure during the 
crisis, which encouraged workers to contribute to individual savings account by 
automatic enrolment when taking a new job or changing employers, as well as 
allowing them to opt out if they prefer. In addition, providing incentives for working 
longer and retiring later are another approach to regulating workers' behaviour and 
reducing the fiscal burdens of a pension system rather than only mandating an 
increase in retirement age. For instance, the national employment savings trust 
(NEST) introduced in the UK features automatic enrolment and mandatory employer 
and employee contributions, as well as tax incentives for the savers (Williams, 2010). 
The nudge pension plans allow the government to encourage pension saving while 
not being so heavy-handed. Third, the increasing interest in notional defined 
contributions (NDC). The recent development trend in the transitional debate is an 
increasing interest in NDC pensions (Brooks, 2005). This was advocated because it 
generates the same benefits without a large transition cost and high management fees. 
NDCs are administrated in the form of PAYG based on individual accounts and is 
used for the contribution and investment return records. The benefits are paid on the 
basis of contributions in the personal accounts. In this way, the individual account is 
a transparent accounting mechanism to encourage saving and working through the 
link between benefits and earnings. NDCs are conceptually similar to a DC pension 
because the benefits are adjusted to the capital market risk, but they are also similar 
to a DB pension because they are not fully-funded and function financially in the 
form of PAYG in which benefits are determined by formulas as well as the market 
return rate.  
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In summary, the financial crisis had a strong impact on policy makers to reframe 
pension privatization worldwide. Rather than dismiss the funded pension reform 
trend, the new approach has added a move towards minimum pension protection and 
nudge-type automatic pension saving, as well NDCs and quasi-mandatory 
occupational pension development. The reform objectives have shifted from free 
market dependence to controlling costs by raising the retirement age, providing 
better cover for the poor, and nudging people to save (Orenstein, 2011).  
Practical implication for China 
1. Social pension?  
Although the institutional design has made steps towards universal coverage for the 
elderly, innovations such as the national rural resident scheme and the urban resident 
scheme, and the senior citizen's allowance, are all aimed at building institutional 
coverage for the elderly nationwide. Some elderly people may not be entitled to 
pension benefits under this programme. The empirical evidence shows that the 
poorest often have the least capacity to save for their retirement and cannot meet the 
criteria for the basic benefit in RPS and URPS. The sub-national governments with 
weak fiscal capacity may not have sufficient matching resources to motivate the 
participation of rural residents and informal sector workers, which would leave some 
of elderly population uncovered. In addition, the senior citizen's allowance pilot 
scheme sets the entitlement age at 80, which only covers a small fraction of the 
retired population (aged 60 and above) and the limited benefits could not address the 
elderly poverty issue.  Analysis of elderly poverty and vulnerability in China and 
the global advocacy of social pensions in recent years provide a solid rationale for 
minimum pension protection development in China. In addition, the critical features 
of a social pension should be a non-contributory basis and funding from general 
revenues, particularly with the minimum benefits protection from central 
government. This feature on the one hand would include the vulnerable elderly in the 
protection, but on the other hand the local fiscal capacities would not affect the 
delivery of minimum protection for the elderly.  
2. 'Nudge' measures - an incentive for working longer? 
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Increasing the legal retirement age is one approach to addressing the demographic 
aging and pension sustainability issues over the world. The recent trend occurring in 
developed countries is moving towards more incentives for working longer rather 
than just legitimizing later retirement.  In China, discussions about raising the 
retirement age have been prevalent in recent years. Shanghai has experimented with 
a flexible system of retirement and has allowed senior managers and skilled workers 
to work longer (Dorfman et al., 2012a). There is concern about increasing the 
retirement age, however, on the one hand because of the pension fiscal crisis, and on 
the other hand, in China's case the retirement age is relatively low (60 for men and 
55 for women) compared with other countries (Pallares-Miralles et al., 2012). The 
recent nudge trend might encourage Chinese policy makers to generate incentives for 
older workers to stay in employment and to reduce the barriers to them prolonging 
their employment. Allowing such personal choices about retirement or longer 
employment through policy design could reduce the barriers and opposition to 
reform, for instance, a tax incentive measure for continued employment, and 
considering changing the existing incentives for early retirement and disincentives 
for delaying retirement. In addition, in order to promote longer employment, the 
policy environment should enable the elderly to work in a different form (part-time, 
self-employed and so on), as well as generating an enabling labour market 
environment to increase the demand for elderly workers, reducing discrimination 
against older workers and so on. 
3. NDC scheme?  
NDC schemes have been adopted by several countries (Italy, Latvia, Poland and 
Sweden) and Norway and Egypt joined this trend in 2011 and 2010 respectively 
(Holzmann, 2013). As the mechanism strengthening the link between contributions 
and benefits, it has the advantages of dealing with the current transition cost problem 
as well the future fiscal sustainability, because the system operates on a PAYG basis, 
and no more funds are injected to cover the transition cost. So the benefits are 
calculated on the individual notional account balance and remaining life expectancy, 
which helps to achieve financial sustainability. What can China learn from these 
policy experiences apart from the general advantages, particularly for solving the 
challenges? A shift from a partially-funded public pension to the NDC scheme might 
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solve the current problem. The financing of transition costs (from PAYG to funded) 
or the so-called 'empty individual accounts', the portability of pension rights, and the 
integration of a national pension scheme across sectors, professions and regions 
could be solved to a certain degree by shifting the funded individual accounts to 
NDC accounts. Dorfman (2012a) pointed out that NDCs could accommodate 
regional heterogeneity and support portability. The NDC framework provides full 
portability of accrued rights (the value of the national account balance) across 
different regions. Workers moving across regions could gain the accrued pension 
rights by combining the notional account balances in different locations during their 
whole working life. In addition, NDCs could facilitate the future pension integration 
between urban and rural areas. The contributions and accumulations in the different 
schemes (RPS, URPS) could be aggregated as the notional account, and the accrued 
pension rights could be portable across different schemes and different locations.   
10.1.2 Theoretical: what does welfare regime discussion offer China? 
Discussions about China's welfare regime can be divided into two groups. One seeks 
to classify the Chinese welfare state based on the specific features of welfare 
protection. The other attempts to capture the welfare protection features at one point 
in time, with the regime framework implicit or explicit. This current research study 
goes beyond the discussion about whether the Chinese welfare state is forming or not, 
or in which group China should be located. Rather, this study treats the Chinese 
welfare system as equal with other mature welfare states and traces the pension 
protection development path over the past three decades, with the aim of offering the 
specific implication of generalizing the Chinese welfare regime change trajectory 
and determinants. A pension system is the crucial part of a welfare programme and 
takes up a large proportion of public spending, and extensive reform efforts in China 
have been devoted to this field over time. The development template and principle of 
this programme provide some clues about the direction and dynamics of a holistic 
welfare programme. First, China's pension programme underwent systemic 
retrenchment in the 1990s and moved towards a more generous direction in the 
middle of the 2000s, and there is the prospect of future expansion in the 
government's plan. This development path in China's pension programme provides a 
template to re-examine other welfare programmes and then generalize the trajectory 
 273 
 
of welfare regimes as a whole. Second, from the pension reform experiences, it has 
been found that the making and reforming of the Chinese welfare system have been 
influenced by the diffusion of international organizational ideas and their advocated 
model. Even if China may not be dependent on the capital conditionality of IOs, the 
policy paradigms they promote were diffused in the policy design to certain degree. 
Third, the political system and strong central executive make welfare reform (either 
cutting back or expansion) not as difficult as in the developed democracies in the 
decision-making process, while non-compliance or over-compliance at the local 
level redirects the implementation of the policy. The veto possibilities in the political 
system challenge further welfare development, particularly when the local 
governments bear the fiscal burden but have limited fiscal capacities. Fourth, the 
starting point of the target welfare institution and the policy feedback in the reform 
process also impose veto possibilities to block change. The urban-rural divide in 
welfare design and the segregated schemes for different population groups based on 
profession and employment status as the current features of the welfare system 
represent intensive efforts to improve welfare coverage; however, they also imply 
future difficulties for building a national welfare system which is the emphasized 
objective in the future development design. Fifth, the interest groups, particularly the 
private interests emerging in the transition context as a reverse force of expansion, 
will challenge further welfare extension. Finally, the organized labour welfare 
constituency in China's case does not play as great a role as in the counterpart mature 
systems. Based on the findings from pension reform experiences, it is argued that the 
Chinese welfare system entered a period of expansion led by politicians in the 
mid-2000s. However, the fragmented and decentralized design and administration of 
the welfare system mitigated the central initiatives. Also the accumulated private 
interests in the market economy interplaying with the public welfare provision 
alleviated the state's welfare intervention. The relative weakness of organized labour 
and the welfare constituency made the change easier, even in the retrenchment 
reform. Unlike the way the labour lobby and the leftist parties have promoted 
welfare development in mature welfare states, their roles in China's expansion 
context are very limited. How far the state-initiated welfare expansion can go and the 
extent to which it can benefit China's citizens are the questions to be answered in the 
future.   
 274 
 
10.1.3 Methodological: what does the historical institutional analysis offer? 
This study draws on the historical institutionalist approach to study a single country 
case with the intention of bringing China into comparative welfare studies and 
improving the understanding of the development of the pension element of the 
Chinese welfare system. First, it has connected the historical institutionalist approach 
with welfare policies. A comparative welfare study grouped in the institutionalist 
tradition is not novel in western cases. Arguments about welfare state resilience and 
welfare path dependency are prevalent in the literature, while the adoption of 
historical institutionalism to study welfare policy in China's case is not so prevalent. 
Indeed, historical institutionalism as used in Chinese political science studies more 
often concerns political change and political reform (Yang and Li, 2013). This 
research study has incorporated a historical institutionalist approach to examine 
China's case, which is usually considered as exceptionalist and myth within the 
mainstream welfare discussion. Not only the differences in development level 
between China and mature and developing welfare regimes, but also the political 
system itself render China distinctive and make equivalent comparisons difficult. 
The use of historical institutionalism could overcome this exceptional issue of 
China's case, and this grounded theory built the case study design, observation and 
analysis units.  Second, this study generated an explanatory framework based on 
global pension reform experiences. This framework structure was generated from 
historical institutionalism and institution change, and the variables in the framework, 
or the specific objects of investigation in terms of the operationalization and 
measurement of each variable used for the case study were generated from the 
pension reform literature (mostly on mature welfare regimes and some prominent 
reform experiences, such as Latin America and socialist transitional countries). The 
causal propositions between independent variables and dependent variables which 
emerged from the literature provided the foundation to create causal hypotheses for 
China's case. Overall, the whole design was used to study a single country - China - 
in this study, and it could be adapted for qualitative small case studies in the future. 
The examination of the dependent variables and the various extents of impacts from 
independent variables among several countries could present a comparative and 
complete picture of each case. Finally, in an orthodox historical institutionalist 
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account, change is usually tied to a punctuated equilibrium in which change is 
sudden and radical and breaks the previous equilibrium. More recent works have 
challenged this picture: Kathleen Thelen, James Mahoney, Wolfgang Streeck and 
Sven Steinmo have turned to institutional dynamism or institutional incrementalism. 
They argue that as the context shifts, targeted institutions begin to create more space 
or openings to adopt the new environment and the actors also play a role of change 
in the shifting context. Different forms and patterns of gradual institutional change, 
for instance layering, drift and conversion, were proposed to capture the empirical 
reality. This study has stepped away from the traditional historical institutionalist 
approach and has used the case of China as evidence to explain the pension policy 
change pattern over the recent decades. Given the short history of the application of 
institutional incrementalism (Van Der Heijden, 2010), this study has made efforts to 
contribute to this field too.   
10.2 Limitations  
First, from the dependent variable perspective, this study tends to focus on the 
political and policy analysis of pension reform. Even though it also considers the 
macro social and economic context, it is still weak on observing the meso level 
institutional network associated with the pension institution, such as industrial 
relations, production and employment regimes, financial systems and other social 
institutions. These meso level institutional complementary and interacting effects are 
definitely another set of resources and drivers of pension institution change and 
continuity.  
Second, from the dependent variable perspective, this study mainly overviews the 
public pension reform process and outcomes. With the introduction of a multi-pillar 
pensions system in the mid-2000s, the study of the architecture of pension 
institutions within the whole pension arrangement and the interplay of private and 
public pillars might also inspire pension reform literature. The different types of 
pension plans, eligibility and benefits levels, and incentive measures would shape the 
preferences of the policy actors and interest groups and consequently affect the 
reform design and outcomes. The shortage of examination of the relationship 
between public and market provision, as well as the interaction with family-based 
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support in China, can clearly not produce overall performance outcomes. It is 
necessary to examine the achievement of pension arrangement objectives: poverty 
relief, consumption smoothing and insurance (Barr, 2002). In addition, this study 
conducts a qualitative assessment of pension system change and dynamic over time. 
The change pattern could be revealed from the empirical evidence. As for the extent 
of change, this qualitative study could not address it very well. A method which 
could scale or quantify the qualitative evidence would offer a possibility of revealing 
the extent of reform over time, or over leadership generations in China's case: it 
could demonstrate the scope of welfare change and its impact on social change in 
China. 
10.3 Future work  
Accordingly, future work could be built on the limitations discussed above. First, 
from the independent variable perspective, a fruitful direction of a future research 
plan might be to incorporate meso-level institutional complementary studies, 
bringing more political, economic and social variables into consideration, such as the 
labour market institution. This might yield insights into the relations between the 
special features of Chinese capitalism and the welfare institution, which might also 
inspire the defining of the Chinese welfare regime. In addition, the welfare 
constituencies and their attitudes, perceptions and opinions regarding the welfare 
system also affect the interaction between state and society as well as welfare 
consequences. This is another aspect which could be explored further in the future.  
Second, from the dependent variable perspective, more consideration deserves to be 
given to pension privatization in the multi-pillar pension framework. The interplay 
between public and private pensions could reveal complete picture of the 
consequences of state-led welfare expansion. The quantitative indicators (as opposed 
to other methods such as qualitative comparative analysis and the fuzzy set method) 
could be adopted to suggest the extent of change in a more specific, numerical way. 
This would not only help to clarify the extent of reform over time or across 
governments within one country, but could also be useful when bringing more cases 
into comparative observation. Furthermore, the analysis framework, 
operationalization and measurements used in this study could be expanded to more 
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cases studies. A broader, implicit comparative pension study is feasible in further 
research.  
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List of abbreviations 
Miscellaneous:  
ACFTU 
ADB 
ALMP 
APEX 
CCP 
CPC 
CPF 
DB 
DC 
EA 
ESRC 
FSITA 
HI 
ILO 
IO 
IPD 
MOCA 
MOF 
MOHRSS 
MOLSS 
NDC 
NPC 
NPM 
NSSF 
PAYG 
PDC 
PROST 
RPS 
SC 
SOE 
URPS 
UN 
WB 
All-China Federation of Trade Union 
Asian Development Bank 
Active Labour Market Policy 
Analysis of Pension Entitlement Across Countries 
Chinese Communist Party 
Communist Party Committee 
China Pension Fund 
Defined Benefit 
Defined Contribution 
Enterprise Annuity 
The Economic and Social Research Council 
Fuzzy-Set Ideal Type Analysis 
Historical Institutionalism 
International Labour Organisation 
International Organisation 
Implicit Pension Debt 
The Ministry of Civil Affairs 
The Ministry of Finance 
The Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security 
The Ministry of Labour and Social Security 
Notional Defined Contribution 
National People’s Congress 
New Public Management 
The National Social Security Fund 
Pay As You Go 
Partial Defined Contribution 
Pension Reform Option Simulation Toolkit 
Rural Pension Scheme 
State Council  
State-Owned Enterprise 
Urban Resident Pension Scheme 
United Nation 
World Bank 
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